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Abstract
Part I of this Note describes West Germany’s post-war Gastarbeiter [guest worker] program
from 1961 to 1972. Part II focuses on the long-term results of the Gastarbeiter program, with spe-
cial emphasis on the legal status of Turkish Gastarbeiter in Germany. This assessment concludes
that guest worker programs inevitably result in the permanent settlement of foreigners in the host
country. If not properly anticipated and planned for, this settlement leads to social stratification
and political divisiveness. Part II also presents for comparison U.S. immigration policies and their
effect on Mexican immigrant workers. The section asserts that the United States over the past two
decades has implemented a de facto guest worker policy, which led to many of the same adverse
consequences wrought by Germany’s Gastarbeiter program, including the permanent settlement
and subsequent marginalization of undocumented immigrants from Mexico. Part III concludes
that temporary worker programs, formal or de facto, have irreversible and adverse sociopolitical
consequences for their participants and the countries that adopt these policies. Accordingly, this
Note cautions against the adoption of a formal temporary worker program in the United States and
argues that the permanent legalization of undocumented immigrants is the most judicious means
of reversing recent trends.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2001, U.S.-Mexican talks on immigration
reform reached a pinnacle.1 In an address to a joint session of
Congress in September 2001, Mexican President Vicente Fox
pressed for the legalization of undocumented Mexican workers
in the United States2 and bilateral talks between the Mexican
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1. See Barbara Hines, So Near Yet So Far Away: The Effect of September 11 th on Mexican
Immigrants in the United States, 8 TEX. Hisp. J. L. & POL'Y 39, 44 (2002) (noting that
immigrant community felt renewed optimism regarding immigration reform in August
2001); see also Keep Politics Out Of Immigration Policy, Bus. WK., Sept. 10, 2001, at 146
[hereinafter Keep Politics Out] (noting that September 2001 meeting between U.S. Presi-
dent George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox promised to open dialogue
that could lead to reform of American immigration policy); Lynn Brezosky, Response To
Terror: Amnesty Hopes Dashed By September 11, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, at A10 (noting
that illegal Mexican immigrants had high hopes of receiving amnesty from U.S. govern-
ment in summer of 2001); Amy Borrus and Geri Smith, Spotlight on The Border, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 10, 2001, at 40-43 (reporting that current White House Administration had been
laying groundwork for immigration reform prior to Mexican President Vicente Fox's
September 2001 visit to United States).
2. See Hines, supra note 1, at 42 (noting that President Fox urged Congress to
legalize Mexican workers in United States in September 2001); see also Ginger Thomp-
son, Fox Urges Congress to Grant Rights to Mexican Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at
A6 (reporting on President Fox's request that Congress grant legal rights to undocu-
mented Mexican workers); Cindy Rodriguez, Immigrant "Normalization" Covers Many
Needs, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2001, at A2 (reporting that Mexican President Vicente
Fox pressed U.S. President George W. Bush and Congress to resolve immigration issue
by end of year); Bob Kemper & Frank James, Fox Presses Congress On Immigration: Time to
Put Aside Distrust He Says, Cmn. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2001, at 1 (reporting that President Fox
sought overhaul of U.S. immigration laws in his speech before Congress); Mike Allen,
Fox, Bush Urge Route to Legalization For Immigrants, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2001, at A16
(reporting that Mexican President Vicente Fox appealed to joint session of U.S. Con-
gress to support President Bush's call for broad changes in immigration law); Karen
Masterson, Looking For New Game: Trust, Equity Top Fox Goals, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 7,
2001, at 1 (reporting that Fox asked Congress to give dignity of legal status to illegal
Mexican immigrants living and working in United States); Julia Malone, Business, Un-
ions Unite For Sake Of Illegal Workers, ATL. J.-CoNST., Sept. 8, 2001, at A6 (reporting that
President Vicente Fox of Mexico asked Congress to legalize millions of illegal immi-
grants).
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leader and his U.S. counterpart yielded promising results. 3 U.S.
President George W. Bush had agreed to a new immigration
framework that would grant legal status to some Mexican work-
ers in the United States, possibly through a temporary worker
program.4 Immigration advocates, labor activists, and business
leaders had high hopes that long-sought immigration reform
might soon be at hand.5
The catastrophic events of September 11, coupled with a
weakening U.S. economy, dulled these once high hopes,6 put-
ting immigration reform proposals on the legislative backburner
in favor of security bills, such as the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
3. See Hines, supra note 1, at 42 (noting that bilateral talks between Presidents
Bush and Fox had resulted in renewed commitment to immigration reform); see also
Keep Politics Out, supra note 1, at 146 (noting that September 2001 Bush-Fox meeting
led to renewed hopes that two countries could reach agreement on new U.S. immigra-
tion policy); Patty Reinert, Bush, Fox Vow to Better Treatment of Illegal Immigrants, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 7, 2001, at 6 (reporting that President Bush and Mexican President Vi-
cente Fox pledged to improve treatment of Mexicans working in United States while
creating jobs south of border); Senate OKs Plan for Undocumented, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2001, at A22 (reporting that Senate voted to renew program allowing certain undocu-
mented immigrants to apply for legal status as gesture of goodwill during Mexican Pres-
ident Fox's visit to United States).
4. See Fact Sheet on Migration, White House Press Release, Sept. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ (stating that United States was
considering temporary worker program with Mexico); see also Hines, supra note 1, at 42
(noting that U.S. President George W. Bush had proposed a temporary guest worker
program that would allow some workers to obtain permanent residence over period of
time); Keep Politics Out, supra note 1, at 146 (reporting that U.S. and Mexican Presidents
Bush and Fox started discussions that could lead to comprehensive immigration agree-
ment, including guest worker program); Reinert, supra note 3, at 6 (reporting on Presi-
dent Bush's support for guest worker program that would link U.S. employers with
Mexican workers).
5. See Hines, supra note 1, at 44 (noting that immigration advocates, labor leaders,
and business leaders felt that immigration reform was imminent); see also Brezosky,
supra note 1, at A1O (reporting on optimism surrounding prospects for immigration
reform prior to September 11 attacks); Malone, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing alliance
between labor and business leaders on issue of immigration reform); Keep Politics Out,
supra note 1, at 146 (noting that U.S. attitude toward immigration was undergoing ma-
jor change).
6. See Hines supra note 1, at 44-45 (noting that tragedy of September 11 changed
U.S. priorities and prompted calls for stricter immigration laws); September 11, One Year
Later, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1345, 1346 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter One YearLater]
(stating that September 11 attacks permanently altered immigration debate); Events of
Sept. 11 Spur Revised Customary Procedures, Altered Legislative Landscape, 78 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1493 (Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Events of September 11] (noting that legisla-
tive agenda was rewritten for foreseeable future).
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and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("PATRIOT Act"),7 that emphasized
heightened enforcement of existing immigration laws., After a
two-year hiatus, talk of immigration reform has resurfaced, and
for good reason.9 The disappointing economic performance of
the past two years has not altered the fundamental structure of
the U.S. labor market." An array of industries," such as ser-
7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act [hereinafter PATRIOT Act], Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
8. See Hines supra note 1, at 44-45 (noting that INS introduced new security mea-
sures following September 11 attacks); see also One Year Later, supra note 6, at 1345
(noting that September 11 attacks derailed immigration reform initiatives in favor of
new anti-terrorism measures); Events of September 11, supra note 6, at 1493 (noting that
lawmakers shifted their focus from guest worker and earned legalization programs to
border build-up plans and heightened restrictions on immigration in aftermath of Sep-
tember 11 attacks).
9. See Joe Black, Immigration Overhaul Urged, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2004, at 4
(noting that some U.S. senators found that existing immigration policies hurt home-
land security efforts and were in need of immediate overhaul); see also Eunice Moscoso,
Immigration Plan Defended, ATL. J.-CONST., Feb. 13, 2004, at A9 (noting that security con-
cerns have driven resurgence in support for immigration reform); Jerry Gonzalez, Dia-
logue Welcome on Immigrants, ATL. J.-CONST., Jan. 26, 2004, at A9 (noting that Bush's
immigration proposal has forced Americans to readdress immigration issue); Elisabeth
Bumiller, Politics At The Border, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at Al (discussing President
Bush's renewed efforts to give legal status to millions of illegal workers); Allert Brown-
Gort, Seeking Balance In The Immigration Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2004, at A13
(noting that President Bush's immigration proposals brought to forefront long overdue
debate); Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Bush Would Open U.S. To Guest Workers, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2004, at Al (noting that President Bush's 2004 initiative to overhaul U.S. immi-
gration laws was prompted by continuing U.S. labor shortages in certain sectors).
10. SeeJohn Simons, Even in Recession, the U.S. Economy Depends on Immigration, FOR-
TUNE, Nov. 26, 2001, at 92-98 (discussing importance of immigrant labor to success of
U.S. economy, despite recent downturn); see also United States: Who Goes There?, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 27-28 [hereinafter Who Goes There] (noting that underlying eco-
nomic facts that drive migration have not changed since September 11); Milford
Prewitt, Many Borders to Cross: Immigration Reform On Rocky Road, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEws, July 7, 2003, at I (reporting that workforce shortages continue to be problem for
many companies and will become more acute as U.S. economy improves); Economic
Focus/Immigrants: They Come Into America, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at B13 (noting that
immigration is expected to increase because of U.S. labor shortages despite recent slow-
down); Future Labor and Skill Shortages Jeopardize American Prosperity (Employment Policy
Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 23, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Future Labor] (noting
that United States will have shortage of thirty-five million workers by 2030 despite re-
cent short-term weakening of economy); Immigration Is Critical to Future Growth and Com-
petitiveness, (Employment Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C.), June 11, 2001, at 1
[hereinafter Future Growth] (noting that U.S. labor market will remain tight despite
recent slowing of economic growth). But see The Truth About Employment-Based Immigra-
tion, (Federation For American Immigration Reform, Washington, D.C.), available at
http://www.fairus.org/Research/ResearchList.cfm?c=2 (arguing that high immigration
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vices12 and agriculture,13 face severe labor shortages irremedia-
ble without immigrant labor.14 Moreover, the aging of the U.S.
population, combined with a declining national birthrate,
promises to accelerate this trend and force policymakers to look
beyond our borders for a workforce able to meet the demands of
is not necessary to maintain robust U.S. economy because U.S. workers could fill empty
jobs).
11. See Cecelia Blalock, Immigration Reform Can't Come Soon Enough For Hotel Indus-
tiy, HOTEL AND MOTEL MGMT., Sept. 3, 2001, at 10 (noting that lodging industry has had
difficulties finding sufficient numbers of semiskilled and unskilled workers to meet its
demands); Milford Prewitt, Operators, Lobbyists Laud "Alien" Amnesty, NATION'S RESTAU-
RANT NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 3, 98 (noting that many companies in food service, hospi-
tality, retail, construction, and other industries support immigration reform as way to
abate labor shortages); Stephen H. Daniels et al., The Open Door Is Swinging Shut, ENG'G
NEWS REC., Oct. 22, 2001, at 36-39 (reporting that construction industry depends heav-
ily on immigrant labor because no "Anglos" are available); Jay Holtzman, Labor Strains,
Bic BUILDER, Dec. 2002, at 27, 28 (discussing current labor shortages in building sector
and noting that building companies have stepped up recruiting efforts); Grace Hinch-
man, Immigration Policy and the Cost of Doing Business, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Oct. 2001, at 70
(discussing Iowa's example of hiring foreign workers to ease labor shortages, especially
in healthcare field); Joel Millman, The Great California Farmhand Debate - Growers Ask
U.S. to Let In Mexican "Guest" Labor: Critics Call It Fruitless, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at
A17 (discussing labor shortages in farming industry in California and noting that lack
of workers puts region's $1 billion annual harvest at risk). But see Immigration and Job
Displacement (Federation For American Immigration Reform, Washington, D.C.), availa-
ble at http://www.fairus.org/Focus.cfm?keyword=59 (noting that immigration displaces
U.S. workers because immigrants are willing to work for lower wages than native work-
ers).
12. See, e.g., Blalock, supra note 11, at 10 (noting that lodging industry has strug-
gled to find sufficient numbers of semiskilled or unskilled workers to meet operational
demands); see also Prewitt, supra note 11, at 3, 98 (noting that food services industry
hires illegal immigrants out of economic necessity because no other workers are availa-
ble); Hinchman, supra note 11, at 70 (noting that Iowa has begun recruiting foreign
workers to ease worker shortages, especially in healthcare sector).
13. See Millman, supra note 11, at A17 (noting that California's Imperial Valley
suffers from shortage in farm workers); see also Fred Alvarez, Picking Fight Over Immigrant
Farm Labor, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at B8 (noting that California farmers depend on
undocumented farm workers because legal immigrants are not available); Victor Ep-
stein, Farm Worker Shortage Looms, J. OF COMMERCE., Mar. 29, 1999, at 4A (noting that
some U.S. farmers had stopped planting crops out of fear that they would not have
enough workers to harvest them).
14. See Blalock, supra note 11, at 10 (reporting that undocumented workers do not
"steal" jobs from Americans because more jobs than willing workers exist in certain
industries); see also Prewitt, supra note 11, at 3, 98 (noting that economic downturn
would not alleviate worker deficiencies in many service industries because U.S. workers
will not take certain jobs); Daniels, supra note 11, at 36-39 (reporting that construction
would "shut down" without immigrant workers because no U.S. laborers are willing to
take these positions); Alvarez, supra note 13, at B8 (discussing dependency of agricul-
tural industry on immigrant labor).
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the growing U.S. service economy.15
Among the most controversial immigration reform plans
has been the White House's proposal for a guest worker pro-
gram, which would grant temporary employment visas to Mexi-
can workers.16 The idea is not novel. t 7 The United States and
15. See Daniel T. Griswold, Willing Workers: Fixing the Problem of Illegal Mexican Mi-
gration to the United States (Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 15, 2002, at 9 (noting
that U.S. workers are becoming older and more educated and less willing to take on
low-skilled jobs); see also Simons, supra note 10, at 92-98 (reporting that increasing life
spans and declining fertility rates have made replacement migration economic neces-
sity); Hinchman, supra note 11, at 70 (noting that changing composition of U.S.
workforce is causing corporations, state governments, and Congress to take closer look
at immigration policy); Future Labor, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that future U.S. labor
shortages could be eliminated through increased immigration); Essential Workers Help
Our Economy (American Immigration Lawyers Association, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 5,
2003, at 1 [hereinafter Essential Workers] (noting that United States is not producing
enough new workers to compensate for retirement of Baby Boomers from workforce).
16. See Fact Sheet on Migration, supra note 4 (outlining U.S. President George W.
Bush's immigration reform proposal, which calls for temporary worker program and
humane approach to change).
17. Five main guest worker programs are in force in the United States presently,
each targeted at different employer recruitment needs. See Employment Categories and
Required Documentation, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/
tempbenefits/ecrd.htm (describing various U.S. temporary worker programs). The
best-known U.S. guest worker visa is H-1B, which is aimed at highly educated and highly
trained individuals. Id. The H-2 visa covers seasonal agricultural and non-agricultural
workers. Id. The H-3 visa is reserved for international trainees. Id. The L-1 visa covers
intra-company transferees working for multinational corporations. Id. The 0-1 visa is
aimed at individuals with extraordinary ability or achievement in the arts, sciences, edu-
cation, or business. Id. See also National Security and the Economy: The Numbers Behind
Foreign Guest Workers (Employment Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C.),Jan. 9, 2002,
at 1 (noting that 970,045 resident guest workers generate 8% or U.S.$82 billion of U.S.
economy). Many Western European countries implemented guest worker programs
after the Second World War. See, e.g., Stephen Castles, The Guest-Worker in Western Europe
- Obituary, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 761 (1986) [hereinafter Obituary] (noting that
guest workers were recruited in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, and
Switzerland to remedy post-war labor shortages); see also Philip L. Martin & Mark. J.
Miller, Guestworkers: Lessons from Western Europe, 33 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 315-30
(1980) (noting that France, Switzerland and West Germany implemented guest worker
programs after World War Two); STEPHEN CASTLES & MARKJ. MILLER, THE AGE OF MI-
GRATION: INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 68 (1998)
(noting that all highly industrialized Western European countries used temporary la-
borers for some time between 1945 and 1973); Friedrich Heckmann, Temporary Labor
Migration or Immigration? "Guest Workers" in the Federal Republic of Germany, in GUESTS
COME To STAY. THE EFFECrs OF EUROPEAN LABOR MIGRATION ON SENDING AND RECEIV-
INC COUNTRIES 69-83 (Rosemarie Rogers ed., 1985) [hereinafter GUESTS COME TO STAY]
(noting that Germany recruited temporary laborers from Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
and Turkey); STEPHEN CASTLES & GODULA KOSACK, IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE 40-41 (1985) (noting that German government formed
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Mexico had instituted the Bracero guest worker program during
World War Two, 8 and guest worker policies were commonplace
in many post-World War Two Western European countries ex-
periencing labor deficiencies.19
These programs were fraught with problems.2 ° In many
cases, guest workers failed to return home once their usefulness
as temporary laborers diminished, defeating the purportedly
provisional purpose of the programs. 21 In some cases, the per-
recruitment agreements with several countries in 1960s to meet Germany's growing
labor demands).
18. See DouGt.As S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRA-
TION IN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 35-39 (2002) (noting that U.S. government
signed labor recruitment arrangement with Mexico to address agricultural labor
shortage in 1940s); see also PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO
DIVIDE 33 (2000) (noting that Bracero program was established to meet labor demands
of southwestern agribusinesses); Suit Seeks Back Pay For Mexican Guest Workers During
1940s, Hous. CHRON., June 13, 2002, at 17 (noting that Mexican guest workers were
recruited to United States between 1942 to 1964 to harvest crops and maintain railroad
tracks).
19. See generally Obituary, supra note 17, at 761 (noting that labor shortages in
Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland compelled these
West European countries to recruit workers abroad); see also Martin, supra note 17, at
315 (finding that labor deficiencies in France, Switzerland and West Germany led to
implementation of guest worker programs); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17 at 68-73
(noting that rapidly expanding economies of several post-war European countries, such
as Germany, France, and Switzerland, prompted these countries recruit temporary
workers); Heckmann, supra note 17, at 69-83 (noting that migration of workers from
Greece, Turkey, and other countries to Germany was result of country's guest worker
program); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 39-43 (noting that Germany's guest
worker program was established as result of late 1950s labor shortage).
20. See generally Obituary, supra note 17, at 761 (noting that one problem with guest
worker programs is that participants become permanent settlers); see also Martin, supra
note 17, at 318-19 (discussing how guest worker programs in France, Switzerland, and
West Germany led to administrative problems, discrimination, and foreign labor depen-
dency); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 68-73 (describing Western Europe's post-
war guest worker programs and their negative consequences, including restriction of
workers' civil rights); Heckmann, supra note 17, at 69-83 (discussing problems with Ger-
many's post-war labor recruitment program); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 40-43
(noting that Germany's purportedly temporary worker program resulted in permanent
settlement).
21. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 761 (finding that guest workers frequently do not
return to their native countries); see also David Abraham, American Jobs But Not the Ameri-
can Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A19 (noting that foreign workers are not good
"guests" because they rarely want to leave their host country); CASTLES & MILLER, supra
note 17, at 71 (noting that over time German government was forced to recognize that
permanent immigration had taken place during its guest worker program); Ursula
Mehrlander, Second-Generation Migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany, in GUESTS
COME TO STAY 159, 160 (noting that defacto immigration had taken place in Germany
despite German federal government's unwillingness to recognize it as such).
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manent settlement of large numbers of guest workers led to
widespread racial or ethnic discrimination. 22  Lacking citizen-
ship rights, guest workers were unable to advance their place in
European societies, 23 and became convenient scapegoats for so-
ciety's ills. 24
It is not surprising then that critics are wary of implement-
ing a new guest worker program in the United States.25 These
22. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 761-63 (noting that many of Western Europe's
guest workers faced economic and social crisis as ethnic minorities in their host coun-
try); see also Martin, supra note 17, at 327 (noting that foreign guest workers have been
subjected to widespread discrimination); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 81 (not-
ing that non-European foreigners experienced socioeconomic exclusion through dis-
crimination and racism); WILLIAM A. BARBIERI, JR., ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP 33 (1998)
(noting increase in xenophobia and xenophobic acts against Turkish nationals in Ger-
many); ULRICH HERBERT, A HISTORY OF FOREIGN LABOR IN GERMANY, 1880-1980, at 225-
27 (1990) (discussing rise of xenophobic hostility toward foreigners in Germany in the
aftermath of its guest worker program).
23. See, e.g., Czarina Wilpert, Children of Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 11 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 475, 476 (1977) (noting that Turkish teenagers have
limited options upon leaving school); see also Richard D. Alba et al., Ethnic Inequalities In
The German School System, in 5 PATHS TO INCLUSION: THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 130-31 (Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Mfinz eds., 1998)
[hereinafter PATHS TO INCLUSION] (noting that many Turkish students leave German
school system with limited or no credentials, so that they are ineligible for many jobs);
BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 7 (stating that immigrant children's chances of finding ap-
prenticeship or being admitted to university are slim); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17,
at 194-95 (noting that structural factors made it difficult for guest workers to gain pro-
motions in workplace); Mehrlander, supra note 21, at 168 (noting that many foreigners
are only able to work as unskilled laborers because they have not finished elementary
school).
24. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 775-77 (noting that guest workers were blamed
for Germany's social problems); see also Martin, supra note 17, at 327 (stating that pres-
ence of foreign workers fostered right- and left-wing political extremism); CASTLES &
KOSACK, supra note 17, at 270-71 (describing tendency of Germans to blame foreigners,
rather than their landlords, for overcrowded housing); Alba, supra note 23, at 147
(characterizing Germany's Turks as highly visible, socially stigmatized, and legally disad-
vantaged group).
25. See Wayne Washington, Bush Upsets Part of the Conservative Base, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 9, 2004, at Al (noting that many conservatives do not support President Bush's
immigration plan); see also Frank Del Olmo, Immigration Reforms Border on Good Proposal,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at M5 (noting that many Republicans, including key members
of Congress, are dubious about U.S. President George W. Bush's immigration reform
proposal); Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Would Give Illegal Workers Broad New Rights, N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at Al (noting that conservative Republicans oppose immigration
reform because they believe it constitutes amnesty for undocumented workers); T.
Shawn Taylor, Critics Bash Work-Visa Proposal, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2004, at 4 (reporting
that AFL-CIO president John Sweeney commented that White House proposal would
not strengthen protections for wages, benefits, and other rights of immigrant and do-
mestic workers); see also Janice Fine, Bush's Plan Three Flaws, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11,
2004, at LII (arguing that Bush's immigration proposals would give too much power to
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concerns, however, are somewhat misdirected. A close look at
recent U.S. immigration reforms through the lens of one of Eu-
rope's largest temporary worker programs, that of West Ger-
many, reveals that the U.S. has implemented a de facto guest
worker policy over the past two decades.2 6
A comparison between the United States and West Germany
is instructive because of these countries' many commonalities.
27
Among advanced industrial countries, the United States and
Germany have the largest number of immigrants. 28 In the twen-
tieth century, both countries experienced demographically
employers, risking exploitation of immigrant workers); Daniel B. Wood, Do Citizens Re-
ally Want These Jobs? From Construction To Landscaping, Bush "Guest Worker" Plan Is Contro-
versial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 13, 2004, at 1 (quoting labor expert as stating that
U.S. President Bush's plan gives employers greater opportunity to exploit immigrant
workers).
26. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 4 (noting that policies of benign neglect created
defacto guest worker program in United States); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 105
(noting that United States throughout twentieth century has made provisions to import
Mexican workers while pretending not to); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 34-35 (noting
that formal U.S. guest worker program of post-World War Two era has merely been
replaced by informal one).
27. See KlausJ. Bade & Myron Weiner, Introduction, in MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION
FUTURE: GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES vii (Klaus J. Bade & Myron Weiner eds.,
1997) [hereinafter MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION FUTURE] (discussing similarities be-
tween United States and Germany and noting that both countries have large numbers
of immigrants); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, BETWEEN ALEINIKOFF: THE DIRECTION
OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP POLICv 4 (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace,
1998) (noting that foreign-born populations in United States and Germany respectively
constituted 10% and 8.5% of each country's total populations).
28. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at vii (noting similarities of immigration
patterns and policies in Germany and United States). In 1993, the U.S. had twenty-
three million foreign-born residents, or 8.9% of the population. Id. The comparable
figure for Germany (in 1994) was 6.8 million foreigners, or 8.6% of the population. Id.
See also Foreign Population, 1980 to 2002, Federal Statistical Office, Germany 2003, availa-
ble at http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/bevoe/bevtab7.htm (reporting that Germany's
foreign population in 2002 was 7.3 million); Foreign-Born Population by Sex, Age, and Year
of Entiy, U.S. Census Bureau, March 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/socdemo/foreign/p20-534/tab0201.txt (noting that U.S. foreign-born population
totaled 28.3 million in March 2003); Thomas C. Heller, Change and Convergence: Is Amer-
ican Immigration Still Exceptional?, in CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL WORLD 196, 199 (Atsushi
Kondo ed., 2001) (noting that one million immigrants enter United States annually
with intent to reside indefinitely); Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship Rights For Aliens in Ger-
many, in CITIZENSHIP IN GLOBAL WORLD 100 (Atsushi Kondo ed., 2001) (noting that
Germany's foreign population was 7.32 million, or 9% of country's total population, by
end of 1998); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 4 (noting that foreign-born populations in
United States and Germany respectively constituted 10% and 8.5% of each country's
total populations).
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driven labor shortages29 and began to admit large numbers of
immigrants ethnically different from those that settled in the
past. ° The U.S. immigrant population became less European;
most immigrants today come from Asia and Latin America, pri-
marily Mexico."1 In Germany, Polish and Italian immigrants
have given way to those from Turkey and southeastern Europe. 2
The ethnic, racial, and religious composition of these new immi-
grants has raised issues of acculturation in both countries. In
29. See Stephen Castles, The Guests Who Stayed - The Debate on "Foreigners Policy" in
the German Federal Republic, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 517, 518 (1985) (noting that Ger-
many experienced labor shortages in aftermath of World War Two); see also Rainer
Mfinz & Ralf Ulrich, Changing Patterns of Immigration to Germany, 1945-1995: Ethnic Ori-
gins, Demographic Structure, Future Prospects, in MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION FUTURE 65,
79 (noting that Germany's booming post-war economy prompted labor shortages);
Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at ix-x (noting that both United States and Germany
experienced post-war labor deficiencies); see also ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 33 (noting
that post-WWII labor shortages in United States led to Bracero program); Blalock, supra
note 11, at 10 (noting that United States is currently experiencing labor shortages in
industries such as hotel and food services); see also Prewitt, supra note 11, at 3, 98 (not-
ing that U.S. workforce shortages exist in certain industries despite weaker economy);
Daniels, supra note 11, at 36-39 (discussing U.S. construction industry's dependence on
immigrant labor due to worker shortages); see Alvarez, supra note 13, at B8 (noting that
U.S. farms experience labor shortages).
30. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at ix-x (noting that national origin of U.S.
and German immigrants changed in second half of twentieth century); see also Peter
Duignan & Lewis H. Gann, Introduction, in THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES OVER
IMMIGRATION 3 (Peter Duignan & Lewis H. Gann eds., 1998) [hereinafter DEBATE IN THE
UNITED STATES] (noting that immigration patterns in Germany and United States
changed in similar ways after World War Two in that both countries began to admit
immigrants whose ethnic origin was different than those that had come before).
31. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at xi (stating that most U.S. immigrants now
arrive from Latin America and Asia); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 92 (noting that by
late 1980s U.S. immigrants were coming overwhelmingly from Asia and Latin America);
see also Heller, supra note 28, at 202 (noting that approximately 150,000 undocumented
Mexicans enter United States annually); John Fraser, Preventing and Combating the Em-
ployment of Foreigners in Irregular Situation in the United States, in COMBATING THE ILLEGAL
EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS (2000) (noting that large number of illegal immi-
grants come to United States from Mexico and Central America).
32. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at xi (stating that most immigrants to Ger-
many originate from Turkey and Southeastern Europe); see also Veysel Oezcan, Ger-
many: Immigration in Transition, Migration Information Source, May 2002, available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=22 (noting that by
1973 most immigrants to Germany came from Turkey rather than Italy); Hermann
Korte, Labor Migration and the Employment of Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany
Since 1950, in GUESTS COME To STAY 29, 31 (noting that Turks have constituted largest
number of foreign residents in Germany since 1972).
33. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at vii (noting acculturation of immigrants
has been political issue in both United States and Germany); see also Kevin R. Johnson,
Fear of "Alien Nation:" Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 111
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both places, migration issues have dominated the political
agenda,34 amid similar public concerns that immigrants impose
fiscal costs on local and national budgets and have an adverse
effect on local labor markets. 3
5
Part I of this Note describes West Germany's post-war Gas-
tarbeiter [guest worker] program from 1961 to 1972. Part II fo-
cuses on the long-term results of the Gastarbeiter program, with
special emphasis on the legal status of Turkish Gastarbeiter in
Germany. This assessment concludes that guest worker pro-
grams inevitably result in the permanent settlement of foreign-
ers3 6 in the host country. If not properly anticipated and
planned for, this settlement leads to social stratification and po-
litical divisiveness. Part II also presents for comparison U.S. im-
migration policies and their effect on Mexican immigrant work-
ers. The section asserts that the United States over the past two
decades has implemented a defacto guest worker policy, which
led to many of the same adverse consequences wrought by Ger-
(1996) (finding that immigration has played role in partisan and racial politics in
United States); Background Paper: The Debate On Immigration, German Embassy, available
at http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/archives/background/immigration.
html (noting that integration of foreigners within German society has been subject of
"recurring debate"); see also Heller, supra note 28, at 209 (describing how growing in-
flux of Asian and Latin American immigrants since 1965 has intensified U.S. politics of
immigration).
34. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at vii (noting that immigration has loomed
large on political agenda in both United States and Germany); see also Johnson, supra
note 33, at 111 (discussing immigration politics in United States and noting that immi-
grants are frequently blamed for taking away jobs from native workers, committing
crimes, and consuming undeserved share of public benefits).
35. See David W. Haines & Karen E. Rosenbaum, Introduction: Problematic Labels,
'Volatile Issue, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA: REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1, 8 (David W.
Haines & Karen E. Rosenbaum eds., 1999) (noting that immigration debate always fo-
cuses on illegal, rather than legal, immigrants); see also MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IM-
MIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING INSJAIL COMPLEX 15-22, 28-29 (2002) (discussing
nativist efforts in United States to blame immigrants for society's ills); Obituary, supra
note 17, at 776 (noting that right-wing politicians blamed immigrants for many of Ger-
many's social problems); JOEL S. FETZER, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TowARD IMMIGRATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 132 (2000) (noting that German immigra-
tion debate has tended to focus on immigrants' use of social services, rather than on
depletion ofjobs); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 434 (discussing German poll in
which respondents stated that foreign workers overstrain social services).
36. In the context of this Note, the word "foreigners" is used to denote German
residents who are not of German origin. Although many so-called "foreigners" were
once Gastarbeiter, many others were born in Germany as children or grandchildren of
Gastarbeiter. Therefore, it is inappropriate to refer to them as "immigrants." In addi-
tion, many German-born foreigners maintain their foreign citizenship.
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many's Gastarbeiter program, including the permanent settle-
ment and subsequent marginalization of undocumented immi-
grants3 7 from Mexico. Part III concludes that temporary worker
programs, formal or defacto, have irreversible and adverse socio-
political consequences for their participants and the countries
that adopt these policies. Accordingly, this Note cautions
against the adoptioh of a formal temporary worker program in
the United States and argues that the permanent legalization of
undocumented immigrants is the most judicious means of re-
versing recent trends.
I: WEST GERMANYS GASTARBEITER PROGRAM
A. The Recruitment of Foreign Workers
Guest worker policies were commonplace in many Western
European countries facing labor deficiencies after the Second
World War.38 West Germany's post-war Gastarbeiter program with
Turkey was notable both for its scale and its failures.39 It was a
response to the country's rapidly expanding economy and con-
37. For the purpose of this Note, the term "immigrant" refers to people who have
traveled to the United States to live or work, legally or illegally. The terms "undocu-
mented" or "illegal" will be used to denote those immigrants that have traveled to the
United States to live or work without authorization from the U.S. government.
38. See generally Obituary, supra note 17, at 761 (noting that Belgium, Britain,
France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland recruited guest workers to fill labor
shortages after World War Two); see also Martin, supra note 17, at 315 (noting that post-
war guest worker programs in France, Switzerland, and West Germany led to serious
problems, including discrimination of workers); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 67-
73 (noting that Germany, France, and Switzerland recruited guest workers as result of
their rapidly expanding post-war economies).
39. As result of its guest worker program, Germany's foreign population grew from
95,000 in 1956 to 1.3 million in 1996 and 2.6 million in 1974. CASTLES & MILLER, supra
note 17, at 71 (noting that German guest worker system resulted in permanent immi-
gration of millions of foreigners); see also Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (describing
increase in number of foreigners in Germany as result of guest worker program); Mfinz
& Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (discussing increase in number of foreigners in Germany
in early 1970s as result of the country's guest worker program). West Germany's guest
worker program has been considered failure on the grounds that its purportedly tem-
porary immigrants settled permanently, leading to the immigrants' segregation and
marginalization. Castles, supra note 29, at 524 (noting that Germany's attempts to limit
immigration had opposite effect); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 210 (con-
cluding that failure of German policies to acknowledge permanent settlement of immi-
grants led to their marginalization and exclusion); Obituary, supra note 17, at 775 (not-
ing that guest worker policies such as those implemented in Germany led to social
stratification and foreign labor dependency).
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sequent labor demands.4" Propelled by U.S. investment, the
German economy blossomed in the 1950s and full employment
began to constrain growth.41 Accordingly, German employers
started to call for the recruitment of foreign labor.4 2 German
labor unions opposed the idea out of concern that wages and
work conditions would decline,4 3 but the federal government
agreed to establish a state monopoly on recruitment and fix
wages, working conditions, and housing for Gastarbeiter in ad-
vance of their arrival.44
Initially, the government negotiated bilateral Gastarbeiter
agreements with several Mediterranean countries throughout
the 1960s.4 5 These agreements gained particular significance af-
40. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (noting that surging German economy led to
labor shortages); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (noting that increased job
vacancies in booming German economy prompted recruitment of foreign labor);
CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION-STATE: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY
AND GREAT BRITAIN 65 (1999) (stating that foreign labor recruitment was response to
inflationary pressures of full employment economy).
41. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (finding that Germany's rapidly expanding
economy led to labor deficiencies); see also Manz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (noting
that growing number of unfilled jobs led to recruitment of foreign labor in Germany);
JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 65 (stating that Germany's full employment economy and
consequent inflationary pressures prompted German government to recruit foreign la-
borers).
42. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (noting that German businesses were in favor
of recruiting foreign workers to cope with labor shortage); see also BARBIERI, supra note
22, at 28(stating that employers anticipated labor shortage during this period); Mehr-
lander, supra note 21, at 159 (noting that German firms were forced to look abroad for
workers because of their increasing demand for labor).
43. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (noting that German trade unions initially did
not support plan to recruit foreign workers); see alsoJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 65 (noting
that trade unions initially had reservations about recruitment of foreign labor); CASTLES
& KOSACK, supra note 17, at 129 (noting that unions initially were concerned that for-
eign workers would be used to force wages down).
44. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (stating that German government leaders
made deal with labor unions to give guest workers same wages and benefits as native
workers); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (noting that guest workers' wages
were fixed after negotiations with German trade unions); JOPPKE, supra note 40, at 65
(asserting that trade union opposition faded after federal government agreed to grant
equal wages and social benefits to foreign laborers); Mehrldnder, supra note 21, at 159
(noting that federal government consulted with German trade unions in regard to its
bilateral recruitment agreements); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 129 (finding
that unions demanded that foreign workers be granted same wages and conditions as
German workers).
45. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (noting that Germany negotiated guest
worker agreements with several Mediterranean countries, including Turkey and
Greece); see also Minz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 78 (noting that Germany signed
formal employee recruitment agreements with Italy, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain,
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ter 1961, when the German Democratic Republic closed its bor-
ders and constructed the Berlin Wall, halting the influx of immi-
grants (and prospective laborers) from East Germany.16  Gas-
tarbeiter agreements with Turkey were formed in 1961 and
1964.47
Following these agreements, the Bundesanhalt fir Arbeit
[German Federal Labor Office] set up recruitment offices in
Turkey48 to select workers with the skills required in Germany.
4
Initially, the office recruited immigrants for agriculture and con-
struction jobs,5" but eventually the laborers were placed in all
Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in 1950s and 1960s);JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 65 (find-
ing that Germany established foreign labor recruitment agreements with several Medi-
terranean countries, including Greece, Italy, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that Germany signed bilateral guest
worker agreements with Italy, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugosla-
via); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 40 (noting that Germany's guest worker
agreement with Italy was succeeded by agreements with Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portu-
gal, and Yugoslavia).
46. See Bade & Weiner, supra note 27, at x (explaining that construction of Berlin
Wall contributed to Germany's labor shortage because barrier restricted country's
workforce); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 67 (noting that foreign labor was
of no major importance in Germany until 1960-1961, when migration from German
Democratic Republic to Federal Republic of Germany ceased with construction of Ber-
lin Wall); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 28 (listing building of Berlin Wall as one of pri-
mary factors leading to foreign labor recruitment policies).
47. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (noting establishment of Germany's guest
worker program with Turkey in early 196 0 s); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 78
(stating that Germany formed bilateral guest worker agreement with Turkey in 1964).
48. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518 (noting that German federal government set
up recruitment offices in Turkey); see alsoJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 65 (stating that West
Germany's Federal Labor Office opened recruitment offices throughout Mediterra-
nean, including in Istanbul); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that Ger-
many's Federal Labor Office recruited workers in Turkey); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra
note 17, at 40 (noting that BundesanstaltfirArbeit was responsible for setting up recruit-
ment offices in each of migrant-sending countries).
49. See Castles, supra note 29, at 518-19 (describing functions of Germany's Turk-
ish recruitment offices, which included selecting suitable workers, testing their work
skills, and giving them medical checkups); see alsoJoPPrE, supra note 40, at 65 (explain-
ing that recruitment offices selected suitable applicants, provided them with work and
residence permits, and organized their collective transportation to West Germany);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that Germany's Federal Labor Office
selected workers, tested occupational skills, provided medical examinations, and
screened police records); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 41 (stating that recruit-
ment offices ensured that worker was suitable for job in question and that applicant did
not have criminal record).
50. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that guest workers were recruited at
first for agriculture and construction); see also CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 40
(noting that German government originally envisioned that guest workers would be
placed in agricultural and building jobs).
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kinds of industries, primarily in low-skilled manual positions.5"
Gastarbeiter regulations were intentionally vague to give em-
ployers maximum flexibility in recruiting and controlling immi-
grants. 52 The first set of regulations allowed immigrants to stay
in Germany if their "personality and the purposes of their stay"
made them "worthy of hospitality."5 " In the mid-1960s, the Aus-
ldndergesetz (Foreigners Law) was passed.54 While it did not give
foreigners automatic residency rights, it did grant residence per-
mits where they did "not harm the interests of the German Fed-
eral Republic." 55 The presence of foreigners was generally seen
as being in the country's interests only so long as employers re-
quired their labor.56 Thus, residence permits were linked to la-
bor permits and labor permits were often limited to a particular
51. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that guest workers were placed mainly
in low-skilled industrial positions); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (charac-
terizing guest worker jobs as generally unpleasant, unprestigious, and low-wage);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (finding that recruitment of foreign workers was
result of shift to new methods of mass production that required large numbers of low-
skilled workers).
52. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522 (stating that guest worker regulations were
intentionally vague); see alsoJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 66 (noting that legal framework
for handling presence of foreign workers in Germany was "meager"); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 189 (noting that foreign workers' special legal status meant
they had few labor market and social rights); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 126
(noting that restrictions on political activities of immigrants were so vague as to permit
authorities to ban whatever activities they wished).
53. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522 (noting that earliest Gastarbeiter regulations
were deliberately vague and gave authorities great latitude in granting or refusing resi-
dent permits); see alsoJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 66 (stating that earliest guest worker laws
made entry and stay of foreigners contingent on their "worthiness").
54. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522 (noting that Foreigners Law of 1965 did not
improve situation of guest workers because it did not give them residence rights); see
also JOPPKE, supra note 40, at 66 (noting that 1965 Foreigners Law made residents per-
mits contingent on State interests).
55. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522 (noting that 1965 Foreigners Law authorized
work permits for guest workers so long as they did not harm interests of State); see also
BOLENT CAIiEKLI, THE LEGAL POSITION OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
103 (1998) (noting that Foreigners Act of 1965 did not grant foreigners automatic right
of residence).
56. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522-23 (noting that presence of foreigners was
generally seen as being in Germany's interests so long as companies needed their la-
bor); see also CIR EKLI, supra note 55, at 104 (explaining that administrative officials had
great discretion in determining whether residence permit injured interests of country);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that German policies conceived Gas-
tarbeiter as temporary labor units that could be recruited, used, and disposed as employ-
ers required).
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company, occupation, or area. 5' Administrative authorities al-
ways retained the power to revoke the permits at will.
58
The laws did not grant Gastarbeiter the right to freedom of
movement, the right to assembly, freedom of association, place
of work, or place of education. 59 Gastarbeiter were contracted for
limited periods of time, usually one year.60 The government be-
lieved it could maximize the flexibility of the foreign labor force
and prevent immigrants from settling permanently if workers
were regularly rotated.6 Additionally, the government discour-
aged immigrant workers from bringing family members to Ger-
many.6 2
Nevertheless, the existence of short-term contracts proved
57. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522-24 (noting that some rigid requirements were
dropped after employers complained they made labor market too inflexible.); see also
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that residence and labor permits were
granted for restricted periods and were usually valid only for specific jobs and areas).
Work permits with geographic restrictions led to disproportionate concentrations of
immigrant communities in certain areas. Martin, supra note 17, at 325 (noting that
certain German states had larger foreign populations than others). See also HERBERT,
supra note 22, at 238 (discussing how populations of foreign workers were concentrated
in certain regions and neighborhoods); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 207 (not-
ing that existence of large Turkish communities contributed to notion among Germans
that immigrants were "taking over").
58. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522-23 (noting that work and residency visas were
revocable at any time); see also JoPPE, supra note 40, at 66 (asserting that issuance of
residency permits were virtually "acts of grace" by State).
59. See Castles, supra note 29, at 522 (noting that legal rights of guest workers were
restricted, so that they did not have basic rights of freedom of assembly, freedom of
association, freedom of movement, or free choice of occupation); see also QICEKLI, supra
note 55, at 103 (stating that foreigners' rights were limited because they did not get
automatic residence rights and could only assert some political rights); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 189 (noting that foreign workers' special legal status gave
them limited labor market and social rights).
60. See Wolfgang Seifert, Social and Economic Integration of Foreigners in Germany, in
PATHS TO INCLUSION 83 (noting that most guest worker contracts were for limited pe-
riod); see also Minz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (stating that, generally, work and
residence permits issued to foreign laborers were valid for only one year); see also
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that residence and labor permits were
granted for "restricted periods").
61. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 83 (noting that foreign workers were rotated so
that they would not settle in Germany permanently); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note
29, at 79-80 (noting that aim of West Germany's recruitment policy was to counterbal-
ance cyclical and demographic bottlenecks in country's labor market); BARBIERI, supra
note 22, at 29 (noting that Germany's guest worker rotation policy was imposed
through use of short-term labor contracts).
62. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that federal government did not in-
tend for guest workers to bring their families to Germany); see also JoPPKE, supra note
40, at 67 (stating that 1965 Foreigners Law contained no provisions for reuniting guest
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problematic for German employers. Companies grew weary of
continually training the new employees rotated through their
factories. 64 Even in economically weak times, it became appar-
ent that foreign workers were not readily replaceable by "native"
employees. 65  Foreign Gastarbeiter filled primarily industrial
jobs 6 which required minimal qualifications,67 and entailed low
workers with their families); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that
Germany's guest worker program discouraged entry of dependants).
63. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (noting that rotation of laborers slowed in late
1960s and 1970s because industry did not want to train new workers); see also BARBIERI,
supra note 22, at 29 (stating that rotation policy met with resistance from German em-
ployers who regularly renewed foreigners' short-term contracts rather than train new
workers).
64. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (stating that companies found it burdensome to
continually train new guest workers); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (finding that
German companies renewed temporary labor contracts on regular basis so they could
avoid training new guest workers).
65. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (stating that employers found it difficult to
replace foreign workers with local employees); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at
79 (noting that German workers were unwilling to accept unprestigious positions held
by foreign workers); Obituary, supra note 17, at 775 (noting that indigenous workers
were unwilling to fill low-skilled jobs, even when unemployment reached record levels
in early 1980s); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 196 (noting that foreign workers
were segmented into specific forms of work so that they were irreplaceable by local
labor, even in times of high unemployment); Martin, supra note 17, at 319 (asserting
that native workers shunned low-paying, physically arduous jobs dominated by foreign-
ers); Korte, supra note 32, at 48 (noting that Germans are unwilling to occupy positions
predominantly filled by foreigners even when unemployment is relatively high). De-
spite their predominance in low-skilled jobs, Turkish immigrants have played important
role in success of the German economy. German Economy Dependent on Foreigners, Study
Says, THIS WEEK IN GERMANY, Sept. 18, 1992, at 4 (finding that foreigners have made
important contributions to German economy because they have created jobs and
helped finance German social security fund). In 1991, Germany's 33,000 Turkish-
owned businesses generated 700,000 jobs, with sales of over DM 25 million (approx.
U.S. $17 billion). Id. In 1989, foreign workers' contributions to the German social
security fund totaled DM 12 billion, while only about one quarter of that amount was
paid out to foreigners in social security benefits. Id. See also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at
31 (noting that presence of foreign workers in Germany created jobs for Germans and
helped fund German welfare system).
66. See (ICEKLI, supra note 55, at 17-18 (noting that Turkish immigrants filled in-
dustrial jobs with little opportunity for advancement); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra
note 17, at 71, 194-95 (noting that immigrants were recruited to fill new abundance of
low-skilled industrial jobs and that Germany's guest worker program led to labor mar-
ket segmentation); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 74 (noting that foreign workers
were strikingly underrepresented in white collar industries, such as services, commerce,
and transport). In 1992, 56% of foreign workers and 16% of German workers were in
unskilled or semiskilled positions. Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 98 (discussing dif-
ferent labor trends among German and foreign workers). Germans far outnumber for-
eigners in white-collarjobs. Id. Thus, despite nominal equality, foreign immigrants are
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wages and stressful working conditions.6" Native German work-
ers became ever less willing to accept such positions.69
In 1971, under pressure from employers and trade unions
to ease restrictions on foreign workers, 70 the German govern-
not able to improve their positions even after having worked in Germany for extended
periods of time. Id.
67. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 775 (noting that guest workers primarily had low-
skilled jobs); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that immigrants
were recruited to fill low-skilled jobs).
68. See HERBERT, supra note 22, at 241 (noting that wages for foreign workers were
far below those for workers in comparable jobs); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note
17, at 194 (asserting that influx of foreign workers prevented upward pressure on
wages); Korte, supra note 32, at 43 (noting that accident rates for foreigners working in
many plants was much higher than accident rates for German workers); CASTLES &
KOSACK, supra note 17, at 74 (noting that foreign workers tend to be employed in indus-
tries where no Germans work because conditions are poor); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at
34 (noting that employment of foreign workers was characterized by disproportionately
hazardous conditions). The worker accident rate among foreigners in Germany was
25% higher than the rate for indigenous workers in the early 1970s. Martin, supra note
17, at 325 (discussing comparative workplace accident rates among Germany's native
and foreign workers); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 34 (noting that employment of
foreign workers is characterized by disproportionately hazardous conditions); Korte,
supra note 32, at 43 (noting that accident rates for foreigners working in many plants
were much higher than accident rates for German workers); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra
note 17, at 74 (noting that foreign workers are most frequently employed in industries
which Germans are moving out of due to bad conditions). The availability of cheap
foreign labor reduced incentives for employers to improve wages and working condi-
tions. Martin, supra note 17, at 324 (noting that employers had little incentive to raise
wages given availability of inexpensive foreign labor). See also HERBERT, supra note 22,
at 241 (noting that wages for foreign workers were far below those for native workers in
comparable jobs); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 194 (asserting that influx of
foreign workers prevented upward pressure on wages).
69. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (noting that Germans would not fill positions
that foreign workers occupied); see also Mdinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (stating that
Germans were not interested in jobs that guest workers held). Some economists have
argued that the presence of low-wage foreign workers in the German economy pre-
vented companies from investing in new technology and machinery. Martin, supra note
17, at 324 (noting that labor-importing societies inevitably become dependent on for-
eign labor); see also Korte, supra note 32, at 45 (discussing argument that import of
foreign workers prevents rationalization of industrial population); HERBERT, supra note
22, at 221-22 (discussing how availability of cheap foreign labor had negative impact on
productivity because companies delayed technological modernization). But see Obitu-
ary, supra note 17, at 773 (arguing that tight labor market also would have hindered
rationalization); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 194 (finding that some economists
have suggested that failure to recruit foreign workers would have resulted in competi-
tive decline of German industry); Martin, supra note 17, at 324 (noting that companies
were able to lower costs by hiring foreign workers).
70. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 82 (noting that trade unions, employers,
and other groups were critical of rotational labor recruitment model); see also Seifert,
supra note 60, at 84 (stating that companies found it burdensome to continually train
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ment decided to grant five-year work permits to those foreigners
who had already worked in the country for five years.71  The
presence of foreign workers in the German Federal Republic in-
creased dramatically in the subsequent decade.72 The figure
grew from 95,000 in 1956 to 507,000 by 1961 and 1.3 million by
1966.7' The figure briefly remained steady amid a recession in
1966-67, 7 as Germany successfully exported some of its unem-
ployment by sending a portion of its Gastarbeiter home. 75 By mid-
1973, however, the number of foreign workers in the Federal
Republic had jumped to 2.6 million.76 Turkish laborers consti-
tuted 605,000 of the total figure.7 7
new guest workers); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that German employ-
ers regularly renewed temporary labor contracts to avoid rotational system that forced
them to retrain new workers).
71. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 82 (noting that German federal govern-
ment increased length of work permits to five years); see also (IcEKLI, supra note 55, at
112 (stating that special permit was issued to foreign workers who had been employed
in Germany for five years).
72. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that number of Germany's foreigners
grew from 95,000 in 1956 to 507,000 by 1961 and 1.3 million by 1966); see also CASTLES
& MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that total number of foreign workers in West
Germany increased from 95,000 in 1956 to 1.3 million in 1966 and 2.6 million 1973).
73. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (stating that total number foreigners living in
Germany rose from 95,000 in 1956 to 507,000 by 1961 and 1.3 million by 1966); see also
HERBERT, supra note 22, at 209 (noting that number of foreigners in Germany rose by
one million between 1959-1965); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that
number of foreign workers in West Germany grew from 95,000 in 1956 to 1.3 million in
1966 and 2.6 million 1973).
74. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (finding that many Turkish guest workers
returned home when German economy soured in mid-1960s); see also Minz & Ulrich,
supra note 29, at 80 (noting that number of foreigners living in Germany from 1960 to
1994 declined slightly); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that many guest workers
went back to their countries of origin amid 1966-1967 recession).
75. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (stating that significant number of guest work-
ers returned to Turkey amid economic downturn); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note
29, at 80 (tracking number of foreigners and foreign laborers in Germany from 1960 to
1994 and finding that number of foreigners grew to seven million in mid-1990s); BAR-
BIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that many guest workers were compelled to return
home during 1966-1967 recession).
76. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that number of foreign workers in
Germany had risen substantially by 1973); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79
(discussing increase in number of foreigners in Germany in early 1970s); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that Germany's foreign population had increased
to 2.6 million by 1973).
77. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 79 (explaining that Turkish laborers con-
stituted majority of foreign workers during this period); see also HERBERT, supra note 22,
at 230 (stating that number of Turkish workers in Germany reached 600,000 by 1973);
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B. The Termination of the Gastarbeiter Program
Concerns about the global oil crisis 78 and its effect on the
world economy prompted the West German government to ab-
ruptly end the Gastarbeiter program in 1973 7 and ban the entry
of non-European Community workers.8 0  The government
aimed to reduce and consolidate the country's foreign labor
force"' and hoped to encourage the remigration of foreign
workers to their countries of origin. 2 Social integration for
those that stayed was a further aim."3
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that Germany's foreign population had
increased to 2.6 million by 1973).
78. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (noting that recruitment of foreign labor
stopped after oil price shock of 1973); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that
recruitment of foreign labor was abruptly terminated in 1973 amid oil crisis); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that abrupt halt of Germany's guest worker was
both result of looming oil crisis and realization that permanent immigration was taking
place); Mehrlander, supra note 21, at 160 (noting that 1973 recession and global oil
crisis prompted decision to halt recruitment).
79. See Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (stating that halt in recruitment of foreign
labor occurred amid 1973 oil price shock); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at
71 (noting that looming oil crisis and realization that permanent immigration had
taken place prompted abrupt halt of Germany's Gastarbeiter program); Mehrldnder,
supra note 21, at 160 (noting that decision to halt recruitment of foreign labor was
result of 1973 recession and global oil crisis); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (finding
that German government stopped foreign labor recruitment in 1973).
80. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that 1973 ban on non-EC workers was
designed to reduce Germany's foreign employment and foreign population). The ban
on non-EU workers was in response to labor integration requirements of the European
Union. Id. See also Seifert, supra note 60, at 84 (noting that recruitment of foreign
labor stopped after oil price shock of 1973); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 29 (stating that
recruitment of foreign labor was abruptly terminated in 1973); CASTLES & MILLER, supra
note 17, at 71 (noting that abrupt halt of Germany's guest worker was both result of
looming oil crisis and realization that permanent immigration was taking place).
81. See Mtinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that recruitment stop was part
of government package aimed at consolidating and decreasing foreign employment in
Germany); see also Peter Kfihne, The Federal Republic Of Germany: Ambivalent Promotion of
Immigrants'Interests, in TRADE UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE, 1960-
1993, at 45 (Rinus Penninx & Judith Roosblad eds., 2000) (discussing consolidation
phase of Germany's guest worker policy).
82. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that German federal govern-
ment sought to encourage repatriation of its guest workers); see also CASTLES & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 80 (noting that government hoped unwanted guest workers would just
leave).
83. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that federal government
hoped to encourage integration of those foreigners who planned to remain in Ger-
many); see also ( IQEKLI, supra note 55, at 108 (noting that Germany's foreigner policies
broadened in 1970s to include social aims, such as integration, in addition to already
established economic aims); Heckmann, supra note 17, at 82 (noting that in 1973 Ger-
man state authorities adopted policy of integration for limited period of time); Mehr-
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Immigration declined and remigration increased slightly
during the recession of 1974-1975.84 By 1977, the total number
of foreigners had decreased by 200,000, and the number of for-
eign laborers fell by 706,000 to 1.9 million.85 As early as 1976, a
trend toward increased immigration was once again evident.86
The number of newly arriving foreigners crept up and by 1980
4.5 million foreigners were living in Germany, comprising 7% of
the country's population.8 7 The foreign workforce was 2.1 mil-
lion, of which 592,000 laborers were Turkish.88 The number of
foreigners remained fairly steady in the early 1980s, despite a
recession and fewer jobs for foreign workers.8 9 The figure dip-
ped temporarily in the period between 1983 and 1984, when the
German government began to offer financial incentives to en-
lander, supra note 21, at 160 (noting that federal government has enacted measures to
integrate its foreigners since 1970s).
84. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (describing brief decline in migration
of foreigners to Germany); see also W.E. Kuhn, Guest Workers As Automatic Stabilizer of
Cyclical Unemployment in Switzerland and Germany, 12 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 210, 221
(1978) (noting that great number of guest workers left Germany to return to their
home countries around 1975); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 80 (noting that
number of foreign men in FRG declined slightly between 1974 and 1981).
85. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that by 1977 total number of
foreigners living in Germany had declined significantly); see also Kuhn, supra note 84, at
221 (noting that in Spring of 1975 total number of foreign workers in Germany fell
below two million).
86. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that by late-1970s foreign mi-
gration to Germany was rising yet again); see also Ursula Mehrldnder, Federal Republic of
Germany: Sociological Aspects of Migration Policy, in THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION POLICIES
145, 152 (Daniel Kubat ed., 1979) [hereinafter POLITICS OF MIGRATION POLICIES] (dis-
cussing how recruitment ban failed to stop inflow of immigrants into Germany);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at80 (noting that total number of foreign women and
children living in Germany increased between 1974 and 1981).
87. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that number of foreigners
continued to rise throughout 1970s and 1980s); see also HERBERT, supra note 22, at 235
(stating that Germany's foreign population in 1980 was one million above what it had
been in 1972); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 189 (stating that number of Turkish
residents in Germany grew to 1.6 million by 1982).
88. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that Turkish nationals made
up significant portion of foreigners in Germany in 1980s); see also Foreign Population,
1980 to 2002, Federal Statistical Office, Germany 2003, available at http://www.destatis.
de/basis/e/bevoe/bevtab7.htm (reporting that Germany's foreign population totaled
4.45 million in 1980).
89. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that size of Germany's foreign
population did not change dramatically during 1980s); see also Foreign Population, 1980 to
2002, supra note 88; CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 81 (noting that Germany's
foreign population remained steady in late 1970s and increased again in early 1980s);
ClQCEKLI, supra note 55, at 49 (noting that more than 370,000 Turks returned to Turkey
between 1983-85).
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courage foreigners to return home. 90
The ban on entries of non-EC workers created a dilemma
for Germany's resident immigrants.9 Non-EC workers could
"ride out" the recession jobless or risk a bar on return.92 There-
fore, many of the same Turkish workers who willingly returned
home during the 1966-1967 recession decided to stay in Ger-
many during recessionary periods in the 1970s and 1980s, de-
spite being unemployed.93 They sought to bring their families to
Germany.94 Changing international norms in favor of family
reunification facilitated this process.95 In many cases, spouses
90. See Minz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that financial incentives aimed
at repatriation of guest workers resulted in decline in Germany's foreign population);
see also Kfihne, supra note 81, at 47 (noting that 300,000 foreign workers returned home
as result of incentives offered by German government); Mehrldnder, supra note 21, at
161 (noting that 1983 law provided incentives for unemployed foreign workers to re-
turn home).
91. See Mlinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 91 (explaining that Germany's foreigners
faced difficult choices as result of ban on non-EU workers); see also CICEKLI, supra note
55, at 107 (finding that recruitment ban created catch-22 for Turkish workers living in
Germany because leaving country might mean never being able to return); Heckmann,
supra note 17, at 72 (noting that Germany's foreign population increased despite ban
on new recruitment of foreign labor).
92. See M(inz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 91 (explaining that Germany's foreigners
were concerned that they would not be able to return to Germany to work in future if
they left); see also QICEKLI, supra note 55, at 107 (noting that even unemployed Turks
were reluctant to return home for fear they would not be able to return to Germany).
93. See Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 91 (noting that foreign workers remained
in Germany despite recession and even though they did not have jobs); see also CICEKLI,
supra note 55, at 107 (asserting that migrants' knowledge of advantages of German
social system also drove them to postpone their decision to return); Korte, supra note
32, at 36 (stating that foreigners remained in Germany despite recruitment stop and
sent for their families to join them).
94. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that foreign workers began to send for
their families after ban on non-EC workers went into effect); see also Alba, supra note 23,
at 121 (stating that number of foreign women and children migrating to Germany in-
creased after cessation of immigrant recruitment in early 1970s); BAR.BIERi, supra note
22, at 29 (explaining that Turkish immigrants brought their families to Germany after
1973 because they realized they were going to remain in Germany somewhat perma-
nently); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 80 (noting that total number of foreign
women and children living in Germany increased from 1974 to 1981).
95. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 771 (noting that family reunification had begun
to be seen internationally as human rights issue); see also POLITICS OF MIGRATION POLI-
CIES, supra note 86, at 157 (noting that Germany was not exempt from a "general trend
in family reunification"); Heller, supra note 28, at 198 (noting that humanitarian con-
cerns for family reunification after termination of guest worker program in 1973 led to
less restrictive immigration policies); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 80 (noting
that Germany grudgingly accepted family reunions as human right).
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entered the country as Gastarbeiter themselves.96 Additionally,
many immigrants started new families, and birth rates among
young immigrant families increased noticeably in the 197 0s. 7
C. Permanent Settlement and the "Racialization" of German Politics
The first generation of Gastarbeiter consisted primarily of
young, single males.9" An increase in women and children char-
acterized the second generation.99 Initially, Gastarbeiter resided
dormitory-style in huts or hostels near the factories they worked
in.'00 They had little contact with Germans and did not compete
for apartments or other facilities.'O° Reunited with their fami-
lies, many foreign workers began to seek housing in the inner
96. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that frequently spouses came to Ger-
many under auspices of guest worker program); see also CICEKLI, supra note 55, at 192
(noting that men encouraged their wives and daughters to sign up as guest workers in
order to get work permits for themselves by association); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note
17, at 71 (noting that officially recruited immigrants asked their employers to request
their wives and husbands as workers).
97. See Castles, supra note 29, at 519 (noting that number of German-born foreign-
ers rose significantly in 1970s); see also Minz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 92 (noting that
1.2 million of Germany's seven million so-called "foreign" residents were born in Ger-
many); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that immigrants increasingly
established families and gave birth to children in Germany).
98. See Castles, supra note 29, at 520 (noting that guest worker program was domi-
nated by young men); see also Alba, supra note 23, at 121 (noting that most foreign
laborers migrating to Germany in 1950s and 1960s were men); Heckmann, supra note
17, at 70 (noting that great majority of immigrants to Germany in 1960s were men).
99. See Castles, supra note 29, at 520 (noting that second generation of sojourners
was comprised primarily of women and children); see also Alba, supra note 23, at 121
(stating that number of foreign women and children migrating to Germany increased
after cessation of immigrant recruitment in early 1970s); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note
17, at 80 (noting that number of women and children residing in Germany increased
from 1974 to 1981); Heckmann, supra note 17, at 70 (noting that in 1970s immigrant
population changed to include more women and children).
100. See Castles, supra note 29, at 521 (describing living conditions of first genera-
tion of guest workers); seeJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 65 (noting that guest workers' provi-
sional status was symbolized by their accommodation in army-style employer-provided
mass quarters); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that employers had to
provide initial accommodation for guest workers); Heckmann, supra note 17, at 73
(noting that majority of guest workers lived in barracks or provisional accommodations
in 1960s); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 130 (noting that employers were respon-
sible for providing housing to immigrant workers).
101. See Castles, supra note 29, at 521 (noting that guest workers did not have
much opportunity to socialize with Germans); see also HERBERT, supra note 22, at 218-20
(describing living conditions of Germany's foreign workers in 1960s); CASTLES &
KOSACK, supra note 17, at 269 (describing how isolated many foreign families in Ger-
many felt).
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cities. 112
Immigrants became a convenient target for other marginal-
ized groups, including the native unemployed and other low-in-
come wage earners, who blamed foreigners for their economic
woes."' 3  Discrimination in housing was particularly severe.0 4
Landlords regularly turned down prospective tenants because
they were foreign,10 5 and signs and notices declaring that apart-
ment rentals were off limits to foreigners were not uncom-
mon.' °6 Government efforts to limit such discrimination 0 7 and
102. See Castles, supra note 29, at 521 (noting that foreigners sought housing
outside factory barracks once their families joined them in Germany); see also BARBIERI,
supra note 22, at 29 (discussing how Turkish immigrants began to put down roots in
Germany during 1970s); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 198 (noting that immi-
grants entered housing market because their need for family accommodation grew);
Heckmann, supra note 17, at 73 (noting that during 197 0s foreigners moved into apart-
ments, usually under discriminatory conditions); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at
270 (noting that foreign couples preferred any kind of accommodation to employer-
sponsored hostels).
103. See Castles, supra note 29, at 521 (noting that Germany's foreigners became
scapegoats for all of society's ills); see also CICEKLI, supra note 55, at 49 (describing grow-
ing hostility toward foreigners amid economic crises in Germany in 1980s and 1990s);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 81 (noting that non-European foreigners exper-
ienced socioeconomic exclusion through discrimination and racism); CASTLES &
KOSACK, supra note 17, at 270-71 (describing tendency of Germans to blame foreigners,
rather than their landlords, for overcrowded housing).
104. See Andrei S. Markovits & Samantha Kazarinov, Class Conflict, Capitalism, and
Social Democracy, 10 COMP. POL. 373, 381 (1978) (stating that foreigners faced housing
discrimination and noting that landlord signs prohibiting foreign renters were com-
monplace); see also FETZER, supra note 35, at 135 (noting that anti-immigrant sentiment
increased in German neighborhoods whose population consisted heavily of immi-
grants); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 35 (explaining that most Turkish immigrants must
contend with poor living conditions); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 198 (noting
that discrimination and lack of local knowledge made it difficult for foreigners to find
good housing); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 268 (noting that some German
landlords have exploited foreign renters).
105. See Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 381 (noting that discrimination
made it difficult for foreigners to get apartments in Germany); see also CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 198 (noting that some landlords refused to rent to foreign-
ers); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 268 (noting that foreign renters were regu-
larly exploited by German landlords).
106. See Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 381 (noting that signs and no-
tices declaring that certain foreigners were not wanted were common); see also CASTLES
& MILLER, supra note 17, at 198 (noting that some landlords would not rent apartments
or rooms to foreigners); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 268 (noting that German
classified ads for apartments frequently prohibited foreigners); see, e.g., HERBERT, Supra
note 220, at 225 (noting that restaurant signs prohibited Italians).
107. See Peter O'Brien, Continuity and Change in Germany's Treatment of Non-
Germans, 22 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 109, 117 (1988) (noting that German government's
involvement in protecting rights of foreigners at this time was very limited); see also
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the subsequent "ghettoization" of foreigners'0 8 in the inner cit-
ies were nonexistent in the early years of permanent settle-
ment.109
In the workplace, employers did little to quell xenophobic
tensions, 10 fueling the racism of native workers to prevent the
integration of immigrants into the working class movement.1 '
Germans and foreigners rarely worked side by side. 112 By hin-
HERBERT, supra note 22, at 236 (noting that business and government leaders re-
sponded with bewilderment and astonishment to social problems resulting from large
number of foreigners living in Germany). Leaders of West Germany's major political
parties repeatedly asserted that Germany was "not country of immigration," ignoring
fact that millions of foreigners had permanently settled there. Castles, supra note 29, at
517 (noting that German leaders refused to acknowledge that Germany had become
multicultural society). See also Jonathan Kaufman, The Issue Of Identity That Underlies
Germany's Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 1992, at 2 (noting that Germany's Constitu-
tion explicitly states that Germany is not immigration country); CASTLES & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 186, 202 (noting that political leaders continue to assert that Germany
is not country of immigration); Heckmann, supra note 17, at 69 (stating that official
position of German federal government has always been that Germany is not immigra-
tion country). In 1979, the German federal government began to make more of effort
to integrate foreigners. Castles, supra note 29, at 525 (noting that German federal gov-
ernment's earliest efforts to address permanent settlement of Gastarbeiter included pro-
posals for introduction of definite legal rights for foreigners); see also O'Brien, supra
note 107, at 122-26 (discussing federal and state efforts to integrate foreigners, includ-
ing attempts to extend foreigners' residence permits).
108. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 117 (noting that German government under-
took no steps to help immigrants avoid housing discrimination and ghettoization); see
also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 198 (noting that ethnic ghettos developed in
Germany).
109. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 117 (noting that government's involvement in
protecting rights of foreigners at this time was very limited); see also HERBERT, sUpra note
22, at 236 (noting that German government officials and company managers re-
sponded with "bewildered astonishment" to social problems resulting from the large
number of foreigners living in the country).
110. See Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 382 (noting that employers ex-
ploited anti-foreigner sentiment in workplace to prevent consolidation of foreign work-
ers into larger working class movement); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 206 (not-
ing that evidence of institutional racism included discrimination in hiring and promo-
tion and non-recognition of foreign workers' skills).
111. See Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 382 (noting that employers were
not interested in reducing anti-foreigner sentiment in workplace); CASTLES & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 206 (noting that local workers and their unions initially supported
workplace discrimination against foreigners). But see Kfihne, supra note 81, at 43 (not-
ing that over time German trade unions welcomed foreigners into their ranks); CASTLES
& KOSACK, supra note 17, at 130 (noting German trade unions made considerable ef-
forts to attend to special needs and problems of foreign workers).
112. See Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 382 (noting that immigrants
were excluded from complex jobs requiring communication with large numbers of peo-
ple); see also Kfihne, supra note 81, at 60 (explaining that even within trade unions
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dering the development of friendships between immigrants and
German employees, companies were able to limit the participa-
tion of foreign laborers in trade unions."' In fact, German em-
ployers and labor unions regularly came together against the
rights of foreign workers in the early years of the program."'
Discrimination was not limited to the workplace." 5 Studies
showed that media representations of foreigners, especially
Turks, were notably negative.116 In times of economic decline,
xenophobia manifested itself through anti-foreigner graffiti and,
at its worst, physical attacks.1 1 ' Foreigners were more likely to be
charged with crimes than Germans" 8 and to be treated poorly at
the hands of government officials.119
foreigners tend to be isolated); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 131-32 (noting that
many foreign workers feel that unions do not adequately represent their interests).
113. See Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 382 (describing foreigners' lim-
ited participation in trade unions); see also Kfihne, supra note 81, at 55 (noting that
many young foreigners do not join trade unions); Seifert, supra note 60, at 98 (noting
how few foreigners have German friends).
114. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 117 (noting that trade unions were not very
supportive of guest workers in early years of program). But unions, as well as churches
and other advocacy groups, became more supportive of the immigrant cause in 1970s
and 1980s. Id. at 122. See also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 206 (noting that
local workers and their unions initially supported workplace discrimination against for-
eigners). Over time, German unions realized that a split in the working class harmed
local workers too, so they made efforts to organize immigrants and fight blatant ex-
ploitation. Id.
115. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 32-33 (describing daily discrimination Ger-
many's Turks have had to endure); see also Alba, supra note 23, at 147 (characterizing
Germany's Turks as highly visible, socially stigmatized, and legally disadvantaged
group); FETzER, supra note 35, at 70 (noting that opinion polls, anti-Turkish hate
crimes, and vicious "Turkish jokes" are evidence of strong public opposition guest work-
ers and their families have confronted in Germany).
116. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that many studies have found that
German media portrayed foreigners, especially Turkish nationals, in negative light); see
also O'Brien, supra note 107, at 117 (noting that tide of article in popular German
magazine Der Spiegel, "The Turkish Invasion," articulated renewed fear of foreigners);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 206 (noting that racism against foreigners escalated
in 1970s when German unemployment rates soared).
117. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 33 (describing increase in xenophobia and
anti-foreigner violence in German cities such as Hoyerswerda, Rostock, M611n, and Sol-
ingen); see also HERBERT, supra note 22, at 225-27 (noting rise in xenophobic hostility
toward foreigners in Germany); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 204 (discussing
murder of several Turkish immigrants in arson attacks).
118. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that foreigners were more likely
than Germans to be charged with crimes); see also QIPEKLI, supra note 55, at 44 (discuss-
ing factors that create impression of disproportionate criminality among Turkish immi-
grants in Germany).
119. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 32-33 (noting that Germany's Turks have had
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German schools failed to provide any kind of special treat-
ment or language training for Turkish children.1 20  Unable to
adjust quickly enough to a new language and culture, many for-
eign schoolchildren struggled academically and their failure
rates in the 1970s were high. t21  Because Turkish youths left sec-
ondary school without the qualifying certificate required to pur-
sue apprenticeships or higher degrees, 122 their career choices
were limited to lower paying, blue collar jobs. 12 1 Moreover, a
ban on work permits for children of immigrant workers coming
to face daily discrimination, including isolation in crowded subways and refusal of ad-
mission to discos); see also FETZER, supra note 35, at 70 (noting that Turkish nationals
have been forced to endure racistjokes and hate crimes); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note
17, at 196 (noting that many young foreigners are refused training positions because of
prejudice); Alba, supra note 23, at 147 (noting that Germany's Turks have been socially
stigmatized and legally disadvantaged).
120. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 117 (noting that Turkish school children
rarely received any special training); see also Alisa Roth, Bilingual Education: Berlin Wall
For Turkish Children, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Dec. 21, 2000, at 7 (discussing challenges
Turkish children have faced in German schools); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at
196 (noting that until mid-1980s many of Germany's foreign children were failing in
schools); Mehrlander, supra note 21, at 167 (noting that German educational system
was not prepared to handle influx of foreigners into German schools). Educational
authorities had two aims: to integrate foreign children temporarily during their stay in
Germany and to prepare them for return to their country of origin. CASTLES & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 204 (discussing dual strategy federal officials used to deal with educa-
tion of foreign children). Accordingly, foreign children were separated from German
students and enrolled in "national classes," "preparatory classes," and "mother-tongue
classes." Id. This isolation prevented many foreign students from achieving education
success. Id.
121. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 117 (discussing school failure rates among
foreign children in Germany); see also Alba, supra note 23, at 118 (finding that educa-
tional accomplishments of foreign children in German school system do not match
those of their German counterparts); Mehrldnder, supra note 21, at 168 (noting that
children of foreign workers were twice as disadvantaged in German school system and
were frequently illiterate in two languages). But see CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at
196 (noting that school achievement rates among foreign children in Germany have
improved recently).
122. See Alba, supra note 23, at 130-31 (noting that many Turkish students are
destined to leave school system with minimal credentials or no credentials whatsoever
and that they are eligible for limited range ofjobs); see also Mehrlander, supra note 21,
at 168 (noting that many foreigners are only able to work as unskilled laborers because
they have not finished elementary school).
123. See Wilpert, supra note 23, at 476 (noting that Turkish teenagers have limited
options upon leaving school); see also Alba, supra note 23, at 130-31 (noting that many
Turkish students are not eligible for many jobs upon leaving school because they have
few qualifications); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 7 (stating that foreign children's chances
of finding apprenticeship or being admitted to university are slim); CASTLES & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 196 (noting that far fewer Turkish students are granted apprentice-
ships than their German counterparts); Mehrldnder, supra note 21, at 168 (noting that
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to Germany after December 1, 1974124 further limited the op-
tions of foreign children by making many of them ineligible for
any jobs or social benefits. 125 In recognition of the problems the
ban on work permits created, German policymakers abandoned
the so-called Schlisseldatum ["key date"] rule in 1978.126
German politics eventually became radicalized and "racial-
ized," with extremist politicians blaming foreign workers for the
country's social and economic problems. 2 7 Right-wing politi-
many foreigners are only able to work as unskilled laborers because they have not com-
pleted grammar school).
124. Under the ban, non-EC youths who entered Germany after November 40,
1974 could not receive employment permits. Castles, supra note 29, at 524 (noting that
ban on youth work permits was perfect recipe for juvenile delinquency because it left
youths with nothing to do); see also HERBERT, supra note 22, at 24748 (noting that 1974
ban on work permits led to socially and morally untenable situation); Korte, supra note
32, at 37 (noting that German federal government stopped issuing work permits to
adolescents who joined their families after 1973); Mehrlander, supra note 21, at 176
(noting that prohibition on youth work permits prevented foreign youths from ob-
taining apprenticeships). Foreign youngsters rushed to enter Germany to beat the
deadline for receiving work permit. O'Brien, supra note 107, at 121 (noting increase in
migration to Germany among foreign youths during this time); see also HERBERT, supra
note 22, at 247-48 (noting that 1974 ban on work permits did not have desired effect of
reducing migration to Germany); Korte, supra note 32, at 37 (noting that federal gov-
ernment stopped issuing work permits to adolescents who joined their families after
1973). Similarly, a 1975 law limiting foreigners' childcare benefits to those children
living in Germany had an almost identical effect. O'Brien, supra note 107, at 119 (not-
ing that Turkish families sent for their children because they did not want to lose gov-
ernment assistance); see also ICEKLI, supra note 55, at 193-94 (discussing how changes
in Germany's Kindergeld [children's benefits] program prompted Turkish families to
send for their children); Korte, supra note 32, at 36-37 (noting that changes in condi-
tions under which foreign workers could obtain financial aid for children caused for-
eigners to being more children to Germany). Stricter limits on spouses' right to work
caused many foreigners to migrate to Germany before the laws took effect. O'Brien,
supra note 107, at 121 (noting that foreign workers' spouses' right to work was re-
stricted by the German government); see also CICEKLI, supra note 55, at 229-31 (describ-
ing controls on admission of foreign spouses into Germany).
125. See Castles, supra note 29, at 524 (describing effects of so-called "key date"
rule); see also HERBERT, supra note 22, at 247-48 (discussing socially and morally untena-
ble situation wrought by 1974 ban on work permits); Korte, supra note 32, at 37 (noting
that German federal government stopped issuing work permits to adolescents who
joined their families after 1973); Mehrlander, supra note 21, at 176 (noting that 1974
ban on work permits prevented foreign teenagers from getting apprenticeships).
126. See Castles, supra note 29, at 524 (noting that ban on work permits led to
juvenile delinquency); see also JoP'EE, supra note 40, at 77 (noting that denial of work
permits to young foreigners created demoralized, crime-prone sub-proletariat in inner
cities); Korte, supra note 32, at 37 (noting that restrictive immigration policy measures
had to be repealed for legal reasons); Mehrldnder, supra note 21, at 176 (noting that
ban's cutoff date was changed to 1976 and liberalized in 1979).
127. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 776 (noting that German media and politicians
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cians accused immigrants of depleting social security, overpopu-
lating schools, and causing housing shortages and social un-
rest.128  One conservative opinion leader warned against the
"Orientalization" of Europe. 129  In turn, liberal politicians and
activists challenged restrictive plans and policies regarding for-
eigners. 13 0 They criticized Germany's jus sanguinis (citizenship
by blood) citizenship laws,13 1 which provided for citizenship by
descent, and called for a jus soli (citizenship by birth) ap-
proach. 132 By the early 1980s, the "foreigners" issue was a center-
piece of West German politics.13 3 The two leading parties, the
presented image of foreigners as ethnic minorities that take away jobs, abuse social
security, and overwhelm housing and schools); see generally JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 76-
85 (noting that German political process and debate leading up to Foreigners Law of
1990 included characterizations of Turkish residents as undesired and difficult for-
eigner group); see also Castles, supra note 29, at 533 (noting that segregation led to
xenophobia and political extremism); CicEKLI, supra note 55, at 49 (noting that pres-
ence of foreigners in Germany led to rise of extremist anti-immigrant political parties).
128. See Obituary, supra note 17, at 776 (noting that right-wing politicians blamed
immigrants for many of Germany's social problems); see also FETZER, supra note 35, at
132 (noting that German immigration debate has tended to focus on immigrants' use
of social services, rather than on depletion ofjobs); CASTLES & KoSACK, supra note 17, at
434 (discussing German poll in which respondents stated that foreign workers over-
strain social services).
129. Gfinther Gillessen, Die Orientalisierung Europas, FRANFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Apr. 2, 1980, at 1 (warning against "Orientalization" of Europe). See also
JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 78 (noting that German opinion leader had warned against
"Orientalization" of Europe).
130. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 122 (detailing public statements liberal groups
made in support of less restrictive foreigners policy); see also Anne Marie Seibel, Deutsch-
land ist doch ein Einwanderungsland Geworden: Proposals to Address Germany's Status as
"Land ofImmigration," 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905, 933-34 (1997) (discussing efforts
by liberal Social Democratic Party and Greens to expand citizenship rights of foreigners
in Germany); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 204 (describing three dominant po-
litical positions regarding presence of foreigners in Germany prior to 1990s, which
ranged from calls for exclusionary policies to calls for integration and recognition that
Germany had become multicultural society).
131. SeeJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 206-08 (noting that liberal German politicians
and activists criticized Germany's jus sanguinis laws); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at
42 (finding that Green party has lobbied to grant Germany's foreigners political rights).
132. See JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 206-08 (discussing Germany's once restrictive
citizenship regime and noting that grassroots attempts to reform it were partially suc-
cessful); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 42 (noting that Germany's liberal Green
party has pushed for full political rights for foreigners).
133. See Castles, supra note 29, at 527 (noting that immigration issue dominated
political agenda by early 1980s); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 55 (noting that
German politicians capitalized on foreigners issue in early 1980s); CASTLES & MILLER,
supra note 17, at 204 (explaining that national debate on foreigners policy started in
1970s and has continued up to present).
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Christian Democrats' 34 and the Social Democrats, '1 5 articulated
three goals in light of the "problem:" (1) the integration of for-
eign residents, (2) the restriction of additional immigration, and
(3) the encouragement of repatriation."3 6
Today, more than seven million foreigners, two million of
whom are Turks, live in Germany.1 37  Although labor recruit-
134. See Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), available at http://www.
cdu.de/ (outlining CDU's agenda and goals and reporting on latest partisan news).
135. See Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), available at http://www.spd.de
(describing SPD's platform and discussing current political issues).
136. See Castles, supra note 29, at 528 (noting that German federal government's
new initiative in regard to foreigners problem was aimed at integrating foreigners, re-
stricting additional immigration, and encouraging of repatriation); see also BARBIERI,
supra note 22, at 55 (stating that German government's new foreigners policy focused
on restriction, repatriation, and integration). To encourage repatriation, the German
federal government passed the Gesetz zur Fdrderung der Riickkehrbereitschaft von Ausldndern
[Law to Support Foreigners' Willingness to Return] in 1983. See Rosemarie Rogers,
Migration Return Policies and Countries of Origin, in 3 IMMIGRATION ADMISSIONS: THE
SEARCH FOR WORKABLE POLICIES IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 147, 154 (Kay Hail-
bronner et al., eds., 1997) (describing provisions of law); see also c IEKLI, supra note 55,
at 49 (noting that 1983 law led to feelings of insecurity among Germany's foreigners
and caused 370,000 Turks to return to Turkey); Mehrldnder, supra note 21, at 161
(finding that repatriation law contributed to insecurity felt by foreigners living in Ger-
many). The repatriation law offered the immediate repayment of social security contri-
butions to non-EC foreigners on the condition that they leave Germany immediately
and not return or seek work in Germany in subsequent years. Rogers, supra note 136,
at 155 (noting that 1983 law's incentives were aimed at encouraging foreigners to re-
turn home); see also Kfihne, supra note 81, at 47 (noting that foreigners could apply for
reimbursement of their contributions to state pension scheme under 1983 law); Mehr-
l.nder, supra note 21, at 161 (noting that 1983 legislation provided cash incentives for
foreign workers to return home). The repatriation program also offered financial in-
centives in the amount of DM 10,500 to foreign workers who had recently been laid off
and were willing to return home. Rogers, supra note 136, at 155 (stating that foreign
workers could receive a cash payment if they repatriated); see also QIGEKLI, supra note
55, at 110-11 (noting that unemployed foreigners were offered DM 10,500 to return
home); Mehrlander, supra note 21, at 161 (noting that foreign workers were eligible to
receive DM 10,500 if they left Germany). Although as many as 247,000 foreign workers,
primarily from Turkey, Portugal, and Tunisia, left Germany in 1984, at least one scholar
has estimated that only 45,000 or so left purely due to the government's return incen-
tives. Rogers, supra note 136, at 156 (discussing how few Turks actually took advantage
of program); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 30 (stating that cash incentives aimed at
encouraging Turkish guest workers to return home were not particularly successful).
Additional factors contributed to some foreigners' decision to leave Germany. Rogers,
supra note 136, at 156 (noting that law did not prompt decision to return home, but
gave some foreigners incentive to return home sooner than expected); ICEKLI, supra
note 55, at 49 (noting that feelings of racial and economic insecurity also contributed
to Turkish repatriation).
137. See Quickfacts: Society, German Embassy, Washington, D.C., available at http://
www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/facts/society.html (noting that Germany's Turk-
ish population totals two million); see also Abraham, supra note 21, at A19 (stating that
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ment of foreigners ended more than thirty years ago, much of
Germany's foreign population remains marginalized.' Job and
housing opportunities are limited, and prejudice lingers.'39
Caught between two cultures with little hope for the future, 4 °
Turkish children living in Germany face perhaps the most diffi-
cult challenge.14  The fall of the Iron Curtain,1 4 2 German
Reunification, and the subsequent influx of asylum seekers into
Germany 143 have exacerbated the plight of Turks in Germany,
44
more than two million people of Muslim Turkish origin live in Germany today); BAR-
BIERI, supra note 22, at 27 (noting that more than seven million foreigners live in Ger-
many).
138. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 32-33 (finding that Germany's Turks are subject
to discrimination on a daily basis); see also Alba, supra note 23, at 147 (finding that
Turks residing in Germany are socially stigmatized and legally disadvantaged); FETZER,
supra note 35, at 70 (noting that Germany's Turks have faced severe public opposition
that is reflected in negative opinion polls and hate crimes).
139. See CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 196 (noting that many young foreign-
ers are refused training positions because of prejudice); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22,
at 35 (discussing poor living conditions with which most Turkish immigrants must con-
tend); Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 381 (noting how difficult it is for for-
eigners to get apartments in Germany).
140. See generally Patrick Ireland, Reaping What They Sow: Institutions and Immigrant
Political Participation in Western Europe, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELA-
TIONS POLITICS: COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 233, 261 (Ruud Koopmans &
Paul Staham eds., 2000) (noting that young Turks in Germany faced terrible plight as
outsiders); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 7 (describing children of Turkish immi-
grants in Germany as outsiders); CIQEKLI, supra note 55, at 44 (discussing feelings of
isolation and frustration expressed by many adolescent Turks).
141. See Alba, supra note 23, at 130-31 (finding that many Turkish students are
eligible for limited range of jobs because they have few credentials when they leave
school system); see also BARBIERJ, supra note 22, at 7 (stating that immigrant children's
chances of finding apprenticeship or being admitted to university are "slim"); CASTLES
& MILLER, supra note 17, at 196 (noting that far fewer Turkish students are granted
apprenticeships than their German counterparts).
142. See CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 186 (noting that end of Cold War and
German reunification led to massive new population movements since 1989 that made
immigration and ethnic diversity central political issues in Germany after 1989); see also
Klaus J. Bade, From Emigration to Immigration: The German Experience in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries, in MIGRATION PAST, MIGRATION FUTURE, at 24-28 (discussing how
post-reunification alienation experienced by East Germans led to hostility and violence
directed at foreigners).
143. See CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 186 (noting that influx of refugees
from Eastern Europe forced immigration to top of German political agenda); see also
Anti-Immigrant Violence Increases In Germany: Neo-Nazi Attacks Prompt Public Debate, S.F.
CHRON., Oct 1, 1991, at All (reporting that influx of asylum seekers prompted anti-
foreigner violence in some parts of Germany); see also Marc Fisher, Expected Flood of E.
European immigrants Is Trickle So Far, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1991, at A29 (reporting that
approximately 140,000 refugees asked Germany for asylum in 1990, increase of 18%
from previous year).
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despite government efforts since the early 1980s to better inte-
grate the foreign population into Germany. 145
II: THE GUEST WORKER PARADOX
A. West Germany
Scholars have disagreed to what extent citizenship may have
better facilitated the integration of foreigners into German soci-
ety. 14 6 Many practitioners have preferred to emphasize the role
of language skills and work qualifications,1 47 and post-nationalist
analysts have argued that the relevance of nation-state citizen-
ship has declined as countries like Germany increasingly grant
"equal" rights to their non-national residents. 148  To be sure,
Germany's welfare State has been largely nationality-blind. 149 Of
the 4.5 million foreigners residing longer than eight years in
Germany in 1989, 3.5 million could assert many of the same so-
144. See BARBIERI, supra note 195, at 36-37 (noting that increase in number of non-
Turkish immigrants has worsened situation for Germany's Turkish residents because it
has adversely affected German opinions regarding all foreigners); see also CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 186 (noting that massive new population movements since
1989 made immigration and ethnic diversity into central political issues).
145. See O'Brien, supra note 107, at 125 (noting that German government made
efforts to better integrate foreigners in early 1980s). As of early 1980s, the federal gov-
ernment made concerted effort to integrate its foreign population into society at large.
Id. Federal expenditures for integration climbed after 1982, and Islamic instruction for
Muslim pupils was instituted in public schools in several German states. Id. See also
Bade, supra note 142, at 23 (discussing cautious government attempts to foster social
integration of foreigners).
146. See BARBARA MARSHALL, EUROPE IN CHANGE: THE NEW GERMANY AND MIGRA-
TION IN EUROPE 138 (2000) (discussing role citizenship plays in social integration); see
also RIVA KASTORYANO, NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: STATES AND IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE
AND GERMANY 117 (2002) (arguing that Turkish immigrant movement for German citi-
zenship became means of guaranteeing residence and political rights, not ensuring cul-
tural integration).
147. See MARSHALL, supra note 146, at 138 (noting that language and work skills
play essential role in social integration); see also Seibel, supra note 130, at 942 (noting
that citizenship does not lead to integration of foreigners unless it is otherwise legally,
politically, and socially feasible).
148. SeeJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 190 (noting that Germany grants many social and
labor rights to its foreign residents); see also KASTORYANO, supra note 146, at 142-43
(explaining that Germany's foreign workers, though not naturalized, have social citi-
zenship).
149. SeeJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 190 (noting that Germany's foreign population
generally qualifies for same public benefits as its citizen population); see also KASTORY-
ANO, supra note 146, at 77 (stating that Gastarbeiter receive same social allowances as
Germans); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 54 (noting that citizenship status has been of
minor importance in Western Europe in terms of access to social services).
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cial and labor market rights that German citizens did. 15 0
Critics of this paradigm, however, have argued that without
citizenship, immigrants live in perpetual exclusion.1 5 1 Although
non-national residents enjoy many rights that nationals do, full
equality (i.e. full political participation) is reserved for national
citizens. 152 Critics argue that such a schism between political
and economic membership is inconsistent with the values of a
liberal democratic society.55' The benefits a society draws from
the presence of immigrants cannot be reduced to the economic
sphere or plainly disentangled from the political arena. 154 For
150. SeeJoPP, E, supra note 40, at 190 (noting that Germany's foreigners have many
of same social rights as German citizens); see also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 35 (noting
that foreigners with legal residence in Germany possess same rights as Germans); Abra-
ham, supra note 21, at A19 (stating that Turkish immigrant workers get some benefits of
citizenship, such as healthcare and unemployment insurance, without being citizens).
But see Markovits & Kazarinov, supra note 104, at 382 (discussing sociocultural factors
and economic disadvantages that ensure that foreign laborers will occupy lowest posi-
tions in labor force and in society); see also Seibel, supra note 130, at 912-13 (discussing
difficulties foreign workers face in overcoming societal barriers).
151. See generally RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, IMMIGRATION AS DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE:
CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2000) (asserting that
exclusion of non-nationals from sphere of civic equality provokes concerns about legiti-
macy of public authority and laws that shape these non-citizens' lives); JoPPE, supra
note 40, at 186 (arguing that citizenship is essential to preventing stigmatization of
foreigners and their children); Abraham, supra note 21, at A19 (noting that Turkish
immigrants are not allowed full membership in German society).
152. See RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 151, at I (noting that foreign nationals cannot
vote in Germany regardless of their residency status); see also POLITICS OF MIGRATION
POLICIES, supra note 86, at 152 (noting that foreign workers were to enjoy all rights and
privileges of Germans, save suffrage); see also Heller, supra note 28, at 204 (noting that
immigrants of any class are not entitled to vote in U.S. state or federal elections).
153. See RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 151, at 36 (discussing citizenship issue); see also
Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 103 (urging that citizenship question be addressed in
light of size of Germany's foreign population). Mfinz has asserted that if government,
institutions, and political parties cater mainly to the interest of their constituencies,
then seven million foreigners are not only excluded from most forms of political repre-
sentation but also have much smaller opportunities to fight for resources and defend
their special interests. Id. See also Castles, supra note 29, at 533 (noting that principle of
"no taxation without representation" is basic democratic freedom central to modern
parliamentary states). Castles argues that the permanent exclusion of a large section of
the population (7%), or sections of particular social class, is not acceptable. Id.
154. See RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 151, at 36 (arguing that benefits society receives
from immigrants cannot be separated from political or economic spheres); see also KAS-
TORYANO, supra note 146, at 140-41 (noting that foreign workers become part of politi-
cal discourse despite their lack of citizenship). See also Castles, supra note 29, at 533
(noting that poor legal status is major factor in marginalization of immigrants within
West German society, contributing to ethnic segregation and racism); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 194-95 (noting that structural factors and discrimination
which led to initial low status of guest workers resulted in enduring patterns of labor
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example, the tax contributions of immigrants finance their so-
cial benefits as well as the system that ensures national peace and
security for the entire country, but non-citizen immigrants can-
not vote for or against these policies and programs. 155
Because they are subject to a political process from which
they are excluded, non-citizen residents lack the socioeconomic
security their work and residence permits theoretically grant
them. 1 6 The threat of deportation, however distant, always
looms. 157  Indeed, one-fifth of foreign residents living in Ger-
many for ten years or more have expressed worries about their
residency status.15 "
The failure of Germany's federal government to promptly
grant full citizenship rights to the children of its foreign workers
has had a particularly adverse impact on that generation's well-
being and on Germany's social fabric overall.1 9 Stigmatized as
market segmentation); CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 17, at 446-53 (discussing causes of
social prejudice, especially among working class). Castles points out that it is not the
employment of immigrants itself that causes social problems, but the attempt of guest
worker policies to treat these workers as purely economic beings, isolating their labor
potential from their other human attributes. Obituary, supra note 17, at 776 (noting
that not all racial intolerance is inevitable).
155. See RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 151, at 36 (arguing that liberal democratic soci-
ety cannot relegate one group of its members to single function, such as that of being
only immigrant workers); see also KASTORYANO, supra note 146, at 158 (citing 1991 re-
port that estimated economic contributions Turkish immigrant workers have made to
German welfare State could be as high as DM 57 billion).
156. See RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 151, at 3 (noting that foreigners frequently lack
feeling of socioeconomic security); see also Mfinz & Ulrich, supra note 29, at 103 (argu-
ing that foreign residents cannot defend their special interests if they are excluded
from political process).
157. See Castles, supra note 29, at 523 (stating that deportation was "permanent
sword of Damocles" hanging over guest workers). Foreign workers were justified in
feeling insecure because official German policy in the early 1980s requires that the
powers of deportation be used to their fullest extent to limit the size of the immigrant
population. Id. at 527. See also BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 36 (noting that foreigners
have no legal right to stay in Germany and may be expelled for any number of reasons).
158. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 261 (noting that Germany's foreign residents
still express concerns regarding their legal status); see also Castles, supra note 29, at 527
(noting that foreigners had every reason to feel insecure because officials were making
fullest use of powers of deportation to cut immigrant population).
159. See JopPKE, supra note 40, at 186 (arguing that without citizenship, second-
and third-generation foreigners are forever kept separate and stigmatized); see generally
BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 7 (describing children of Turkish immigrants in Germany as
outsiders); see also CIO4,EKLI, supra note 55, at 44 (discussing feelings of isolation and
frustration expressed by many adolescent Turks); Ireland, supra note 140, at 261 (not-
ing that young Turks in Germany have expressed feelings of bitterness, disappointment,
and insecurity and have turned to each other for protection).
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"foreigners," despite living in Germany most or all of their young
lives, the children and grandchildren of immigrant workers fre-
quently express feelings of bitterness, insecurity, and disappoint-
ment.160 The extent of this stigma became tragically apparent
when xenophobic violence escalated in the early 1990s.161
Indeed, widespread agreement exists that the legal and po-
litical exclusion of an entire generation of foreigners has led to a
dangerous sense of social isolation among younger foreigners,
who have compensated for their isolation byjoining militant eth-
nically or religiously based organizations.1 62 They have shunned
the organizations that once linked them to German society and
have withdrawn into their own communities for support. 63
They romanticize traditional lifestyles and have forged new mul-
tiethnic identities based on largely non-western reference
points."' In response to neo-Nazi Skinheads, young Turks
formed their own street gangs for reasons such as self-defense.1 61
In 1990, an estimated 7,000 third-generation Turks were active
in Berlin street gangs, 1 66 and a 1997 survey of third-generation
160. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 261 (noting that children and grandchildren of
Germany's immigrants feel isolated); see alsojoPPRE, supra note 40, at 186 (arguing that
foreigners such as Turks are permanently excluded and stigmatized as outsiders when
they are not granted citizenship); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 7 (noting that children of
Turkish immigrants in Germany are considered outsiders).
161. SeeJoPPIE, supra note 40, at 186 (noting that anti-foreigner violence increased
in 1980s); see also Kaufman, supra note 288, at 2 (discussing sudden outbreak of anti-
foreign violence in 1992); BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that German reunifica-
tion revealed increased level of hostility to foreigners among East Germans); HERBERT,
supra note 22, at 225-27 (noting rise of xenophobic hostility toward foreigners in Ger-
many); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 204 (discussing murder of several Turkish
immigrants in arson attacks).
162. See MARSHALL, supra note 146, at 138 (noting that Turkish youngsters have
joined extremist groups); see also 4ICEKLI, supra note 55, at 44 (explaining that feelings
of isolation and frustration have led to aggressiveness and juvenile delinquency among
adolescent Turks).
163. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 261 (noting that Turkish youths have with-
drawn into their own communities); see also (n EKLI, supra note 55, at 43 (noting that
development of foreign communities has led to residential segregation).
164. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 261 (noting that young foreigners identify
strongly with non-Western reference points); see also CICEKLI, supra note 55, at 44 (dis-
cussing how hostility and discrimination have prompted foreigners to attach to their
national culture and religious beliefs).
165. See JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 221 (noting that formation of Turkish street
gangs was in part response to attacks by Nazi skinheads); see also HERBERT, supra note
220, at 252 (discussing eruption and spread of street battles between gangs of German
and foreign unemployed youths).
166. SeeJoPPKrE, supra note 40, at 221 (noting that high number of young Turks are
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Turkish immigrants revealed an astonishing degree of national-
ist and religious attitudes. 1
67
Ironically, the Turkish population did not embrace the gov-
ernment's earliest naturalization initiatives.1 68 Although a com-
bination of factors, including high fees and feelings of being
"unwanted" in their host country, explained this phenomenon,
the biggest reason for the resistance by far was a proscription on
dual citizenship.1 69 This prohibition was rooted in long-held be-
liefs that double citizenship inevitably leads to conflicts of na-
tional loyalty.17 °
involved in Berlin street gangs); see also KASTORYANO, supra note 146, at 74-75 (noting
that formation of Turkish youth gangs is in part result of rage among young foreigners
at their treatment by skinheads).
167. See JoPPIE, supra note 40, at 222 (describing nationalist attitudes among
young Turks). Fifty-seven percent of the interviewed youths agreed with the Turk Fed-
eration slogan: "Turkdom is our body, our soul is Islam. A body without a soul is a
corpse." Id. Almost 66% of those surveyed agreed with the statement: "Every [Muslim]
must know that the religions of other nations are null and void, and that their members
are non-believers. Islam is the only right religion." Id. See also BETIGOL ERcAN AROUN,
TuRKEm IN GERmANY: THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE OF DEUTSCHKEi 70-71 (2003) (noting
that Turkish immigrants strongly identify with their homeland). Restrictive immigra-
tion policies on the part of the German government, as well as foreigners' fear of losing
their identity on foreign soil, have contributed to the self-segregation or ghettoization
of the Turkish population in Germany. Id.
168. See BARBIERI, supra note note 22, at 66 (noting that Turks initially were not
interested in becoming German citizens). Although two-thirds of Germany's immi-
grant population qualified for naturalization, the country still had by far the lowest
naturalization among European nations with guest worker policies. Id. See also Munz &
Ulrich, supra note 29, at 100 (noting that from 1974 to 1992 annual naturalization rates
in Germany were very low by international standards); see also Alba, supra note 23, at
121 (noting that only small fractions of foreign residents have naturalized); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 202 (noting that only 14,000 of three million Turks eligible
for German citizenship actually applied for it each year).
169. See also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 200 (noting that formation of
Turkish associations in Germany led to immigrant calls for political and social rights,
including dual citizenship); see also William Safire, Blood And Irony Help Decide Who Gets
To Become German Citizen, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1993, at 23 (noting that Turks favor dual
citizenship because they would lose property rights in Turkey if they became German
citizens).
170. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 69 (discussing school of thought that person
cannot simultaneously pledge allegiance to two Nations). Barbieri notes that critics of
dual citizenship believe that the legal status of dual citizens is unclear, especially in the
context of private international law. Id. In addition, dual citizens may be taxed twice or
have dual military obligations. Id. Finally, dual citizens may not be able to receive
diplomatic or consular protections in their second country of citizenship. See also Hail-
bronner, supra note 28, at 102 (noting that dual nationality has always been considered
as inconsistent with concept of loyalty and attachment to Germany); see generally JoPPKE,
supra note 40, at 203-04 (noting that German politicians who oppose dual citizenship
have asserted that foreigners who want to acquire German citizenship must commit
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The bar on dual citizenship ignored both the symbolic and
material value inherent in Turkish citizenship, creating an im-
possible dilemma for Turks living in Germany. 171 Because even
the children of Gastarbeiter were not given an automatic right to
live and work in Germany at this time and because deportation
was always a lurking possibility, naturalization offered the only
real security. 7 2 However unrealistic, many Turkish workers ad-
hered to the dream of returning to their homeland and saw the
renunciation of their Turkish citizenship as a betrayal of their
country, family, and people. 173 First-generation Gastarbeiter, in
particular, were hesitant to break these ties, and many arranged
to be returned to Turkey at least for burial after their death. 74
Moreover, substantial legal and financial dilemmas confronted
Turks who abandoned their citizenship.17 5 Visas were required
for Turkish reentry, and Turks lost the right to operate busi-
nesses, own land, and inherit once they naturalized elsewhere.1
76
themselves to national community). German opponents of dual citizenship believe that
the toleration of dual citizenship can lead to the formation of permanent national mi-
norities. Id.
171. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that Turks living in Germany did
not want to give up their Turkish citizenship); see also ARGUN, supra note 167, at 69-70
(noting that without Turkish citizenship Turks might find it difficult to inherit land,
own business, or be buried in Turkey); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 204 (stating
that Turks cannot easily give up their previous citizenship).
172. See Castles, supra note 29, at 527 (noting that naturalization was only mecha-
nism by which Turks could lock in their social rights). More than two million foreign-
ers had residence permits that could lead to deportation in wide variety of circum-
stances. Id. See also Alba, supra note 23, at 121 (noting that sojourner orientation ex-
isted among Turkish immigrants who felt they must be prepared for possibility of
return); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 202 (noting that even second-generation
immigrants could be deported under German law).
173. See BARBiERj, supra note 22, at 66-67 (noting that nearly all foreigners living in
Germany are reluctant to sever their ties to their homeland); see also Castles, supra note
29, at 527 (noting that many Turks were unwilling to surrender all hope of returning to
their country of origin in exchange for German citizenship).
174. See Castles, supra note 29, at 533 (noting that many elderly Turks choose to be
buried in their country of origin); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Nationality Law in the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany: Structure and Current Problems, in PATHS
TO INCLUSION 274-75 (noting that both psychological and practical reasons explain why
foreign workers are unwilling to relinquish their native citizenship).
175. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that Germany's official refusal to
accept dual citizenship was main deterrent why Turks did not naturalize); see also Safire,
supra note 169 (noting that naturalization rates among Turks historically have been low
because many of them feared they would lose property rights in Turkey if they applied
for German citizenship).
176. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that Turks who gave up their Turk-
ish citizenship would need visas to return to Turkey and lose right to operate business,
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A 1991 Berlin poll verified the strong deterrent effect of these
factors: 61% of the poll's Turkish respondents said they would
apply for German citizenship if they were not required to give up
their old one.177
After years of heated political debate, German citizenship
rules were relaxed in the 1990s. The Foreigners Law of 1990
made naturalization the general rule rather than the exception
and greatly lowered the costs associated with the process. 178
Moreover, the previously strict prohibition on dual citizenship
was eased.179 Subsequently, a growing number of long-term for-
eign residents naturalized, especially as more government ad-
ministrators used their newfound discretion to allow for dual cit-
izenship. i s
The political debate over the status of foreigners continued
through the 1990s.l sl The Christian Democrats rejected an am-
bitious reform proposal set forth by the Social Democratic Party
own land, or inherit); see also Safire, supra note 169 (noting that few Turks applied for
German citizenship because they would lose property rights in Turkey).
177. See BARBIEI, supra note 22, at 67-68 (discussing 1991 poll in which 61% of
Turks and 72% of Yugoslavs said they would apply for German citizenship if they could
retain their current citizenship); see also ARGUN, supra note 167, at 69-70 (quoting Turk-
ish immigrant who discusses his reluctance to break institutional and psychological ties
with Turkey).
178. See KASTORYANO, supra note 146, at 148 (noting that price of citizenship was
lowered to DM 100); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 202 (noting that it became
easier to obtain German citizenship in 1990s).
179. See Christian Joppke, Mobilization of Culture and the Reform of Citizenship Law:
Germany and the United States, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS
POLITICS: COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 145, 153 (Ruud Koopmans & Paul
Staham eds., 2000) (noting that 1990 law increased number of permissible exceptions
for dual citizenship); see also Neuman, supra note 174, at 275 (finding that special provi-
sions allowing dual citizenship were increasingly invoked in 1990s). See also Hailbron-
ner, supra note 28, at 103 (noting that certain exceptions in Foreigners Law led to
increase in number of naturalizations with dual nationality). Government officials
could grant exceptions if a foreigner was not able to renounce his previous nationality
or could only do so only under particularly difficult conditions. Id. An exception was
very likely to be granted if the original home country required military service. Id.
180. SeeJoppke, supra note 179, at 153 (noting that about half discretionary natu-
ralizations in 1993 entailed dual citizenship with full knowledge of German State au-
thorities). See also Hailbronner, supra note 28, at 104 (describing increase in naturaliza-
tions in the aftermath of citizenship reform). Of a total of 82,913 naturalizations result-
ing from the reformed provisions of the Foreigners Law, 39,111, or 47.2 %, involved
Turkish nationals. Id. See also KASTORVANO, supra note 146, at 148 (finding that natural-
izations surged in early 1990s).
181. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 263 (noting that Germany's Social Democrats
wanted to end country's prohibition on dual citizenship); see also KASTORVANO, supra
note 146, at 149 (discussing CDU's opposition to SPD's dual citizenship initiative).
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that would have led to an official acceptance of dual citizenship
once and for all and shortened the residency requirement for
citizenship.1 2 Nonetheless, a compromise was reached. The
1999 legislation allows children of foreign workers to hold both
German citizenship and that of their parents so long as one par-
ent has lived in Germany for at least eight years."8 3 The children
must, however, choose one nationality by the age of 23.184 The
law permits dual citizenship in situations where it is impossible
to renounce the citizenship of another country.'1 5
The Turkish government has aided its immigrant workers
abroad by easing inheritance laws regarding former citizens and
permitting former citizens to reacquire their Turkish citizen-
ship.8 6 As a result, most Turkish applicants for German citizen-
ship divest themselves only temporarily of their old citizen-
ship. l8 7 In turn, German authorities have become less vigilant in
182. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 263 (noting that SPD Party supported complete
elimination of ban on dual citizenship); see also KASTORYANO, supra note 146, at 149
(noting that Germany's Christian Democrats opposed SPD's initiative to end country's
prohibition on dual citizenship).
183. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 263 (noting that foreign children could attain
German citizenship if one parent had lived in Germany for eight years or more); see also
Background Paper: Citizenship Reform and Germany's Foreign Residents, German Embassy,
available at http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/archives/background/citi-
zenship.html [hereinafter Citizenship Reform] (discussing German citizenship laws that
became effective on January 1, 2000 and noting that main change in new regulations is
substantial reduction in length of residency requirement for adult foreigners); Hail-
bronner, supra note 28, at 103 (discussing 1990 law that facilitated acquisition of Ger-
man citizenship for foreigners aged sixteen to twenty-three).
184. See Ireland, supra note 140, at 263 (noting that foreign children must eventu-
ally choose which citizenship they wish to hold); see also Citizenship Reform, supra note
183 (noting that at age of twenty-three children must decide on one nationality).
185. See also Ireland, supra note 140, at 263-64 (noting that German authorities will
tolerate dual citizenship only where it is not possible to renounce nationality of another
country); see alsoJoeeKE, supra note 40, at 205 (noting that in practical terms dual citi-
zenship has become commonplace, even in Germany). At least one-third of discretion-
ary naturalizations of foreign residents in Germany lead to dual citizenship. Id.
186. SeeJoppE, supra note 40, at 205 (noting that Turkish government has made
its inheritance laws less restrictive and that Turks can request to have their citizenship
reinstated); see also Einbiirgern, Ausbiirgern, Einbirgern, DIE ZEIT, Mar. 28, 1997, at 69
[hereinafter EinbUirgern] (noting that Turkey will reinstate citizenship to its former na-
tionals).
187. SeeJopPKE, supra note 40, at 205 (noting that many Turks only temporarily
divest themselves of their Turkish citizenship); see also Einbuirgern, supra note 186, at 69
(stating that Turks only renounce their original citizenship temporarily); Hailbronner,
supra note 28, at 105 (noting that Turkish authorities assist their nationals in reacquir-
ing their Turkish citizenship after they have gone through German naturalization pro-
cess.)
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actually checking whether the citizenship has been relin-
quished.' 8
B. The United States
Although the United States has experimented with formal
guest worker policies,189 immigration in the United States tradi-
tionally has been an informal affair."'° Nevertheless, U.S. immi-
gration policies have had many Qf the same consequences as
Germany's failed Gastarbeiter program. 191
188. See JoPPVE, supra note 40, at 205 (noting that German officials have increas-
ingly permitted exceptions to dual citizenship); see also Neuman, supra note 174, at 275
(noting that authorities increasingly relied on special provisions to allow dual citizen-
ship in 1990s). But see Hailbronner, supra note 28, at 105 (noting increasing concern
among German authorities regarding abuse of country's citizenship laws).
189. Under the Bracero program, the U.S. granted temporary employment visas to
Mexican workers to alleviate WWII-driven labor shortages in the United States. The
program was halted in 1964. See generally MASSEY, supra note 18, at 35-39 (discussing
history of Bracero program). Currently, the United States grants temporary work visas
to professionals in high-tech jobs and to seasonal agricultural workers. See generally
Temporary Workers, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/services/tempbenefits/tempworker.htm.
190. See ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 33 (noting that large numbers of Mexican
workers historically made their way across U.S. border without going through formal
channels); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 105 (noting that United States implicitly
arranged to import Mexican workers throughout twentieth century); Griswold, supra
note 15, at 6 (noting that for all practical purposes from 1964 to 1986 Mexican immi-
grants were free to cross border into United States with few obstacles).
191. Both Germany and the United States have experienced the permanent settle-
ment of once temporary migrants. MASSEY, supra note 18, at 47 (noting that growing
numbers of Mexicans began to settle permanently in United States in 1980s); see also
ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that Mexican migration to United States has
become more permanent); Griswold, supra note 15, at 6-7 (noting that U.S. immigra-
tion policies in 1980s and 1990s prompted immigrants to remain in United States more
permanently); Obituary, supra note 17, at 761 (noting guest workers in Western Europe
did not return to their native countries); POLITICS OF MIGRATION POLICIES, supra note
86, at 192 (noting that de facto immigration had taken place in Germany despite Ger-
man federal government's unwillingness to recognize it as such). Both Germany and
the United States have experienced native backlashes against their immigrant popula-
tions. See CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 275 (noting that right-wing Republican
presidential hopeful Patrick Buchanan used anti-immigrant theme in his 1996 cam-
paign); see also MASsEY, supra note 18, at 89 (noting that U.S. politicians have tried to
outdo each other with symbolic gestures against undocumented migration); BARBIERI,
supra note 22, at 33 (describing increase in xenophobia and xenophobic acts against
foreign residents in Germany during times of economic downturn); HERBERT, supra
note 22, at 225-27 (noting that xenophobic hostility toward Turks and other foreigners
in Germany emerged in mid-1960s); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 204 (noting
that several Turkish residents were killed in arson attacks in Germany in early 1990s but
these deaths were followed by large anti-racism demonstrations throughout Germany).
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1. From Circular Migration to Permanent Settlement
Mexican workers rarely migrate to the United States with
the intent of becoming permanent settlers.'92 Their primary
goal is to bolster family finances through higher wages and ac-
cess capital not readily available to them in Mexico,' 93 in large
part because of an absence of commercial credit.'94 Money
earned in the United States gets sent home in the form of remit-
tances, 195 which provide investment funds to improve housing,
pay medical bills, and finance community projects.' 96 Most Mex-
icans see themselves as sojourners and plan to rejoin their fami-
lies after a few months or years in the U.S. labor market.'97
Many Mexicans do remain in the United States indefinitely,
192. See Fraser, supra note 31, at 101 (noting that illegal immigrants from Mexico
and Central America come to United States for seasonal employment); MASSEY, supra
note 18, at 12 (noting that Mexican families send workers overseas so that they can earn
higher wages to increase their savings in relatively short period of time).
193. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that need for credit and access to
capital motivates Mexicans to come to United States); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at
7-8 (noting that Mexican workers come to United States to take advantage of higher
wages); Fraser, supra note 31, at 101 (noting that seasonal immigrants from Mexico
come to United States to achieve target earnings).
194. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that need for credit and capital moti-
vates Mexicans to come to United States); see also Douglas S. Massey & Kristin E. Espi-
nosa, What's Driving US.-Mexican Migration? Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis, 102
AM. J. OF SocIoLoGY 939, 987 (1997) (finding that Mexicans migrate to United States
primarily for purpose of accessing scarce capital); Fraser, supra note 31, at 101 (stating
that seasonal immigrants travel to United States to accumulate savings); MASSEv, supra
note 18, at 12 (noting that Mexicans migrate to access capital that is scare at home and
to mitigate capital risks they would otherwise endure in Mexico).
195. See CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 220 (noting that most immigrant
workers have to send money home); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that
Mexican immigrants sent home remittances to improve their lives at home); Griswold,
supra note 15, at 5-6 (noting that Mexican families send workers to United States to
earn money to send back as remittances).
196. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that Mexican immigrants send remit-
tances home to their families who are often unable to obtain bank loans or other forms
of commercial credit); see also Allert Brown-Gort, Seeking Balance in the Immigration De-
bate, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2004, at A13 (noting that Mexican workers sent estimated
U.S. $13 billion in remittances from United States to Mexico in 2003); MAssEY, supa
note 18, at 11 (noting that Mexican immigrants send home billions of dollars in remit-
tances to improve their lives at home).
197. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (describing circular migration patterns
among Mexican migrants); see also Francisco Alba, Mexico: Crucial Crossroads (Migration
Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.), July 2002, available at http://www.migrationinfor-
mation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=211 (noting that many permanent immigrants be-
gan their journey to United States as circular migrants); Fraser, supra note 31, at 101
(noting that illegal immigrants from Mexico and Central America enter United States
on seasonal basis for employment purposes); MASSEY, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that
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for several reasons. 9 ' Some immigrants undoubtedly find
greater possibilities for their economic well-being upon arriving
in the United States.'99 Immigrants also depend heavily on so-
cial networks of friends and relatives who ease their journey and
subsequent settlement by helping them find employment and
housing.200 After several generations of migration, these net-
works have deepened and have laid a foundation for continuing
migration, which cannot easily be reversed.20 '
Third, government policies, particularly those aimed at halt-
ing illegal immigration, have played a facilitative role in immi-
grants' decisions to remain in the United States.202 After the
Mexicans come to United States to work for short periods of time to bolster their sav-
ings).
198. See MASSEY, supra note 18, at 47 (noting that growing numbers of Mexicans
began to settle permanently in United States in 1980s); see also ANDREAS, supra note 18,
at 38 (noting that Mexican migration to United States became more permanent as im-
migrants began to fill year-round jobs instead of seasonal jobs); Griswold, supra note 15,
at 6-7 (noting that U.S. immigration policies in 1980s and 1990s prompted immigrants
to remain in United States longer).
199. See, e.g., Mary Beth Sheridan, Invisible Community's Hushed Cheer: "Guest
Worker" Plan Excites Area's Illegal Mexican Immigrants, WASH. PosT, Dec. 27, 2003, at Al
(quoting Mexican immigrant who laments lack of comparable economic opportunities
at home); see also Heller, supra note 28, at 203 (noting that opportunity to work for
extended periods may be more important to immigrants than political or social privi-
leges); Fraser, supra note 31, at 101 (finding that about 5.5 million undocumented im-
migrants have lived in United States for more than one year).
200. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing important role social networks
play in helping Mexican immigrants get established in United States); see also Richard
Alba & Victor Nee, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM 188-89 (2003) (explaining
how Mexican social networks disseminate information on U.S. job opportunities and
border crossings to Mexico); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 38 (finding that immigrants
legalized after IRCA aided a second wave of illegal immigrants).
201. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining that social networks reinforce
current patterns of migration); see also Alba & Nee, supra note 200, at 188-89 (noting
that existing social machinery will lead to continuation of large-scale immigration from
Mexico for foreseeable future); Fraser, supra note 31, at 103 (noting that existing immi-
gration flows can serve to establish migration pathways and networks that maintain and
even expand migration flows); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that those who
were legalized under IRCA helped facilitate arrival of new illegal immigrants).
202. See Brown-Gort, supra note 196, at A13 (noting that tightened borders have
prompted immigrants to stay in United States for longer periods of time); see also Del
Olmo, supra note 25, at M5 (stating that tougher U.S. border enforcement in 1990s had
unintended consequence of forcing immigrant workers to lengthen their stays in
United States); Heller, supra note 28, at 206 (noting that various government efforts to
halt illegal immigration have failed to reduce pool of undocumented workers); Gris-
wold, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that increased border control has made Mexican im-
migrants less confident that they will be able to return to United States once they
leave); Duignan & Gann, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that strengthened border patrols
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passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
("IRCA") 20 3 and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),204 both of which substantially
increased Border Patrol spending, 2°5 Mexican immigrants in-
creasingly had to rely on costly smugglers to get into the United
States.2 6 Tighter border controls in urban areas also drove im-
migrants to enter the United States in more remote, rural areas,
where conditions for crossing were more dangerous.20 7 These
translated into higher physical and financial costs of entry for
immigrants, who began to stay in the United States longer out of
uncertainty over whether they would be able to repeat the jour-
and fencing have prompted many illegals to remain in United States rather than risk
being caught); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 109 (noting that tightening of border con-
trols has encouraged immigrants to stay longer in United States).
203. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (providing for increased bor-
der control spending and enacting sanctions against employers that hire undocu-
mented immigrants).
204. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, (Sept. 20, 1996) (bolstering number of bor-
der control personnel and increasing civil penalties for immigrants entering United
States illegally).
205. See Heller, supra note 28, at 206 (noting that U.S. government has made sub-
stantial investments in improved border enforcement, especially along Mexico-Califor-
nia corridor); Fraser, supra note 31, at 103 (noting that effective control of borders and
ports-of-entry is principal strategy for preventing illegal immigration); LFAH A. HAuS,
UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: NEW CHALLENGES AND CHANGING
COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 67-68 (2002) (discussing new strategies
implemented in 1990s aimed at reinforcing U.S. border with Mexico); ANDREAS, supra
note 18, at 38 (noting that IRCA authorized expansion of U.S. Border Patrol).
206. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that smugglers are increasingly used
to assist immigrants across U.S.-Mexico border). The share of illegal immigrants using
smugglers to cross into the United States from Mexico increased from 70% to 90% in
the 1990s. Id. Smuggler fees in the same period rose from $500 to $1,000 or more. Id.
See alsoJeffrey S. Passel, Undocumented Immigration, in DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 197
(noting that increased smuggling costs make border crossings more expensive and
thereby encourage undocumented workers to remain in United States for longer peri-
ods of time); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 97 (discussing emergence of migra-
tion industry that includes human smugglers who transport Mexicans across Rio
Grande River); MASSEY, supra note 18, at 8-9 (noting that tougher border control mea-
sures failed to increase odds of immigrants returning home); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at
95 (finding that 75% of all illegal Mexican border crossers use service of smuggler).
207. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that remote topography and hostile
desert climate resulted in 336 immigrant deaths in 2001, mostly from dehydration); see
also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 113-14 (noting that diversion of undocumented workers
to rugged terrain has increased risks of injury and death); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 95
(noting that smuggling fees have increased from $250 to $1,500 at some part of U.S.-
Mexico border).
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ney.20 Longer stays also became necessary to save the money
needed to pay off increasingly expensive smuggling fees. 2 9 Ac-
cordingly, the median stay of undocumented immmigrants from
Mexico grew from 2.6 years to 6.6 years from 1986 to 1998,210
and the number of undocumented immigrants doubled from
four million to eight million after 1986, with the undocumented
population growing at about 250,000 a year.211
Prior to 1986, migration patterns between the U.S. and
Mexico were more circular.2 12 Of an estimated twenty-eight mil-
lion Mexicans who had entered the United States from 1964 to
1986, 23.4 million, or more than 80%, went back to Mexico.
213
208. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that Mexican immigrants have be-
come less confident that they will be able to return to United States once they leave); see
also Duignan & Gann, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that strengthened border patrols and
fencing have prompted many illegals to remain in United States rather than risk being
caught); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 109 (noting that tightening of border controls has
encouraged immigrants to stay longer in United States). See, e.g., Sheridan, supra note
199, at Al (quoting Mexican immigrant who states that she is reluctant to return home
for fear she will not be able to cross border back into United States). Perversely, one of
the effects of U.S. border enforcement strategies in the 1990s has been to reduce the
previously circular movement of sojourners to and from Mexico. New Directions in the
U.S.-Mexico Relationship: The Elements of Bargain (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 14, 2001, at 11 [hereinafter New Directions] (noting that
many undocumented workers who otherwise might have preferred to stay in Mexico
have settled in United States because of danger and expense associated with crossing
U.S. border).
209. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that increased cost of smuggling fees
compelled many Mexican immigrants to stay in United States longer than in past); see
also Passel, supra note 206, at 197 (noting that higher smuggling fees made border
crossings more expensive for undocumented workers from Mexico); ANDREAS, supra
note 18, at 95 (noting that smuggling fees have increased from $250 to $1,500 at some
part of U.S.-Mexico border).
210. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that from 1986 to 1998 median stay
of undocumented immmigrants from Mexico grew from 2.6 years to 6.6 years); see also
MASSEY, supra note 18, at 131 (noting that Mexican immigrants have increased length of
their sojourns to United States); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 109 (noting that increased
risk and cost of crossing border increased incentive for many immigrants to extend
their stays or settle permanently in United States).
211. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that number of undocumented im-
migrants doubled from four million to eight million after 1986, with the undocu-
mented population growing at about 250,000 per year); see also Passel, supra note 206,
at 194 (stating that undocumented U.S. immigrant population increases annually by
roughly 200,000 to 300,000).
212. See Alba, supra note 197 (stating that IRCA unintentionally transformed Mexi-
can migration from predominantly circular flow into more permanent move); see also
MASSEY, supra note 18, at 101 (describing Mexican-U.S. migration in early 1980s as cir-
culation of undocumented labor).
213. See MASSEY, supra note 18, at 45 (noting that number of Mexican immigrants
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Because relatively lax border controls characterize this period,
214
the figures also indicate that immigrants were more willing to go
back home so long as the option of returning to the United
States in case of financial need remained open.215
Notably, Mexican demographics are changing in a manner
expected to reduce migration to the United States in the long
run. 2 1  Immigrants tend to be between the ages of 15 and 44
years old, a segment of the Mexican population that is shrink-
ing.2 17 In the next ten to fifteen years, the number of working
age Mexicans will drop from 1.2 million to as low as 600,000.218
As a result, the number of Mexicans expected to seek employ-
ment across the border is projected to subside.2 1 9 In the
meantime, migration rates remain high, with 150,000 unautho-
that returned home prior to enactment of 1986 immigration laws was approximately
80%); see also Migration Between Mexico And The United States 9, Binational Study on Mi-
gration, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1997), available at http://www.
utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/binational.hthl (noting that increasing number of Mexican im-
migrants have decided to settle in United States permanently); ANDREAS, supra note 18,
at 109 (noting that undocumented workers from Mexico have increasingly decided to
settle down permanently in United States).
214. See MASSEY, supra note 18, at 71-72 (noting that border controls were lax prior
to 1986); see also ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 33 (noting that in past large numbers of
Mexican workers made their way across U.S. border without going through formal
channels); Griswold, supra note 15, at 6 (finding that from 1964 to 1986 Mexican immi-
grants faced few obstacles crossing Mexican-U.S. border).
215. See MAssEY, supra note 18, at 71-72 (noting that lax border controls in mid-
1980s encouraged circular pattern of Mexico-U.S. migration); see also Griswold, supra
note 15, at 6 (stating that Mexican immigrants returned home with knowledge that they
could return to United States for additional work whenever they wished to raise addi-
tional capital); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 109 (noting that traditionally most Mexicans
who came to United States illegally went back and forth between two countries).
216. See U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions: An Historic Opportunity, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong., (Sept. 7, 2001) (comments by Dr. Demetri-
ous Papandemetriou, Co-Director, Migration Policy Institute) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings] (stating that changing Mexican demographics will reduce migration to
United States over long run); see also New Directions, supra note 208, at 8 (noting that
expected decline in Mexico's natural growth rate should reduce number of immigrant
workers entering United States); Griswold, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that demo-
graphic and economic factors within Mexico are likely to reduce emigration pressures).
217. See Senate Hearings, supra note 216 (noting that number of young Mexicans
is decreasing); see also Griswold, supra note 15, 12 (noting that declining birthrates in
Mexico are reducing growth rate of Mexican workforce).
218. See Senate Hearings, supra note 216 (noting that number of working age Mex-
icans is declining); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that number of young
workers entering Mexican domestic workforce is expected to decline by half in next
decade).
219. See Senate Hearings, supra note 216 (noting that number of Mexicans cross-
ing U.S. border is expected to decrease); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 12 (noting
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rized Mexican immigrants crossing the border each year to sat-
isfy the insatiable labor demands of U.S. industries.22 °
2. Labor Dependency and Social Stratification
For years, U.S. migration laws have existed in dissonance
with the labor needs of American companies,22' which changing
U.S. demographics have made ever more dependent on immi-
grant workers.2 22 As Baby Boomers near retirement, the median
age of U.S. workers has risen.223 The Department of Labor ex-
pects the median age of U.S. workers to grow from 36.6 to 40.6
years old between 1990 and 2010.224 Moreover, U.S. workers are
becoming more educated. 22' The number of native-born men
that demographic and economic changes within Mexico are likely to reduce number of
immigrants coming to United States).
220. See Senate Hearings, supra note 216 (noting that migration rates from Mexico
to United States remain high); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that cur-
rent high levels of Mexico-U.S. migration represent peak in volume).
221. See MAssEY, supra note 18, at 73 (noting that United States has pursued "polit-
ics of contradiction" in its immigration policies); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 1
(noting that U.S. immigration law contains virtually no legal channel through which
low-skilled workers can enter United States to fill excess jobs); ANDREAS, supra note 18,
at 88 (noting that anti-immigrant legislation ignored fact that employers in key sectors
of California economy relied on illegal immigrant workers).
222. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that U.S. workers are becoming older
and more educated while number of low-skilled jobs grows); see also New Directions, supra
note 208, at 1 (noting that influx of immigrants and their children will be necessary to
finance retirement of Baby Boomers); Future Labor, supra note 10, at 1-2 (noting that
number of people aged sixty-five and older will double from 35.1 million to 70.3 million
in next thirty years); Essential Workers, supra note 15, at I (noting that United States is
not producing enough new workers to compensate for Baby Boom retirement); Future
Growth, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that in next thirty years number of Americans aged
thirty-five to forty-four will decrease).
223. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that median age of U.S. workers will
rise to 40.6 years from 36.6 year); see also New Directions, supra note 208, at 1 (noting that
immigrants and their children will be needed to fund retirement of Baby Boomers);
Future Labor, supra note 10, at I (noting that retirement of Baby Boom generation and
improvements in medical technology will result in growing number of older Ameri-
cans); Essential Workers, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that reduction in total size of U.S.
workforce will occur as Baby Boomers retire); Essential Workers, supra note 15, at 1 (not-
ing that more than sixty million current employees will likely retire over next thirty
years).
224. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing Labor Department study); see also
New Directions, supra note 208, at 8 (stating that U.S. population is aging); Future Labor,
supra note 10, at 1 (noting that United States will see increase in number of older
Americans); Future Growth, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that number of Americans aged
thirty-five to forty-four will decline in next thirty years).
225. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (describing results of Labor Department
study, which found that number of native-born adult males lacking high school diploma
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without a high school diploma has fallen to 9% in 1998 from
53.6% in 1960.226 During the same period, the number of col-
lege degrees has risen from 11.4% to 29.8%.227 Meanwhile, the
number of low-skilled jobs has increased by more than 700,000 a
year. 2
2 8
Because U.S. workers are increasingly unable or unwilling
to fill the growing number of low-skilled positions2 2 9 U.S. com-
panies rely on immigrant labor to accept these jobs.23' Although
some economists argue that U.S. workers would fill immigrant
jobs at higher wages, they concede that many companies would
has fallen to 9% in 1998 from 53.6% in 1960); see also Educational Level Of U.S. Work Force
Rises, Report Shows, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Education Level] (report-
ing significant increases in education levels of U.S. workers); Joseph E. Hight, Young
Worker Participation In Post-School Education And Training, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 14
(U.S. Dept. Of Labor, June 1998) (noting that levels of formal education attained by
U.S. workers increased substantially during 1970s and 1980s); Future Growth, supra note
10, at 2 (noting that typical American worker in next generation will be manager rather
than laborer).
226. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (noting dramatic decline in number of U.S.-
born men without high school diplomas from 1960 to 1998); see also Education Level,
supra note 225, at 1 (reporting that proportion of workers without high school diploma
declined from 24% in 1978 to 15% in 1998); Future Growth, supra note 10, at 3 (finding
that higher levels of high school completion and post-secondary education among na-
tive-born Americans has prompted these workers to seek out higher paying and less
physically demanding positions).
227. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing rise in number of college degrees
awarded in United States); see also Education Level, supra note 225, at 1 (reporting that
one out of four U.S. workers in 1988 was college graduate, compared with one out of
five in 1978); Future Growth, supra note 10, at 3 (finding increased levels of high school
completion and post-secondary education among native-born Americans).
228. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (noting rise in low-skilled positions in U.S.
labor market); see also New Directions, supra note 208, at 9 (noting that U.S. demand for
low- and medium-skilled workers is on rise); Essential Workers, supra note 15, at 1 (noting
that unskilled and semi-skilled occupations have highest projected growth rates).
229. See Blalock, supra note 11, at 10 (reporting that undocumented workers do
not take away jobs from Americans because more jobs than willing workers exist in
certain industries); see also Daniels, supra note 11, at 36-39 (reporting that construction
would "shut down" without immigrant workers because no U.S. laborers are willing to
take these positions); Prewitt, sup-a note 11, at 3, 98 (noting that economic downturn
would not alleviate worker shortages in many service industries because U.S. workers
will not take certain jobs); Alvarez, supra note 13, at B8 (noting that agricultural indus-
try depends on immigrants to fill its labor force); Future Growth, sup-a note 10, at 3
(noting that native U.S. population has eschewed jobs in manual labor services indus-
tries).
230. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 13, at B8 (noting that as much as 70% of Califor-
nia's agricultural labor force consists of undocumented immigrants); see also Future
Growth, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that immigrants have filled low-skilled labor gaps in
recent years); Future Labor, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that increased immigration could
help solve labor and skill shortage in United States).
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ship low-wage jobs overseas rather than pay U.S. workers higher
wages.231
The Essential Worker Immigrant Coalition (EWIC),232 an al-
liance of businesses, trade associations, and other industry orga-
nizations, has continued to lobby for immigration reform, not-
ing the critical role foreign workers play in the many industries
the coalition represents. 233 According to the EWIC, businesses
as varied as hotels, restaurants, construction companies,
meatpacking plants, and nursing homes face severe labor
shortages in the coming years as native U.S. workers become too
elderly or too skilled too apply for these jobs.2 34
This unrelenting demand for immigrant labor was evi-
denced by industry behavior after the Immigration Reform and
Control Act was passed in 1986.235 Companies continued to hire
undocumented workers in droves, despite the prospect of facing
stiff penalties under the new laws.2 3 6
231. See Duignan & Gann, supra note 30, at 25 (noting that in absence of immi-
grant labor, some U.S. jobs would likely move offshore); see also Wood, supra note 25, at
1 (finding that U.S. workers are willing to take jobs currently filled by illegal immi-
grants, but only at higher salaries); Del Olmo, supra note 25, at M5 (noting that most
economists and demographers agree that immigrant labor is essential to filling low-
wage U.S. jobs); Warren Vieth, Economists See Benefits To Bush's Plan: In the Long Term,
The Picture Looks More Complicated, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at Al 4 (stating that undocu-
mented workers have become essential part of U.S. labor force).
232. Essential Worker Immigration Coalition, available at http://www.ewic.org/
(describing EWIC as coalition of businesses, trade associations, and other organizations
that is focused on resolving skilled and low-skilled labor shortage).
233. Letter from the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition to the United States Senate
(February 24, 2003), available at http://www.ewic.org/LettersofCongress.asp (asking
108th Congress to reform U.S. immigration system).
234. Documenting the Labor Shortage (Essential Worker Immigration Coalition,
Washington, D.C.), March 2002, available at http://www.ewic.org/Usefulinks.asp (not-
ing that many industries, including construction, nursing, and food services, anticipate
labor deficiencies as the U.S. workforce ages).
235. See Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Mt~nz, Introduction, in PATHS TO INCLUSION vii,
xvi (noting that employer sanctions did little to deter hiring of undocumented work-
ers); see also Heller, supra note 28, at 206 (noting that IRCA imposed employer sanc-
tions for first time on firms hiring illegal immigrants); Fraser, supra note 31, at 103
(noting that employer sanctions have been ineffective in preventing illegal employment
of unauthorized workers). But see Louis Uchitelle, Plan May Lure More To Enter U.S.
Illegally, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A12 (finding that although employers
faced up to $10,000 fines and jail time, employer penalties were difficult to enforce
because employers needed only to check job candidate's documents, not authenticity of
worker's documents).
236. See Schuck & Mtinz, supra note 235, at xvi (finding that employers continued
to hire workers despite IRCA's sanctions); see also Heller, supra note 28, at 206 (noting
that IRCA imposed employer sanctions for first time on firms hiring illegal immi-
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One study has estimated that a reduction in the undocu-
mented Mexican population would produce a $155 billion drop
in U.S. economic output.23 7 The study also noted that the pres-
ence of undocumented workers enables native U.S. workers to
move into more specialized positions. 238 Additional research
demonstrates that undocumented immigrants pay roughly $7
billion in annual taxes, including $2.7 billion to Social Security
and $168 million into state unemployment funds. 23 9 Arguably,
these payments serve as direct subsidies to these programs be-
cause undocumented workers are ineligible to collect from
them.240
grants); Fraser, supra note 31, at 103 (noting that employer sanctions have been ineffec-
tive in preventing illegal employment of unauthorized workers); ANDREAS, supra note
18, at 101 (noting that IRCA-imposed employer sanctions are notoriously weak and
minimally enforced with effect that employers regularly hire illegal immigrants).
237. See Raul Hinojosa Ojeda, Comprehensive Migration Policy Reform in North
America: The Key to Sustainable and Equitable Economic Integration, (North American Inte-
gration and Development Center, UCLA, Los Angeles, California), Aug. 2001 (discuss-
ing study which found that reduction in illegal Mexican immigrant population would
produce $155 billion drop in U.S. economic output); see also Mexican Immigrant Workers
and the U.S. Economy: Increasingly Vital Role, 1 IMMIGRATION POLICY Focus 6-8 (American
Immigration Law Foundation, Sept. 2002) (noting that Mexican workers are integral to
U.S. economic growth and are filling needed jobs in new geographic areas, such as
Mississippi and Tennessee). See generally CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 165 (not-
ing that on balance immigration had slight but beneficial overall effect on U.S. econ-
omy). A 1989 Department of Labor study found that foreign-born constituted nearly
7% of all U.S. workers and accounted for some 22% of annual growth of the workforce
in the 1980s. Id. See also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 105 (noting that benefits of Mexico-
U.S. migration have historically exceeded costs for all concerned).
238. See Ojeda, supra note 237, at 17 (explaining how presence of undocumented
workers in economy leads native workers to seek better jobs); see also Duignan & Gann,
supra note 30, at 25 (noting that competition from immigrants provides incentive for
native U.S. workers to find better employment or acquire further training); Griswold,
supra note 15, at 13 (noting that competition from immigrants gives native-born high
school dropouts even greater incentive to complete their education and enhance their
skills).
239. See David Bacon, For Immigration Policy Based On Human Rights, in IMMIGRA-
noN: A CIVIL RJGHTS ISSUE FOR THE AMERICAS 157, 159 (Susanne Jonas & Suzie Dod
Thomas eds., 1999) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE] (finding that illegal immigrants
contribute approximately $7 billion in annual taxes); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at
150-51 (noting that U.S. citizens benefit from taxes paid by immigrants); Duignan &
Gann, supra note 30, at 30 (asserting that overall, immigrants contribute more to public
coffers than they receive).
240. See Bacon, supra note 239, at 159 (noting that undocumented workers pay
estimated $2.7 billion to Social Security and $168 million into state unemployment
funds); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 150-51 (noting that U.S. citizens benefit from
taxes paid by immigrants); Duignan & Gann, supra note 30, at 30 (asserting that overall,
immigrants contribute more to public coffers than they receive). See also David Wessel,
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Despite such contributions, immigration rules treat undocu-
mented workers as criminals, while overlooking the employers
who hire and, in many cases, exploit these workers. 24' The un-
certainty of their legal status prevents immigrants from asserting
many rights in the workplace and society at large.24 2 With the
threat of deportation hovering over them, immigrants are un-
likely to demand higher wages or better working conditions.
2 3
Employers routinely use the threat of immigration raids to intim-
idate workers and prevent them from unionizing.24" Immigrants
rarely, if ever, file complaints concerning unpaid wages or over-
Immigration's Attraction Lies In Its Boost to Economic Vitality, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2003, at
A2 (noting that immigrant workers help finance U.S. Social Security system). Every
additional 100,000 immigrants shaves 3% off the seventy-five year cost of fixing Social
Security because of payroll taxes that immigrant workers will pay to finance the retire-
ment of the Baby Boomers. Id.
241. See, e.g, Ken Ellingwood, Tyson Smuggled Help for Years, U.S. Alleges, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2003, at A19 (discussing exploitation of undocumented workers at poultry com-
pany); see also Cindy Rodriguez, Union Alleges, Plans Protest at Salem Site, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 16, 2002, at BI (noting alleged exploitation and undercompensation of immigrant
construction workers); System Fails the Exploited, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2001, at Al 6 (re-
porting abuse of undocumented domestic workers); Fraser, supra note 31, at 104 (not-
ing that employers have threatened their illegal workers with exposure to INS in order
to elude demands for improved wages or working conditions).
242. See Heller, supra note 28, at 203 (noting that opportunity to work for ex-
tended periods may be more important to immigrants than political or social privi-
leges); Fraser, supra note 31, at 104 (noting that illegal workers tend to be "hard work-
ing, docile and compliant" out of fear that they will be exposed, apprehended or de-
ported); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 35 (noting that illegal immigrants were less likely to
organize or complain about working conditions because they lacked public support and
State protection).
243. See generally Haines & Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at 351-52 (explaining that
undocumented workers are unlikely to assert their rights at risk of being deported); see
also Liz Spayd, More Immigrants Speak Up About Bias: But Dependency On Employers Makes
Some Afraid to Complain, Rights Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, July 5, 1993, at All (quoting
immigrant rights advocate who states that most immigrants are so grateful to have work
that they do not want to complain); Fraser, supra note 31, at 104 (noting that illegal
workers are usually hard-working and obedient because they are afraid of being ar-
rested or deported); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 35 (noting that illegal immigrants were
less likely to organize or complain about working conditions because they lacked public
support and State protection).
244. See Bacon, supra note 239, at 165 (noting that immigration raids deter immi-
grants from joining unions or otherwise asserting their rights); see also Stephanie Ar-
mour, Immigrants Become Easy Targets For Abuse, Harassment On The Job: Workers Arrive For
Employment, Find Exploitation Instead, USA TODAY, July 27, 2000, at BI (reporting that
unscrupulous employers threaten to report immigrants workers to immigration officials
if they complain or unionize); Fraser, supra note 31, at 104 (noting that some employ-
ers threaten to expose illegal workers to INS in order to elude demands for improved
wages or working conditions).
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time, violations of health and safety laws, or sexual harassment
because they have no means of enforcing these claims.245 Un-
documented workers are more likely than native workers to be
subject to low wages and poor working conditions.2 4 6 In fact,
wages among undocumented workers have declined in real
terms.
24 7
3. Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and the Rise of "Nativism" in
U.S. Politics
The predominance of immigrants in low-skilled, low-paying
jobs and low-income communities248 has led to the public per-
ception that immigrants threaten the labor opportunities of sim-
ilarly skilled U.S.-born workers and receive an undeserved share
of public assistance.2 4 9 Conservative policymakers have intermit-
tently exploited this apparent immigrant "threat" for political
245. See Bacon, supra note 239, at 161 (finding that immigrant workers rarely file
claims against their employers); see also Fine, supra note 25, at LlI (noting that immi-
grant workers must endure low wages, forced overtime, high rates of workplace injuries,
discrimination, sexual harassment, and unjust firings); Heller, supra note 28, at 204
(noting that willingness of immigrants to assert their civil rights is constrained by fear
that they may be deported); Fraser, supra note 31, at 104 (finding that efforts to enforce
labor standards have effect of discouraging exploited immigrant workers, both legal
and illegal, from filing complaints about workplace abuses).
246. See Ojeda, supra note 237, at 29 (stating that undocumented workers tend to
have lower wages and worse working conditions that native workers); see also Andrew
Buchanan, Agency Will Come To Aid Of Illegal Workers, AT. J.-CoNsT., Oct, 27, 1999, at
A12 (noting that immigrant workers are often paid below minimum wage and suffer
workplace discrimination); Fraser, supra note 31, at 104 (finding that undocumented
workers are willing to work long hours for less than legal minimum wage).
247. See generally Bacon, supra note 239, at 163 (discussing falling wages of Los
Angeles' immigrant industrial work force); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 120-21
(commenting that IRCA led to lowered wages not just for undocumented workers, but
also for native employees); Griswold, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that employer sanc-
tions have artificially depressed wages of undocumented workers by reducing their bar-
gaining power and complicating task of hiring them).
248. See Fraser, supra note 31, at 101-02 (noting that most undocumented workers
are employed in low-skill, low-wage sectors); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (not-
ing that large number of undocumented workers from Mexico work in manufacturing,
construction, restaurants, and agriculture); Future Growth, supra note 10, at 3 (noting
that 1.1 million lower-skilled immigrants have filled jobs in United States since 1994).
249. See Haines & Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at 8 (noting that immigration debate
tends to focus on undocumented workers, rather than on legal immigrants); see also
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 215 (noting that illegal immigration and costs of
welfare for immigrants became major political issues in 1990s); Hugh Davis Graham,
Affirmative Action for Immigrants? The Unintended Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES:
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OP'rIONS FOR AMERICA 67 (John
David Skretny ed., 2001) (noting that by 1990s affirmative action and immigration poli-
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capital,25 ° such as during the immigration controversy of the
1990s. 251
Historically, U.S. immigration policy and public opinion re-
garding immigration have been linked to economic growth.2 5 2
When the economy is strong, citizens and policymakers are less
concerned about high levels of immigration, legal or not,253 but
when the economy falters, a backlash against immigrants is al-
most inevitable.2 54 The seeds of such a backlash were planted in
the 1980s and flourished in the 1990s, culminating with restric-
tive immigration and welfare legislation in 1996.255
Public alarm concerning immigrants first became evident in
the early 1980s, when levels of immigration surged amid gener-
ous asylum and refugee policies.25 6 As waves of asylum seekers
cies had converged and prompted public resentment toward both); MASSEY, supra note
18, at 150-51 (noting that although immigrants use public services, they also pay taxes).
250. See Lowell Sachs, Treacherous Waters in Turbulent Times: Navigating the Recent
Sea Change in U.S. Immigration Policy and Attitudes, in CMIL RIGHTS ISSUE 145, 147-48
(discussing how politicians and anti-immigrant lobbyists have used immigrants as scape-
goats and calls for immigration reform as quick-fix solution); see also WELCH, supra note
35, at 15-22, 28-29 (discussing nativist efforts to blame immigrants for society's ills);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 275 (noting that right-wing Republican presidential
hopeful Patrick Buchanan made anti-immigrant theme key element of his 1996 cam-
paign); MAsSEY, supra note 18, at 89 (noting that U.S. politicians have competed with
one another to offer symbolic gestures against undocumented immigration).
251. See Graham, supra note 249, at 53 (noting that public controversy over immi-
gration policy intensified amid economic recession in early 1990s); MASSEY, supra note
18, at 8 (noting that restrictive sentiment toward immigration was evident in late 1980s
and early 1990s).
252. See Sachs, supra note 250, at 146-47 (noting that economic conditions drive
public opinion regarding immigration so that immigrants benefit in economically
strong times and are targeted in economically weak periods); see also David Masci, Debate
Over Immigration, CQ RESEARCHER, July 14, 2000, at 18-19 (noting that potential for anti-
immigrant or anti-immigration backlash is stronger in weaker economic times).
253. See Sachs, supra note 250, at 146-47 (noting that when country's economic
prospects are strong immigrants are free to pursue work without backlash); see also
Masci, supra note 252, at 18 (finding that that immigration is non-issue when economy
is doing well).
254. See Masci, supra note 252, at 18-19 (stating that opposition to immigration
increases in weaker economic circumstances); see also JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. ED-
WARDS, JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 28 (1999) (noting
that anti-immigrant feelings are stronger when economic conditions sour); Sachs, supra
note 250, at 146-47 (stating that immigrants are targets of anger and frustration during
periods of political or economic difficulties).
255. See HAus, supra note 205, at 67 (noting that 1996 Act increased penalties
against illegal migrants); see also MASSEY, supra note 18, at 8 (noting that late 1980s and
early 1990s were time of restrictive sentiment toward immigration).
256. See DANIELJ. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CON-
TROL IN AMERICA 244-45 (2002) (noting that sharp growth of refugee admissions and
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entered the United States, illegal immigration became the focus
of considerable media attention, and Americans began to ex-
press their anxieties about the issue.25 7 In one poll, more than
90% of respondents favored an "all-out effort to stop" unautho-
2581rized entries.
At the same time, a small group of right-of-center conserva-
tives began to develop politically viable anti-immigrant rheto-
ric,259 and two national lobbying organizations, the Federation
for American Immigration Reform ("FAIR") 26 0 and the Ameri-
can Immigrants Control Foundation ("AICF"),261 promoted
their anti-immigrant policies to a larger constituency, mainly
through direct mailings to right-of-center magazine subscrib-
ers.26 2 Cultural homogeneity was the centerpiece of early anti-
grants of asylum in 1980s led to calls for reduction in immigrant admissions); see also
MASSEY, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that undocumented migration became salient
political issue during 1980s); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 98 (noting that up-
surge in refugee and asylum-seeker entries in mid-1980s became focus for aggressive
campaigns from extreme right).
257. See also TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 243 (noting that growing opposition to
immigration was evident among Americans in 1980s); see also GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra
note 254, at 28 (discussing how flow of Cuban and Haitian refugees into United States
in 1980s and 1990s increased public's support for change in Nation's immigration poli-
cies); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 98 (noting that migration became politicized
in mid-1980s in part because of increase in number of refugees and asylum-seekers).
258. See also TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 243 (noting that more than 90% of re-
spondents favored efforts to end illegal immigration); see also GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra
note 254, at 34 (stating that considerable consensus existed in 1980s that immigrants
and refugees should be kept to minimum); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 98
(noting that public pressure for migration control increased in mid-1980s).
259. See Sara Diamond, Right-Wing Politics and the Anti-Immigrant Cause, in CtwL
RIGHTS ISSUE 175, 177 (noting that during 1980s small group of political conservatives
began to argue that United States should be defined on basis of white ethnicity and
asserted that immigration posed threat to country's cultural homogeneity); see also
WELCH, supra note 35, at 38-39 (noting that nativists and restrictionists lobbied
lawmakers to reduce immigration in 1980s and 1990s); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note
17, at 272 (noting that groups such as restrictionist Federation for American Immigra-
tion Reform called for immigration moratorium); HAus, supra note 205, at 98 (noting
that FAIR strongly denounced any form of amnesty or legalization program for immi-
grants through news releases and action alerts).
260. Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), available at http://
www.fairus.org/About/AboutMain.cfm (noting that FAIR aims to improve border se-
curity and stop illegal immigration and supports immigration levels at rates of about
300,000 entries annually).
261. American Immigrants Control Foundation (AICF), available at http://www.
immigrationcontrol.com/ (noting that AICF's goal is to reduce immigration to "reason-
able" levels and bolster security measures to deter illegal immigration).
262. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 177 (noting that anti-immigrant groups used
tactics such as direct mailings to targeted groups to spread their message); see also
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immigrant activity, as supporters of the movement alleged that
the large influx of nonwhite immigrant groups threatened
America's Anglo culture. 26" These self-identified "paleocon-
servatives" believed that ethnicity, not a shared belief in core
American values, determined the country's identity.26 4 Among
the nativist arguments adopted by this group was the belief that
affirmative action encouraged nonwhite immigrants to retain
their distinctive racial and ethnic identities so that they could
take advantage of racial preference entitlements. 265 An antipa-
thy toward non-English languages and a fear that this linguistic
difference would undermine the American nation was another
common conviction. 26 6  This latter belief led to a successful
movement to promote English as the national U.S. language. 267
The well-funded organization, U.S. English, was founded in
WELCH, supra note 35, at 38-39 (noting that groups such as FAIR and AICF dissemi-
nated anti-immigration literature, organized rallies, lobbied lawmakers, and supported
political candidates that oppose immigration); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 272
(noting that FAIR lobbied for immigration moratorium that received minimal support
in 1990s); HAus, supra note 205, at 98 (noting that FAIR strongly denounced any form
of amnesty or legalization program for immigrants through press releases and action
alerts).
263. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (noting that anti-immigration activists
wanted to preserve "American" culture); see also WELCH, supra note 35, at 38 (noting
that nativists believed that United States should remain country of predominantly white
people of European origin).
264. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (noting that "paleoconservatives" were
not concerned about how immigrants impacted availability ofjobs for U.S. workers, but
rather were focused on threat immigrants posed to country's cultural homogeneity); see
alsoJohnson, supra note 33, at 112, 114 (noting that nativists were interested in preserv-
ing ethnic homogeneity in United States).
265. See GeorgeJ. Sanchez, Face the Nation: Race Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism
in Late Twentieth Century America, 31 INTr'L MIGRATION REv. 1009, 1020 (1997) (explain-
ing nativist tenet that affirmative action provides incentive for non-white immigration);
see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 33, at 114-15 (noting that Latin American immigrants have
been blamed for affirmative action); Graham, supra note 249, at 53 (noting that critics
of affirmative action thought it was absurd that immigrants could benefit from pro-
gram).
266. See Sanchez, supra note 265, at 1020 (noting that anti-immigration activists
were hostile toward bilingualism and feared that linguistic differences would "under-
mine" the United States); see also Johnson, supra note 17, at 115 (noting that nativists
opposed bilingualism because it symobolized loss of cultural identity).
267. SeeJoPK, supra note 40, at 173 (noting that organization U.S. English was
founded in 1983 with goal of declaring English national language of United States); see
also About U.S. English, U.S. English, Inc., available at http://www.us-english.org/inc/
about/ (describing organization as citizens' group aiming to preserve English language
in United States).
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1983,268 and has lobbied legislatures and initiated public refer-
endums to declare English the national language of the United
States ever since.2 6 9 It also has worked to phase out bilingual
programs and government services. 27' As a direct result of these
efforts, thirty-seven state legislatures have introduced Official En-
glish bills, 271 and more than half the states have passed laws or
constitutional amendments declaring English their official lan-
272guage. 2 Although Official English measures have been largely
symbolic and advisory,2 73 politicians did not fail to notice the
measures' broad popularity, which at their core were a public
referenda of the supremacy of Anglo culture.2 7 4
268. SeeJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 173 (noting that U.S. English aims to phase out
most bilingual programs and government services); see also About US. English, supra note
267 (noting that U.S. English believes that the passage of English as country's official
language will expand opportunities for immigrants to learn English); CASTLES &
MILLER, supra note 17, at 215 (noting that U.S. English movement campaigned for Con-
situtional amendment to declare English country's national language).
269. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (noting that Official English bills were
introduced in thirty-seven state legislatures); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 215
(noting that U.S. English succeeded in passing constitutional amendments making En-
glish official language in several states).
270. SeeJoPpsE, supra note 40, at 173 (noting that organization U.S. English hoped
to eliminate bilingual programs, but failed to achieve an English Language Amend-
ment to federal Constitution in 1983); see also Charlotte Libov, Bilingual Prograns Are
Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, at CN1 (reporting that public opposition to
bilingual education was becoming more widespread in 1987).
271. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (noting that English-only legislation had
succeeded in seventeen states by 1990). By the late 1990s, almost half of the states had
declared English to be their official language, and the U.S. House of Representatives
passed similar provision in 1996. Schuck & Miinz, supra note 235, at xv (noting that
about half of U.S. states have passed English-only bills); see also States with Official English,
U.S. English Fact Sheet, available at http://www.us-english.org/inc/official/fact_
sheets/ [hereinafter States with Official English] (noting that many states, including
Georgia, Iowa, Missouri, Utah, and Virginia had passed English-only legislation).
272. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (finding that more than half of U.S.
states have passed laws or constitutional amendments declaring English their official
language); see also Schuck & Ma1nz, supra note 235, at xv (noting that about half of U.S.
states have passed English-only bills); see also States with Official English, supra note 271
(listing those states that have passed English-only legislation, including Alabama,
Alaska, New Hampshire, Montana, and Wyoming),
273. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (noting that Official English measures
have been largely symbolic and advisory); see alsoJoPPE, supra note 40, at 173-74 (not-
ing that effect of official language declarations has remained mostly symbolic because
government agencies have not acted on these declarations and courts have stalled their
implementation on Equal Protection grounds).
274. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 178 (finding that politicians capitalized on
popularity of English-only bills); see also Robert Lindsey, Debate Growing On Use of English:
Drive On In Many Areas of U.S. To Make It Official By Law, N.Y. TIMES,July 21, 1986, at Al
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Interestingly, restrictive immigration reform proposals
found little support among Reagan Republicans, who supported
immigration as a means of accessing cheap labor.27 Media pres-
sure and opinion polls, however, showing broad public concern
about immigration reluctantly prompted the Reagan White
House to support reform. 276 After several years of political wran-
gling, the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") passed
in 1986.277 After intense lobbying by labor unions and civil
rights groups, the final legislation was more expansive than re-
strictive, 2 78 granting amnesty to three million undocumented im-
migrants while instituting sanctions against companies hiring un-
documented workers.2 79
By the early 1990s, the tide had turned and public senti-
ment concerning immigrants grew increasingly negative.28 ° Sev-
(finding that English-only laws were becoming increasingly popular across United
States).
275. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 255-57 (noting that Reagan Republicans sup-
ported immigration because it was consistent with free trade); see also KENNETH K. LEE,
HUDDLED MASSES, MUDDLED LAWS 95-97 (1998) (explaining that laissez-faire conserva-
tives support open immigration as element of free market system). But see MASSEY,
supra note 18, at 87 (noting that Reagan administration introduced legislation granting
president new authority to declare immigration emergencies and to seal border as early
as 1982).
276. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 256 (noting that U.S. President Ronald Rea-
gan was under pressure to introduce immigration reform bill); see also Robert Pear,
President Signs Landmark Bill on Immigration, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1986, at Al 2 (noting that
President Reagan's support for immigration reform was mixed).
277. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (enacting sanctions against employers
hiring illegal immigrants and granting amnesty to many illegal immigrants in United
States) [hereinafter IRCA]. See also TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 262 (noting that IRCA
was signed into law in 1986 after much political wrangling).
278. See Graham, supra note 249, at 66 (remarking that immigration rights coali-
tion turned restrictive efforts into statutes in 1986 and 1990 that considerably expanded
immigration); HAUS, supra note 205, at 66-67 (noting that IRCA had both restrictionist
and non-restrictionist provisions); MASSEY, supra note 18, at 49 (mentioning that IRCA
contained both deeply restrictive and wildly expansive provisions).
279. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 262 (noting that legislation's final form in-
cluded massive amnesty that legalized three million undocumented immigrants); see
also GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 254, at 177 (expressing that final version of 1986
immigration legislation won over many Democrats who had previously dissented); see
also Heller, supra note 28, at 203 (noting that status of 2.69 million undocumented
immigrants was regularized by 1995 under 1986 law); HAus, supra note 205, at 67 (not-
ing that three million people obtained permanent residency status under IRCA's am-
nesty program); MASSEY, supra note 18, at 49 (noting that IRCA had effect of legalizing
some 2.3 million undocumented Mexicans).
280. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 177 (discussing increase in anti-immigration
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eral public opinion polls reflected this shift,2 8 ' which occurred
in the midst of an economic downturn.282 A June 1993 poll re-
ported that 61% of respondents favored a decrease in immigra-
tion rates, up from 49% in 1986.283 Another poll that same year
found that while 59% of the American public thought immigra-
tion had been a "good thing" in the past, only 29% considered it
a "good thing" today.
2 4
By 1994, popular support for restricting immigration inten-
sified, as voters increasingly linked their negative economic ex-
periences to immigration.28 5 In a poll leading up the 1994 elec-
tion, 72% of respondents contended that mass migration was a
views); see also GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 254, at 35 (noting that U.S. anti-immi-
grant sentiment peaked in 1994 and 1996); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 215
(observing that illegal immigration and costs of welfare for immigrants became major
political issues in 1990s); Graham, supra note 249, at 67 (noting that by 1990s conver-
gence of affirmative action and immigration policies drew increasing public resentment
toward both); MASSEY, supra note 18, at 102 (noting that anti-immigrant hysteria
reached its peak in mid-1990s).
281. SeeJoPPKE, supra note 40, at 54 (discussing poll that found only 29% of re-
spondents considered immigration "good thing"); see also Diamond, supra note 259, at
180 (discussing 1993 poll in which 61% of respondents favored decrease in immigra-
tion rates, up from 49% in 1986); LEE, supra note 275, at 28 (describing 1992 poll in
which 60% of respondents said they were "more concerned" about immigration than
they were ten years earlier).
282. See Mike Dorning, Key Indicator Shows Economy Bogging Down, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
4, 1991, at 1 (reporting on weakened state of U.S. economy in 1991); see also David
Wessel, During Bush Presidency, U.S. Economy Has Remained Fundamentally bat, WALL ST. J,
Oct. 1, 1992, atA18 (noting that U.S. economic growth had been flat for several years);
Paul Blustei et al., Economies Falter Around the World: Slowdown in U.S., Europe, Japan Has
Global Ripple Effect, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1992, at Al (reporting on worldwide economic
slowdown of early 1990s).
283. See Diamond, supra note 259, at 180 (discussing 1993 poll in which 61% of
sample favored decline in immigration rates); see also LEE, supra note 275, at 28
(describing 1992 poll in which 60% of respondents said they were "more concerned"
about immigration than they were ten years earlier).
284. See JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 54 (describing results of poll and noting that
several polls in early 1990s found that American public had become increasingly restric-
tionist); TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 277 (noting that several polls in early 1990s re-
vealed anti-immigration sentiments among U.S. public).
285. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 277 (noting that anti-immigration senti-
ments increased in 1990s); see also GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 254, at 44 (stating that
public increasingly favored reduction in immigration by early and mid-1990s); CASTLES
& MILLER, supra note 17, at 215 (noting that illegal immigration and costs of welfare for
immigrants became major political issues in 1990s); Diamond, supra note 259, at 177
(noting that anti-immigration views increased in early 1990s); ANDREAS, supra note 18,
at 86 (noting that IRCA's perverse consequences helped set stage for powerful backlash
against illegal immigration in 1990s).
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"critical threat" to the country's "vital interests. 28 6 Another sur-
vey found that 20% of respondents placed illegal immigration
near the top of a list of issues that mattered to them the most;
the highest ranked answer was crime at 33%.287
Anti-immigrant sentiments were strongest in the key immi-
grant-receiving states of California, Texas, and Florida.288 In Cal-
ifornia, a grassroots group named Save Our State (SOS) 28 9 be-
gan to promote the now infamous Proposition 187,29 ° which
passed with overwhelming support in 1994.291 The ballot initia-
tive eliminated most state-provided benefits for illegal immi-
grants, including non-emergency healthcare and school educa-
tion, and was the showpiece of California Governor Pete Wil-
son's successful re-election campaign.292
286. Gallup/Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Poll, Oct. 7, 1994, American
Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1995, (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,
John Reilly, ed., 1995), at 32 (noting that 72% of poll respondents described mass im-
migration as "critical threat" to "vital interests" of Nation). See also TICHENOR, supra
note 256, at 277 (discussing 1994 poll results and noting that U.S. voters were increas-
ingly linking poor state of U.S. economy to immigration); Stephen Dinan, Americans
Oppose Increase In Immigration, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004 (reporting on poll in which
60% of Americans stated that present immigration levels represent "critical threat to
the vital interests of the United States").
287. NBC News/WALL ST. J. Poll, Oct. 14, 1994 (finding that illegal immigration
was issue that mattered most to respondents). Welfare reform was second most popular
response at 28%. Id. See also TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 277 (describing NBC News/
WALL ST. J. poll and noting that popular support for restricting immigration intensified
across country in early 1990s).
288. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 275 (noting that grassroots efforts opposition
to immigration was successful in California, Florida, and Texas). But see GIMPEL & E-
WARDS, supra note 254, at 16 (noting that growing strength of economies in Florida,
Arizona, and Texas have prevented growth of anti-immigrant movements in those
states); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 110 (noting that anti-immigrant feelings ran high in
California during 1996 presidential campaign).
289. Save Our State, available at http://www.save187.com (noting that organiza-
tion has launched new initiative to limit public benefits to illegal immigrants).
290. Codified at Cal. Penal Code section 113 (Deering Supp. 1995), Cal. Penal
Code section 114 (Deering Supp. 1995), Cal. Penal Code section 834(b) (Deering
Supp. 1995), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code section 10001.5 (Deering Supp. 1995), Cal.
Health & Safety Code section 130 (Deering Supp. 1995), Cal. Educ. Code section 48215
(Deering Supp. 1995), Cal. Educ. Code section 66010.8 (Deering Supp. 1995), Cal.
Gov't Code section 53069.65 (Deering Supp. 1995).
291. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 277 (noting that Proposition 187 passed with
59% of California vote); see also GIMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 254, at 16 (noting that
59% of California voters supported Proposition 187); Graham, supra note 249, at 53
(noting that California passed Proposition 187 in 1994); JoPPE, supra note 40, at 55
(noting that Californians voted overwhelmingly for Proposition 187).
292. See GiMPEL & EDWARDS, supra note 254, at 16 (noting Governor Wilson's sup-
port for ballot initiative Proposition 187); see also Graham, supra note 249, at 53 (noting
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Although the courts quickly moved to strike down much of
the legislation's harshest provisions as unconstitutional,298 the
symbolic potency of Proposition 187 and Governor Wilson's suc-
cess at the polls was not lost on politicians in other parts of the
country.294 When Republicans regained control of both houses
of Congress in 1994 for the first time in more than thirty
years, 295 they promoted a fresh round of restrictive immigration
reform. 29 6 These efforts resulted in the restrictive Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 2 9
7
and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcil-
iation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,298 which denied public benefits
to many legal immigrants and all illegal ones.2 99
that Proposition 187 helped Republican governor Pete Wilson win reelection); MASsEY,
supra note 18, at 88-89 (noting that Governor Wilson used anti-immigration rhetoric to
revive his struggling reelection campaign); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 86-87 (noting
that Pete Wilson revived his weakened gubernatorial campaign by supporting Proposi-
tion 187 and blaming state's difficulties on U.S. government's failure to secure border).
293. Cf League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (striking down several provisions of Proposition 187 as unconstitutional). See also
Heller, supra note 28, at 209 (noting that Proposition 187 largely has been enjoined
since its enactment); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 86 (noting that Proposition 187 was
declared unconstitutional).
294. See CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 275 (noting that right-wing Republi-
can presidential hopeful Patrick Buchanan made anti-immigrant theme key element of
his 1996 campaign); see also MAsSEY, supra note 18, at 89 (noting that U.S. politicians
competed with one another to offer symbolic gestures about undocumented migra-
tion); ANDREAS, supra note 18, at 86 (noting that Proposition 187 was designed and
promoted as symbolic gesture to send message to U.S. federal government and its pas-
sage sent shockwaves through halls of Congress).
295. See Dan Balz, Historic Republican Triumph: GOP Captures Congress, Party Controls
Both Houses For First Time Since '50s, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994 (reporting on 1994 Re-
publican victory in both houses of Congress); David M. Shribman, GOP Captures Con-
gress, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1 (reporting on Republicans' historical Congres-
sional victory in 1994); Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Shift in Power: Big Republican
Gains Bring the Party Close To Control of Congress, WALL ST. J., Nov 9, 1994, at Al (report-
ing on Republican election successes in 1994 election).
296. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 277 (noting that Republican agenda focused
on immigration reform among other issues); see also WELCH, supra note 35, at 14 (not-
ing that Republican-dominated Congressional task force issued dozens of recommenda-
tions for cracking down on illegal immigration in 1995).
297. IIRIRA, supra note 204 (reducing immigrants' eligibility for public assistance
and benefits).
298. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (eliminating public
assistance for many legal and illegal immigrants).
299. See Schuck & Mfinz, supra note 235, at xvi (noting that 1996 welfare reforms
denied federally funded benefits to many legal immigrants and all illegal immigrants);
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4. Citizenship and Socioeconomic Integration
One of the immediate results of the 1996 legislation was a
surge in naturalizations, 300 as immigrants once satisfied with per-
manent residence status suddenly felt compelled to protect their
place in society.3 1 Because the 1996 legislation limited public
assistance to non-citizens, 0 2 citizenship was the only way immi-
grants could assure access to these important social rights. 30 3
The families most adversely affected by the restrictions were
among the neediest in the country.30 4 Immigrant children in
the United States are more likely to be poor, live in overcrowded
housing, and to report being in poor health than children of
natives. " They also are far less likely to be insured.30 6 By re-
see also Heller, supra note 28, at 207 (noting that PRWORA denied welfare benefits to
both new and existing legal immigrants).
300. See TICHENOR, supra note 256, at 286 (noting rise in post IIRIRA naturaliza-
tions); see also Paul Van Slambrouck, Immigrants Shift Status: No Longer Sojourners, CHRIS-
TIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 21, 1999, at 1 (reporting increase in naturalizations among
U.S. immigrants); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 16 (noting that naturalizations in-
creased to 1.4 million in 1997 from 543,353 in 1994).
301. See Schuck & Mfinz, supra note 235, at xvi (noting that post-IIRIRA surge in
naturalizations was result of revaluation of U.S. citizenship); see also Alba, supra note 197
(noting that IIRIRA convinced many Mexican U.S. residents to seek U.S. naturalization
as way to protect themselves from curtailments of many of their social rights);
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that many immigrants see attaining citizenship
as way to protect themselves against unfriendly legislative and administrative policies);
CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 269 (noting that increase in naturalizations in
aftermath of 1996 welfare reforms resulted from legal changes that threatened to strip
benefits from legally resident immigrants but not citizens).
302. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that 1996 welfare reform legisla-
tion terminated eligibility of permanent resident immigrants for most means-tested
benefit programs); MASSEY, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that IIRIRA declared illegal
immigrants ineligible to receive Social Security benefits and limited their ability for
educational benefits, even if they had paid requisite taxes).
303. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 17 (linking post-1996 surge in naturalizations
to immigrants' desire to protect their access to social safety net); see also MASSEY, supra
note 18, at 96 (noting that 1996 provisions gave Mexican immigrants strong incentive to
acquire U.S. citizenship).
304. See Michael Fix & Laureen Laglagaron, Social Rights and Citizenship: Interna-
tional Comparison (A Report of Working Group on Social Rights and Citizenship for
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Comparative Citizenship Project, Wash-
ington, D.C.), Aug. 2002, at 11 (finding that 1996 immigration legislation had greatest
adverse impact on poorest U.S. families); see also Liza Cristol-Deman and Richard Ed-
wards, Closing the Door on the Immigrant Poor: Creating Permanent Underclass of Immigrants
Residing in the U.S.: "Welfare Reform"May Deter The Entry Of Many Talented, Industrious And
Valuable Individuals, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv 141, 151 (1998) (noting that immigrant
welfare reform provisions had potential to push 1.2 million people below poverty line).
305. See Fix, supra note 304, at 1] (noting that immigrant children are more likely
than children of natives to live in poverty and have poor health); see also Randolph
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stricting access to publicly subsidized childcare, transportation,
job and language training,30 7 the new legislation made it more
difficult for immigrants to participate in the labor force and ad-
vance their socioeconomic standing.3
08
Notably, the 1996 reforms also had a negative impact on the
U.S.-born children of immigrants.0 9 The U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment3 10 automatically grants citizenship to
children born within the country's national boundaries. 311 As a
result, more than three-quarters of all children in U.S. immi-
grant families are citizens.3 12
Capps et al., The New Neighbors (Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 31, 2003, at
16-17 (noting that many immigrant children face economic hardship).
306. See Fix, supra note 304, at 11 (finding that immigrant children frequently do
not have insurance or adequate care); see also Capps, supra note 305, at 17 (noting that
children of immigrants are twice as likely as native children to lack health insurance).
307. See Fix, supra note 304, at 11 (noting that IIRIRA made it difficult for immi-
grants to pursue work); see also Cristol-Deman, supra note 304, at 152 (stating that, in
absence of government aid, it is almost impossible for immigrants to acquire requisite
English skills required for citizenship and noting that welfare reform has left immi-
grants with few options and facing insecure future).
308. See Fix, supra note 304, at 11 (noting that IIRIRA restricted access to child-
care, transportation, and job and language training); see also Cristol-Deman, supra note
304, at 152 (discussing how absence of government aid limits immigrants' ability to
learn English).
309. See Fix, supra note 304, at 12 (noting that welfare reform resulted in decline
in use of benefits among immigrants' citizen children); see also Cristol-Deman, supra
note 304, at 153 (noting that undocumented immigrant parents were reluctant to claim
benefits for their citizen children); Jonathan Curiel, Welfare Reform Hurts Immigrants'
Children, New Research Says, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1999, at A7 (reporting that welfare
reform measures aimed at illegal immigrants were inadvertently punishing those immi-
grants' children).
310. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
311. See Neuman, supra note 174, at 251 (noting that under Fourteenth Amend-
ment's citizenship provisions U.S. citizenship can be attained at birth or through natu-
ralization). Even during the raucous anti-immigrant debates of the 1990s, attempts to
narrow the jus soli principle in United States through Constitutional amendment never
gained momentum. JoPPKE, supra note 40, at 149-50 (noting that references to Ger-
many's non-citizen immigrants or "permanent underclass" were frequent in Congres-
sional hearings over proposed U.S. amendment).
312. See Fix, supra note 304, at 11-12 (finding that many immigrant children are
U.S. citizens); see also Randy Capps, Hardship Among Children of Immigrants: Findings From
the 1999 National Survey of American Families (Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1,
2001, at 1 (stating that 80% of children with immigrant parents are themselves U.S.
citizens); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 28 (noting that in 1996 540,000 U.S.-citizen chil-
dren under one year of age were living with at least one foreign-born parent who was
not naturalized U.S. citizen).
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After 1996, a reduction in the use of benefits occurred not
just among the noncitizens that were the policies' targets, but
among the large population of immigrants' citizen children as
well.313 One explanation for this may be that restrictive policies,
such as those instituted in 1996, contribute to the alienation of
the immigrant population.3" 4 Restrictions on public benefits can
send the message to immigrants that they do not belong,3" 5 ef-
fectively discouraging the kind of feelings of membership that
would ordinarily promote citizenship." 6 Indeed, studies have
shown that even those immigrants eligible for public benefits
often fail to apply on the assumption they will not qualify or out
of fear that seeking out such benefits will have adverse effects on
their precarious immigration status.3" 7
After more than three million illegal immigrants were
granted amnesty in 1986 under IRCA,3"' immigrants increasingly
313. See Fix, supra note 304, at 12 (noting that welfare reform resulted in decline
in use of benefits among immigrants' citizen children); see also Cristol-Deman, supra
note 304, at 153 (discussing reluctance of undocumented immigrant parents to claim
benefits for their citizen children); Curiel, supra note 309, at A7 (reporting that welfare
reform measures aimed at illegal immigrants were inadvertently punishing those immi-
grants' children).
314. See Fix, supra note 304, at 12 (asserting that IIRIRA resulted in feelings of
alienation among immigrants); see also Nora V. Demleitner, The Fallacy of Social "Citizen-
ship, " or the Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 35, 47 (1997) (noting that welfare
reform increased immigrants' awareness of public hostility towards them).
315. See Fix, supra note 304, at 12 (arguing that restrictive welfare policies led to
feelings of alienation among immigrants); see also Demleitner, supra note 314, at 50
(stating that reductions in public assistance cause immigrants to feel increasingly alien-
ated from state which refuses to ensure barely minimal standard of living).
316. See Demleitner, supra note 314, at 50 (stating that reductions in public assis-
tance cause immigrants to feel increasingly alienated from state which refuses to ensure
barely minimal standard of living). But see ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that
anti-immigrant rhetoric of 1990s worked to increase number of citizenship applications
in United States).
317. See Michael Fix & Jeffrey Passel, The Scape and Impact of Welfare Reform's Immi-
grant Provisions (Urban Inst., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 13 (finding that immi-
grants will not seek benefits if they believe it could affect their immigration status); see,
e.g, Cristol-Deman, supra note 304, at 153 (noting that many pregnant, undocumented
women in California ceased to seek prenatal care after passage of Proposition 187 be-
cause they were under false impression that their medical benefits had been cut and
they were afraid of jeopardizing their precarious living situations).
318. See Heller, supra note 28, at 203 (noting that under 1986 law immigration
status of 2.69 million undocumented immigrants was regularized by 1995); see also
HAus, supra note 205, at 67 (noting that three million people obtained permanent
residency status under IRCA's amnesty program); MAssEY, supra note 18, at 49 (noting
that IRCA had effect of legalizing some 2.3 million undocumented Mexicans).
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took their futures into their own hands.3'9 A Department of La-
bor study discovered a surge in investment in language skills, ed-
ucation and training among legalized immigrants. 20 The same
study also found that newly legalized workers experienced a sub-
stantial wage increase.3 2 ' Real wages of undocumented workers
rose 15% in the five years following legalization. 22 The rise in
wages reflects the increased bargaining power of immigrants,
who could suddenly compete for jobs in the larger market if
their current one was unsatisfactory. 23 A high-level binational
panel of Mexican and U.S. experts has estimated that the wages
of Mexican immigrants could increase by as much as 20% if they
attained legal status.32 4
Nonetheless, naturalization rates among Mexicans have his-
torically been low. 325 Some critics have argued that this phe-
nomenon resulted from the fact that legal permanent residents
have in the past enjoyed many of the same rights as citizens,3 2 6
319. Shirley Smith, et al., Effects Of The Immigration Reform And Control Act: Charac-
teristics And Labor Market Behavior Of The Legalized Population Five Years Following Legaliza-
tion (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C.), 1996, at 45 (noting that newly legalized
immigrants worked to improve their skills after attaining legal status under IRCA); see
also Griswold, supra note 15, at 10 (discussing U.S. Labor Department study that found
surge in immigrant investment in language skills, education, and training after IRCA).
320. Id. (noting that 43% of Mexican males pursued skills training after being le-
galized); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that 1995 Department of Labor
study concluded that nearly half of Mexican men undertook some skills enhancement
training after attaining legal status).
321. Id. (noting that wages among newly legalized workers rose noticeably); see also
Griswold, supra note 15, at 10 (discussing U.S. Labor Department study which discov-
ered increase in real wages among newly legalized immigrants).
322. Id. (noting that real wages of undocumented workers rose 15% within five
years of being granted amnesty under IRCA); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 10
(noting that U.S. Department of Labor found 15% increase in real wages of undocu-
mented workers).
323. Id. (noting that rise in wages reflected greater bargaining power on part of
immigrants); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that legalization enabled
previously undocumented immigrants to assert new leverage in workplace).
324. See New Directions, supra note 208, at 4 (discussing potential for higher wages
among immigrants if they were legalized); see also Griswold, supra note 15, at 22 (noting
that legalized system of Mexican migration would raise wages and working conditions
for millions of low-skilled workers and spur investment in human capital).
325. Among 1977 cohort of immigrants, only 15% of Mexicans had naturalized by
1990, in contrast to 57% of Chinese immigrants. Neuman, supra note 174, at 259 (com-
paring U.S. naturalization rates among different immigrant groups). See also Del Olmo,
supra note 25, at M5 (finding scant evidence that immigrant workers are interested in
becoming U.S. citizens); MAssEy, supra note 18, at 96 (noting that Mexican immigrants
have historically displayed very low rates of naturalization).
326. See Peter H. Schuck, The Treatment of Aliens in the United States, in PATHs To
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giving them little incentive to naturalize or assimilate.3 27  How-
ever, this theory discounts other factors that influence immi-
grant decisions to naturalize, including the prospects for dual
citizenship.328
Although dual citizenship is generally accepted in the
United States, 2 9 it has traditionally not been allowed in Mex-
ico.33° As a result, Mexican immigrants have been reluctant to
acquire U.S. citizenship in the past for fear of losing property
rights at home. 1 In 1998, however, Mexico enacted a constitu-
tional amendment that allows its emigrants to keep their citizen-
INCLUSION 217 (noting that until recently differences in legal rights between legal per-
manent residents and citizens in United States were quite modest); see also Neuman,
supra note 174, at 259 (noting that permanent resident immigrants already enjoy nearly
all advantages that citizenship would entail). Cf MASSEY, supra note 18, at 96 (noting
that welfare reform reduced public benefits for legal immigrants who previously had
been eligible); see also Fix, supra note 304, at 9 (noting that United States has restricted
permanent residents' use of non-contributory benefits).
327. See Neuman, supra note 174, at 259 (noting that naturalization rates among
Mexican migrants have been low compared to other U.S. immigrant groups); see also
Cristol-Deman, supra note 304, at 153 (noting that many long-time residents who had
resisted becoming U.S. citizens due to cultural, political, or other loyalties decided to
start naturalization process after welfare cuts were reduced in 1996).
328. See Heller, supra note 28, at 203 (noting that rates of naturalization remain
low in United States because restrictions on dual citizenship in other countries can
adversely affect immigrants' property rights); see also Neuman, supra note 174, at 259
(noting that for long time many Mexicans were reluctant to naturalize because they
would lose property rights in Mexico and were not allowed to be dual citizens).
329. SeeJoppke, supra note 179, at 150 (noting that dual citizenship has always
been tolerated in United States); see also Neuman, supra note 174, at 257 (noting that
Congress lacks power to denationalize U.S. citizen who voluntarily acquires new nation-
ality by naturalization in foreign country). But see Schuck, supra note 326, at 237 (not-
ing that United States officially opposes dual citizenship and requires those who natu-
ralize to explicitly renounce all other allegiances).
330. See U.S. Mexicans Gain Dual Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A31
[hereinafter Dual Citizenship] (discussing 1998 Mexican law that ended prohibition on
dual citizenship); see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that until recently
Mexicans who obtained citizenship in foreign country were deemed to lose Mexican
nationality); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 270 (noting that Mexican naturaliza-
tion rates in United States have lagged in part because historically United States has not
made it easy for Mexicans to acquire U.S. citizenship).
331. See Neuman, supra note 174, at 259 (noting that Mexicans have been reluc-
tant to become U.S. citizens for several reasons, including fact that permanent residents
get many of same rights as citizens and because Mexicans fear losing property rights in
Mexico); see also Dual Citizenship, supra note 330, at A31 (noting that prior to 1998 many
Mexicans were reluctant to become U.S. citizens for fear that they would lose real es-
tate, inheritances or businesses in Mexico); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 270
(noting that constitutional restriction on foreigners owning property in Mexico was
major factor that Mexican immigrants chose not to acquire U.S. citizenship).
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ship even after naturalizing abroad. 32 According to Mexico's
Foreign Relations Ministry, more than thirty thousand Mexican-
Americans have reclaimed their Mexican citizenship under the
provision in the last three years alone.33
5. A New Wave of Immigration Reform
a. Background: Why Now?
A combination of political and economic factors has
prompted recent calls for immigration reform. 334 First, the 2000
Census made it increasingly obvious that immigrants in general,
and Latinos in particular, were becoming an important and pow-
erful political constituency.335 The Latino population grew to
32.8 million, 336 a 46.4% increase since 1990, 33' and Mexicans
332. SeeJoppke, supra note 179, at 151 (noting that Mexico now allows dual citi-
zenship); see also Alba, supra note 197 (noting that IIRIRA's restrictive nature motivated
Mexico to allow its nationals to retain double, or multiple, nationalities, and probably
strengthened its determination to protect its nationals abroad in more systematic way);
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 31 (discussing amendment to Mexican Constitution that
transformed country's citizenship rules); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 270 (not-
ing that changes to Mexican Constitution were expected to increase naturalizations of
Mexicans legally residing in United States).
333. See Dual Citizenship, supra note 330, at A31 (noting increase in number of
Mexican immigrants that have reacquired their former citizenship); see also Edward
Hegstrom, Dual Citizenship: Many Here Are taking Advantage of Mexican Program, Hous.
CHRON., Mar. 18, 2003, at 19 (discussing rise in dual citizenship among Mexican-Ameri-
cans); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 31 n. 52 (noting that significant numbers of Mexi-
cans have obtained U.S. citizenship by naturalization in recent years).
334. The growing power of Latino voters is one factor that prompted reform.
Masci, supra note 252, at 15-17 (discussing role immigration reform was likely to play in
2000 presidential election); CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at 271 (noting that Latino
voters have become focus of inter-party competition as both Democrats and Republi-
cans attempt to woo them). A second factor prompting reform were the harsh effects
of 1996 welfare and immigration reforms. Hines, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing how
IIRIRA's dire consequences led some legislators to seek reform); see also WELCH, supra
note 35, at 30 (noting that many lawmakers had begun to question 1996 immigration
laws despite their original support for them).
335. See Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that Latinos had become important
political constituency in 1990s); see also Elizabeth A. Palmer, Immigration Debate Gains
Intensity As Hill Awaits Details from Bush, CQ WEEKLY, Sept. 1, 2001, at 2 (noting that
immigrants are fastest growing group of new voters in United States).
336. See Melissa Therrien & Roberto R. Ramirez, The Latino Population in the United
States, Population Characteristics (U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C., Mar. 2000), at 1
(noting that U.S. Latino population totaled 32.8 million in 2000); see also Lynette
Clemetson, Hispanic Population Is Rising Swiftly, Census Bureau Says, N.Y. TIMES, at A22
(reporting that number of Latinos in United States reached 38.8 million in July 2002).
337. See Therrien & Ramirez, supra note 336, at 1 (noting that Latino population
grew by 46,4% from 1990 to 2000); see also Clemetson, supra note 336, at A22 (noting
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represented 66.1% of that figure.33 8 Accordingly, politicians be-
gan to court the Latino vote in the 2000 election and both Dem-
ocrats and Republicans have broadened their parties' positions
on immigration issues.33 9 President Bush's own advisors have
stated that the growing power of Latino voters motivated the
president to push an immigration reform agenda, despite oppo-
sition in his own party.34
°
A second factor was the unduly harsh aftermath of the 1996
legislation, especially the unexpected effects of IIRIRA.34 1 The
Act's most severe provisions eliminated discretionary waivers of
deportation, 42 allowed for the retroactive deportation of immi-
grants for past crimes, 43 and restricted judicial review.344 Subse-
quently, longtime permanent residents were separated from
their families for crimes committed years past and noncitizens
were indefinitely detained. 4' Needless to say, the courts struck
down several IIRIRA provisions as unconstitutional,3 46 and many
that number of Latinos in United States rose almost 10% in first two years of twenty-first
century).
338. See Therrien & Ramirez, supra note 336, at 1 (noting that Mexicans consti-
tuted 66.1% of U.S. Latino population in 2000); see also U.S. Born Hispanics Increasingly
Drive Population Developments (Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2002, at 1
(noting that two-thirds of United States' thirty-five million Latinos are Mexican).
339. See Masci, supra note 252, at 15-17 (discussing role immigration reform was
likely to play in 2000 presidential election); see also CASTLES & MILLER, supra note 17, at
271 (noting that both Democrats and Republicans have tried to win over Latino voters
in recent years).
340. See Washington, supra note 25, at Al (reporting on negative impact of presi-
dent's immigration plan on some of his conservative supporters); see also Bumiller,
supra note 25, at Al (reporting that president's immigration reform proposals were
designed to appeal to Latino groups).
341. See Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (discussing how IIRIRA's dire consequences led
some legislators to seek reform); see also WELCH, supra note 35, at 30 (noting that 1996
immigration laws were later questioned by those lawmakers who originally supported
them).
342. See 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (43), 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii) (1996) (eliminating discretion-
ary waivers of deportation).
343. See 8 U.S.C. 1229(a) (allowing for retroactive deportation of immigrants for
past crimes). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), April 24,
1996, 110 Stat. 1214, repealed the former waiver for permanent residents accused of
crime.
344. See 8 U.S.C. 1252 (restricting judicial review of removal proceedings).
345. See Hines, supra note 1, at 40-41 (noting that immigrants were deported
under most extreme provisions of IIRIRA); see also WELCH, supra note 35, at 35-36
(describing sweeps, round-ups, and raids that led to deportation of illegal immigrants
under new legislation).
346. Cf INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (striking down some retroactive restric-
tions on discretionary relief and certain limitations on judicial review); Zadvydas v. INS,
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legislators soon agreed that the Act had gone too far.3 4
7
Labor shortages arising from the 1990s economic boom also
helped drive the discussion on immigrant rights and immigra-
tion reform.348 Figures as prominent as Federal Reserve Chair-
man Alan Greenspan argued that increased immigration could
ease labor force deficiencies in the United States, 34 and an un-
likely alliance between business leaders, labor unions, and the
immigrant community emerged. 50 As corporate leaders looked
to immigrants to fill their countless vacancies, the AFL-CIO or-
ganized membership drives in immigrant communities. 35 1 Al-
though labor unions had traditionally opposed the employment
of undocumented immigrants3 52  and supported sanctions
against employers hiring such workers, 53 they began to view the
large number of immigrant workers as a potential source of po-
litical strength. 5 4
533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (finding that immigrant could be detained until determina-
tion has been made that no significant likelihood of removal exists in reasonably fore-
seeable future).
347. See Hines, supra note 1, at 40-41 (finding that legislators favored reform of
IIRIRA's harshest provisions); see also Events ofSeptember 11, supra note 6, at 1495 (noting
that lawmakers later sought to scale back or reverse overly broad measures of IIRIRA).
348. See Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that economic boom of 1990s made
immigration reform more politically viable); see also WELCH, supra note 35, at 31 (dis-
cussing how improved economic climate of late 1990s reduced opposition to immigra-
tion).
349. See Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that Alan Greenspan favored increased
immigration); see also Richard Stevenson, Greenspan Holds Forth Before Friendly Panel, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 27, 2000, at C1 (reporting on Federal Chairman Alan Greenspan's state-
ment that review of current immigration policies should be considered in light of U.S.
labor shortages).
350. See Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that organized labor, industry leaders,
and immigrant community jointly support immigration reform); see also Malone, supra
note 2, at I (noting existence of alliance between labor and business on issue of immi-
gration reform).
351. See Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that AFL-CIO has expressed interest in
having immigrants join union ranks); see also WELCH, supra note 35, at 32 (stating that
labor unions are eager to organize immigrants); Palmer, supra note 335, at 5 (reporting
that AFL-CIO hopes to turn immigrant workers into new recruits).
352. See HAuS, supra note 205, at 95 (noting that AFL-CIO's position toward illegal
immigrants changed in late twentieth century); Palmer, supra note 335, at 5 (noting
that organized labor has drastically revised its views on immigration and now supports
immigrants).
353. See HAus, supra note 205, at 97 (noting that AFL-CIO had made efforts to
enact employer sanctions prior to 1986); see also Hines, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that
labor unions had historically supported employer sanctions).
354. See Palmer, supra note 335, at 5-6 (discussing shift in labor's stance on immi-
gration issues and noting that labor unions now support immigrants' rights); see also
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b. The Bush-Fox Alliance: Anticipation and Apprehension
The U.S. and Mexican presidents set forth to address the
illegal flow of labor across their borders just months after taking
office . 55  They established a high-level binational working
group, composed of the attorney generals and secretaries of
state and labor from both countries, to work on the problem.356
The group established several principles that were to provide the
foundation of any future migration policy.3 57
In a September 2001 joint statement issued by the United
States and Mexico, Presidents Bush and Fox reasserted their
commitment to promoting "safe, orderly, legal and dignified"
migration.35 a They advocated a framework that would match
willing workers with willing employers,359 serve the social and ec-
onomic needs of both countries, respect the human dignity of
WELCH, supra note 35, at 32 (explaining that labor unions have begun to organize im-
migrants).
355. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that two newly inaugurated presi-
dents met in February 2001 to work together on immigration reform); see also Palmer,
supra note 335, at 1 (reporting on presidents' unprecedented immigration negotiations
that took place in February 2001).
356. See also Griswold, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing establishment of high-level
U.S.-Mexican working group to focus on immigration); see also
Joint Statement of the US-Mexico High Level Working Group on Migration, U.S. Department of
State, Apr. 4, 2001, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/2013.htm
(noting that working group's agenda includes discussion of border safety issues, regu-
larization of undocumented Mexicans in United States, and possible alternatives for
temporary workers with emphasis on circularity issues).
357. See "Two Amigos" Meet Again: Bush and Fox Agree on Principles But No Proposal -
Yet, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1431 (Sept. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Two Amigos] (noting
that U.S. and Mexican presidents had agreed on basic immigration principles on which
both countries would build). The two leaders agreed that reformed immigration poli-
cies should match willing workers with willing employees, serve the social and economic
needs of both countries, and respect the human dignity of all immigrants regardless of
their legal status in the United States. Id. The leaders agreed their countries should
share responsibility for ensuring that immigration took place through safe and legal
channels. Id. See also Hines, supra note 1, at 42 (noting that Presidents Bush and Fox
had agreed on immigration reform framework).
358. Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
White House Press Release, Sept. 6, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/ [hereinafter Joint Statement]. (expressing commitment by Pres-
idents Bush and Fox to promote safe and orderly migration between their two coun-
tries); see also Ronald Brownstein, Political Realities Intrude on Promise of Change, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at Al (reporting that Presidents Bush and Fox had discussed immi-
gration reform during Mexican leader's State visit).
359. Joint Statement, supra note 358 (stating that White House guest worker plan
aimed to match willing employers with willing employees); see also Brownstein, supra
note 358, at Al (reporting that President Bush's main priority has been to establish
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all immigrants, regardless of their status,3 6 ° and recognize the
contributions immigrants make to enrich both societies3 6 ' The
leaders agreed that the United States and Mexico should share
responsibility for ensuring that migration occurs through safe
and legal channels.16 2 They established a public-private "Part-
nership for Prosperity" alliance to spur private sector growth
throughout Mexico in an effort to address some of the root
causes of migration.3 63 They instructed the Cabinet-level work-
ing group to continue its discussions on several immigration is-
sues, including a temporary worker program, and requested pro-
posals "as soon as possible. ' 36
Independently, the White House emphasized that any tem-
porary worker program with Mexico would be carefully con-
structed to meet the needs of the U.S. economy and avoid dis-
advantaging U.S. workers. 5 President Bush, however, also ex
program that would permit low-wage U.S. service industries to import temporary work-
ers from Mexico).
360. Joint Statement, supra note 358 (stating that proposed White House guest
worker plan aimed to serve social and economic needs of all immigrants, regardless of
legal status); see also Edward Epstein, Fox Pushes Pact on Immigration: Congress Gives Mixed
Reviews to Appeals As Mexico's President Wraps Up U.S. Visit, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2001, at
A3 (reporting on statements by President Bush that indicate U.S. president seeks immi-
gration reform that addresses problems of both legal and undocumented immigrants
from Mexico).
361. Joint Statement, supra note 358 (stating that Bush proposal planned to recog-
nize contributions immigrants make to Mexico and United States); see also Epstein,
supra note 360, at A3 (reporting that U.S. President Bush stated that he wanted immi-
gration reform to recognize contributions undocumented workers have made to U.S.
economy).
362. Joint Statement, supra note 358 (stating that Presidents Bush and Fox had
agreed that their countries would share responsibility for ensuring safe and legal immi-
gration between their countries); see also Epstein, supra note 360, at A3 (reporting that
Presidents Bush and Fox focused on immigration reform that would provide legal
means for Mexican laborers to work in United States).
363. Joint Statement, supra note 358 (stating that public-private alliance had been
established to promote growth in some of Mexico's private sectors); see also Epstein,
supra note 360, at A3 (reporting that Presidents Bush and Fox announced creation of
public-private group called Partnership for Prosperity whose aim was to encourage U.S.
businesses to set up in Mexico).
364. Joint Statement, supra note 358 (instructing high-level Mexican-U.S. working
group to continue working on issues of immigration, including guest worker program);
see also Brownstein, supra note 358, at Al (reporting that Mexican and U.S. presidents
had directed binational working group to discuss possibility and details of guest worker
program).
365. Fact Sheet on Migration, supra note 4 (stating that any reform of U.S. immigra-
tion system should not disadvantage U.S. workers and that guest workers should be
used in cases where U.S. workers are not available). The White House noted that it was
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pressed a willingness to consider a temporary worker program
resulting in permanent residency or citizenship.36 6 Although
many Democrats supported the notion of a guest worker pol-
icy,36 7 they insisted that any such plan must avoid the "troubling
legacy of exploitation and abuse" which characterized temporary
worker programs in the past.36a They maintained that a tempo-
rary worker program must be market-focused to ensure that U.S.
workers are not displaced or their wages undermined. 369 These
Democrats stressed that participants in any new temporary
worker program must be given the same labor protections af-
forded U.S. workers, including the right to organize, the right to
change jobs freely - not only between employers, but across eco-
working with Mexico on options for a new program for temporary workers and empha-
sized that the program should meet the needs of the U.S. economy. Id. The presi-
dent's proposed temporary worker program would match willing workers with willing
employees and would aim to recognize the contributions undocumented Mexicans
make in the United States. Id. See also Brownstein, supra note 358, at Al (reporting
that Bush has proposed guest worker program that would allow U.S. businesses to im-
port labor); see also Epstein, supra note 360, atA3 (reporting that President Bush stated
that contributions of undocumented workers should be recognized).
366. Presidents Bush, Fox Discuss State Visit, White House Press Release, Sept. 6,
2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ (noting that
President Bush stated that he hoped to initiate reform plan that would provide guest
workers with some sort of normalization of their legal status). The U.S. president stated
that he was willing to consider ways for guest worker to earn green card status. Id. See
also Brownstein, supra note 358, at Al (reporting that U.S. President Bush had made
public statements in which he said he was willing to consider means by which guest
workers could attain green card status).
367. See Democrats Release "Principles" For Immigration Reform, While Restrictionist Cau-
cus Calls For Moratorium, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1268 (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Dem-
ocrat Proposal] (summarizing Democratic House-Senate task force recommendations on
immigration reform); see also Jonathan Peterson, Democrats Push For Legalizing Workers,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 2001, at 20 (reporting that Democrats endorsed enhanced program
of guest workers); Robert Collier, Democrats, GOP in Tug-Of-War For Immigration Over-
haul, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3, 2001, at A6 (reporting that Democrat proposal would allow
large program of guest worker farm visas); Michael Hedges, Democrats: Don't Limit Ex-
emptions to Mexicans, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 3, 2001, at I (reporting on Democratic sup-
port for creation of temporary worker program).
368. See Democrat Proposal, supra note 367, at 1268 (reporting that Democrats are
interested in ensuring that new guest worker program prevents exploitation and abuse
that characterized previous temporary laborer program); see also Collier, supra note
367, at A6 (reporting that Democrats would allow guest workers to unionize); Peterson,
supra note 367, at 20 (reporting that Democrats stated that immigrant employees
should enjoy same labor rights as everyone else).
369. See Democrat Proposal, supra note 367, at 1268 (noting Democratic support for
market-based temporary worker program); see also Hedges, supra note 367, at 1 (report-
ing that Democrats supported immigration policies that meet labor needs of America's
economy).
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nomic sectors - and the fully enforced legal protection of their
wages, hours, and working conditions. 370 Guest workers should
have the opportunity to become both permanent residents and
citizens,371 and should be allowed to bring their families to the
United States. 3 7 2 Democrats, as well as immigrant rights activists,
have also argued that any guest worker program should not be
limited to Mexicans.3 7 3
On the other end of the political spectrum, anti-immigra-
tion groups and some conservatives in President Bush's own Re-
publican party have called for a restrained approach to tempo-
rary worker visas374 or have opposed the idea of a guest worker
program altogether.37 5 Restrictionists absolutely contest the use
370. See Democrat Proposal, supra note 367, at 1268 (noting Democrat's focus on
labor protections for U.S. workers); see also Collier, supra note 367, at A6 (reporting that
Democrats would allow guest workers to unionize); Peterson, supra note 367, at 20 (re-
porting that Democrats stated that immigrant employees should enjoy same labor rights
as everyone else).
371. See Democrat Proposal, supra note 367, at 1268 (reporting that Democrats
wanted to grant citizenship rights to guest workers over long run); see also Peterson,
supra note 367, at 20 (reporting that principles released by Democrats suggested more
open'approach to legalizing immigrants and aimed to ultimately grant immigrants citi-
zenship).
372. See Democrat Proposal, supra note 367, at 1268 (noting that Democrats support
family reunification for immigrants); see also Peterson, supra note 367, at 20 (reporting
that Democratic lawmakers endorsed expansion of immigration to unify families); Col-
lier, supra note 367, at A6 (reporting that Democrat proposal would lift caps on family
reunification visas); Hedges, supra note 367, at 1 (reporting that principles endorsed by
Democrats include policies that reunite immigrant families).
373. See Eric Schmitt, Bush Says Plan for Immigrants Could Expand, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2001, at Al (noting that Democrats and other critics have complained that Bush's
guest worker plan would exclude millions of non-Mexican illegal immigrants from
equal treatment); see also Eric Schmitt, Other Immigrants, Envying Mexicans, Demand Break,
Too, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at Al (reporting that many immigrant rights groups
consider guest worker program aimed only at Mexicans unfair).
374. See Bush Administration Considers "Regularization" Proposals in Advance of Septem-
ber Meeting With Mexican President, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1269, 1270 (Aug. 6, 2001)
[hereinafter Administration Considers Regularization] (quoting Republican Representative
Tom Tancredo as stating that guest workers must go home at end of their tenure); see
generally Daniel B. Wood & Abraham McLaughlin, Can U.S. Halt Illegal Immigrants By
Hosting More "Guests"? U.S.-Mexico Talks May Center On Controversial "Guest Worker" Pro-
gram That Neither Side Likes Very Much, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 7, 2001, at 2 (not-
ing that groups on both ends of political spectrum have expressed opposition to tempo-
rary worker visas for different reasons); Palmer, supra note 335, at 3 (reporting that
some conservatives in and out of Congress have been skeptical of President Bush's pro-
posals on immigration).
375. See Wood & McLaughlin, supra note 374, at 2 (quoting Daniel Stein, presi-
dent of anti-immigration group FAIR, as stating that he opposes guest worker programs
because they are unenforceable and lead to amnesty for illegal immigrants); see also
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of guest worker programs to extend permanent citizenship to
any immigrants, undocumented or legal, arguing that guest
workers must go home at the end of their visa tenure. 6 In addi-
tion, opponents have been resistant to any mass amnesty or le-
galization program, which they equate with rewarding law-break-
ing behavior.377
Reaction among immigrant advocacy groups and Latino
communities has been mixed. 78 Many Mexican workers cur-
rently working illegally in the United States have supported re-
form, but their hope is for a program that normalizes their status
through legal residency, work permits, or citizenship. 79 They
fear that the presence of temporary workers could suppress
wages for all low-skilled labor.310 These workers, and the unions
that represent them, also have advocated that undocumented
workers currently in the country be legalized before a guest
worker program is introduced.38 ' Civil rights activists have em-
phasized that guest worker programs historically were inade-
Administration Considers Regularization, supra note 374, at 1270 (reporting that restric-
tionists oppose any new immigration or guest worker program); Palmer, supra note 335,
at 4 (reporting on restrictionist opposition to Bush's guest worker proposal).
376. See Administration Considers Regularization, supra note 374, at 1270 (describing
restrictionist opposition to toward temporary worker programs); see also Wood & Mc-
Laughlin, supra note 374, at 2 (reporting that those who oppose higher levels of immi-
gration are not enamored of idea of expanding guest worker program); Palmer, supra
note 335, at 4 (reporting that restrictionists in Republican Party were upset by Bush
proposal).
377. See Jerry Seper, Bush to Push For Amnesty, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at Al
(discussing opposition to amnesty among many Congressional Republicans); see also
Amy Borrus & Geri Smith, Spotlight On The Border, Bus. WK., Sept. 10, 2001, at 43 (not-
ing that amnesty provision would not be popular among Republican base).
378. See William Booth, Immigrants Wary of Guest Worker Plan: Impact on Wages, Com-
petition for Jobs, Permanent Residency Big Concern, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at A6
(describing mixed immigrant support for reform); see also David R. Ayn, Immigration:
Bush Can't Have Latino Support and Mexico, Too, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, at MI (report-
ing on reluctance of some Latinos to support guest worker program that does not lead
to permanent resident status).
379. See Booth, supra note 378, at A6 (reporting on ambivalence immigrants feel
toward immigration reform); see also Ayn, supra note 378, at M1 (noting that many
Latino leaders are wary of guest worker program that does not lead to permanent resi-
dent status).
380. See Booth, supra note 378, at A6 (finding that Mexican workers are concerned
about possibility of decreased wages); see also Wood & McLaughlin, supra note 374, at 2
(quoting immigrant advocate who states that guest worker programs create exploitable
labor force and depressed wages).
381. See Booth, supra note 378, at A6 (noting that many immigrant workers and
union leaders support legalization of immigrants already residing in United States); see
also Wood & McLaughlin, supra note 374, at 2 (noting that Mexican American Legal
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quate in protecting the rights of immigrant workers and have
called for strong protections in regard to wages and working
conditions. 8 2
c. The Impact of September 11 on the Immigration
Reform Debate
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had an immedi-
ate negative impact on public opinion regarding immigrants. 8 3
A poll conducted in October 2001 found that 58% of the public
believed that immigration levels should be reduced. 8 4 The poll
also found that 67% believed the U.S. government should not
make it easier for illegal immigrants to become citizens.38 5 An-
other survey concluded that 76% of Americans thought the gov-
ernment was not doing enough to control the border or the ad-
mission of foreigners into the country. 6 Moreover, 56% of re-
spondents thought efforts by Presidents Bush and Fox to
consider amnesty for as many as three million illegal immigrants
was a "bad or very bad idea.
'
"387
Defense and Educational Fund supports broad-based reform that addresses undocu-
mented workers already in United States).
382. See U.S.-Mexico Migration Discussions: Historic Opportunity, Hearing of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong., (Sept. 7, 2001) (comments by Raul Yzaguirre,
President, National Council of La Raza) (describing civil rights activist's concerns re-
garding temporary worker program); see also Palmer, supra note 335, at 1, 5-6 (report-
ing that Latino interest groups such as National Council of La Raza have historically
opposed guest worker programs out of concern that they would not include any real
worker protections).
383. See Sheridan, supra note 199, at Al (noting that public opinion has swung
against immigration since September 11 terrorist attacks); see also Hines, supra note 1,
at 45 (discussing negative impact World Trade Center attacks had on public opinion
about immigration).
384. CNN/USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, Oct. 26, 2001 (finding that 58% of public be-
lieved that immigration levels should be reduced). See also Hines, supra note 1, at 45
(discussing October 2001 poll and noting that almost 60% of respondents thought im-
migration rates should be reduced).
385. Id. (finding that 67% of public believed U.S. government should not make it
easier for illegal immigrants to become citizens). See Seper, supra note 377, at Al (re-
porting that poll found that 67% of respondents believed that U.S. government should
not make it easier for illegal immigrants to become citizens).
386. Zogby International Poll, Sept. 28, 2001, available at http://www.zogby.com/
soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=3954 (finding that 76% of Americans thought U.S. gov-
ernment was not doing enough to control border or admission of foreigners into
United States). See also Evan Osnos, Attacks Halt Movement Toward Migrant-Friendly Poli-
cies, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2001, at 7 (reporting on Zogby poll findings that that seven in
ten Americans favored stricter control of nation's borders).
387. Id. (finding that 56% of public believed that efforts by Presidents Bush and
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Anti-immigration sentiment,388  combined with increased
jobless rates,"' made the argument that immigrants are essential
to the success of the U.S. economy less politically viable, 390 even
though the underlying factors that created demand for immi-
grant labor remained unchanged.39' Many U.S. industries con-
tinued to depend on Mexican immigrant labor,3 9 2 despite the
crippled economy of the past three years3 3 because U.S. work-
Fox to consider amnesty for up to three million illegal immigrants was "bad or very bad"
idea). See Seper, supra note 377, at Al (reporting on Zogby poll that found that more
than half of Americans thought amnesty for illegal immigrants was not good idea).
388. See Hines, supra note 1, at 45 (noting that public favored reduced immigra-
tion after attacks of September 11); see also Seper, supra note 411, at Al (reporting that
American public did not think U.S. government was doing enough to control country's
borders in aftermath of September 11).
389. See Lisa Girion, Firms Put Hiring In Holding Pattern, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at
C1 (reporting that employers across country have frozen jobs and curtailed hiring since
World Trade Center attacks); see alsoJacob M. Schlesinger and Russell Gold, Labor Lost:
High-Employment Era Seems Over in Wake Of Terrorist Attacks, WALL ST. J., Oct 8, 2001, at Al
(reporting considerable weakening of labor market); Greg Ip, The Economy: Jobless Rate
Increases to 6%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2002, at A2 (reporting that unemployment rate
reached eight-year high in November 2002).
390. See Who Goes There, supra note 10, at 27-28 (explaining that prospects for im-
migration reform were dim following September 11 attacks); see also Hines supra note 1,
at 44 (noting that tragic events of September 11 stunned nation and decisively changed
its direction); One Year Later, supra note 6, at 1345 (noting that September Il attacks
permanently altered immigration debate); Events of September 11, supra note 6, at 1493
(noting that momentum toward more immigration-friendly climate was reversed in af-
termath of World Trade Center attacks).
391. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Signs of Movement on Migrants: Guest-Worker Plan
And Other Reforms On Hold Since 9/11 Are Gaining Support Again - But The President Ap-
pears Less Interested This Time, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at Al (noting that regardless of
economic conditions, low-wage jobs in certain U.S. industries remain unfilled); Who
Goes There, supra note 10, at 27-28 (noting that underlying economic facts that drive
migration have not changed since September 11).
392. See Simons, supra note 10, at 92-98 (noting that immigrant labor remains es-
sential to success of U.S. economy, despite recent downturn); see also Future Labor, supra
note 10, at I (noting that United States will have shortage of 35 million workers by 2030
despite recent short-term weakening of economy); Borrus, supra note 377, at 40-43
(noting that employers continued to clamor for low-wage Mexicans to work in restau-
rants, hotels, meatpacking plants, and construction despite U.S. slump); Alonso-
Zaldivar, supra note 391, at Al (reporting that business and labor still hoped for immi-
gration reform bill that would help fill low-end jobs in aftermath of September 11 th).
393. See Peter G. Gosselin, Economic Growth Slows Sharply: Gross Domestic Product Rose
At 0. 7% Pace Last Fall, Its Smallest Gain In Year, As Consumers Cut Spending A mid Job, Stock
And War Fears, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2003, at C1 (reporting limited growth in U.S. econ-
omy and weak labor market); see alsoJennifer Corbett Dooren et al., The Economy: New
Data Show Weak Creation Of Jobs, Production At Factories, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2002, at A2
(reporting weaknesses in job creation and factory production data); Michael E. Kanell,
Retailing Weakness Reflected In Jobs Data Weak Finish In December Leads To First Back-To-Back
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ers, who as a group are both aging and increasingly well edu-
cated,394 are unwilling to fill low-skilled vacancies.3 9 5 Accord-
ingly, industry leaders continued to push for immigration re-
form during this time. 96
After September 11, 2001, concerns about border security
became an essential element of anti-immigrant sentiment, de-
spite the fact that none of the nineteen hijackers involved in the
World Trade Center attacks entered the United States illegally
or as immigrants. 97 In fact, by some estimates, a system allowing
Mexican workers to enter the U.S. legally could free up
thousands of government personnel and save an estimated $3
billion a year, resources that might be diverted to fighting terror-
Yearly Declines Since 1957-58, ATL.J.-CoNsT.,Jan. 11, 2003, at F1 (reporting on weakened
state of U.S. economy).
394. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that U.S. workers are aging and be-
coming increasingly more educated); see also New Directions, supra note 208, at 1 (noting
that immigrants and their children will be needed to fund reffrement of Baby
Boomers); Future Labor, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that retirement of Baby Boom gen-
eration and improvements in medical technology will result in growing number of
older Americans); Essential Workers, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that reduction in total
size of U.S. workforce will occur as Baby Boomers retire); Education Level, supra note
225, at 1 (reporting that proportion of U.S. workers without high school diploma de-
clined from 24% in 1978 to 15% in 1998); Future Growth, supra note 10, at 3 (finding
that higher levels of high school completion and post-secondary education among na-
tive-born Americans has prompted these workers to seek out higher paying and less
physically demanding positions).
395. See Daniel T. Griswold, Mexican Workers Come Here to Work, Let Them, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 22, 2002, at A18 [hereinafter Griswold, Mexican Workers] (reporting on Labor
Department estimates that total number of U.S. jobs requiring only short-term training
will increase from 53.2 million in 2000 to 60.9 million by 2010); see also Simons, supra
note 10, at 92-98 (discussing importance of immigrant labor to success of U.S. econ-
omy, despite recent downturn). By 2008, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that
the United States will have a surplus of more than five million jobs, many of which will
require only high school education and minimal training. Id. See also Who Goes There,
supra note 10, at 27-28 (noting that basic economic factors that cause cross-border mi-
gration have remained the same since September 11).
396. See Griswold, Mexican Workers, supra note 395, at A18 (noting that business
leaders continued to press for change in U.S. immigration policy after September 11,
2001); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 391, at Al (reporting that business and labor
still hoped for immigration reform bill that would help fill low-end jobs in aftermath of
September 11); Borrus, supra note 377, at 40-43 (noting that employers continued to
seek low-wage Mexicans to work in restaurants, hotels, meatpacking plants, and con-
struction despite U.S. slump).
397. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 17 (noting that border security became pri-
mary concern after World Trade Center attacks); see also Hines, supra note 1, at 44-45
(discussing Congress' focus on increased border enforcement in aftermath of Septem-
ber 11th attacks).
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ism. 9 8 Even Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge has argued
that effective border security requires separating "high risk traf-
fic from low risk traffic. 3
99
Nonetheless, repeated efforts by President Fox to reignite
migration policy talks were until now largely unsuccessful.4"'
With the United States preoccupied with its global fight against
terrorism,4 1 Mexico's migration agenda took a backseat to con-
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.4 °2 Frustration over the inability to
reach a migration deal with the United States prompted Mexi-
can Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda to resign in January
398. See Griswold, Mexican Workers, supra note 395, at A18 (discussing potential
cost savings immigration reform could yield); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 391, at
Al (discussing how immigration reform would free up federal agents to focus their
efforts on individuals who pose potential threat to national security); MASSEv, supra note
18, at 118 (noting that since enactment of IRCA INS has spent $16.5 billion on border
enforcement to no effect). One reason why increased border enforcement has not
succeeded in stopping the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States is that many
illegal immigrants enter the country legally and then remain illegally by overstaying
their tourist visas. Griswold, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that many people who enter
United States illegally do so by overstaying their visas); see also Heller, supra note 28, at
202 (noting that 2.1 million of United States' estimated five million illegal immigrants
are non-immigrant overstays); Fraser, supra note 31, at 102 (noting that 40% of undocu-
mented immigrants illegally overstayed their authorized period of stay as tourists, busi-
ness visitors, or temporary residents); Frank Davies, Many INS Failures Found On Suspects,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 2002, at A27 (reporting that half of 48 Muslim extremists later
involved in terrorism who came into United States since 1993 entered illegally or over-
stayed their visas).
399. See Move Forward On U.S.-Mexico Migration Deal, ATL. J.-CONST, Dec. 9, 2002, at
A17 (describing U.S. Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge's support for border
control reform); see also Philip Shenon, Ridge Favors Status Short of Citizenship For Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A30 (noting that Ridge has expressed his sup-
port for legalization of some illegal immigrants for purposes of homeland security).
400. See generally Ginger Thompson & Tim Weiner, Mexico Struggles for the Attentions
of Preoccupied US., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at 4 (reporting decline of U.S.-Mexico
relations after September 11); see also Ginger Thompson, Mexico Leader Presses U.S. to
Resolve Migrants'Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at 12 (reporting that U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell urged patience on broad immigration reforms).
401. See Thompson & Weiner, supra note 400, at 4 (reporting that White House
has been fiercely focused on war on terrorism at expense of other issues); see also
Thompson, supra note 400, at 12 (reporting that Bush administration set aside immi-
gration talks to focus on national security and fighting terrorism); Patty Reinert, Mexico
Tugs On Bush's Arm: Fox Hopes US. Will Finally Focus On Immigration, Hous. CHRON., Oct.
26, 2002, at 27 (reporting terrorist attacks shifted America's focus away from Mexico).
402. See Kevin Sullivan & Glenn Kessler, Fox Says It's Time To Reopen Talks On Immi-
gration Concerns: Senior US. Delegation Gives Mexico No Signal of Action Soon, WASH. POST,
Nov. 27, 2002 (reporting that President Fox had little to show for his extensive efforts to
improve relations with United States); see also Thompson, supra note 400, at 12 (report-
ing that efforts by President Fox to restart negotiations on immigration reform were
met with reservations and pleas for patience by American officials).
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2003.403 Relations between the two countries also chilled after
President Fox cancelled a trip to the United States following the
Texas execution of a Mexican national4 4 and after Mexico with-
held its support for U.S. military action in Iraq.4 °5
Meanwhile, President Fox began to take the migration issue
quietly into his own hands.4 "6 In 2002, the Mexican government
started issuing consular identity cards to its citizens in the United
States as a way to assist immigrant workers in opening bank ac-
counts, obtaining driver's licenses, and facilitate other aspects of
day-to-day life in the United States.40 7 Lobbying efforts aimed at
getting local and state governments to accept the cards as valid
identification were largely successful.40 8 The U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, formerly the INS, has taken a neutral
403. See Gretchen Peters, Mexican Migration Moves Off Fast Track: Mexico's Foreign
Minister Quit Last Week Following Frustration Over Border Issues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 16, 2003, at 6 (reporting that Mexican Foreign MinisterJorge Castaneda resigned
in January 2003); see also Tim Weiner, Mexican Foreign Minister Quits: Critic of NAFFA
Replaces Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A3 (reporting on Mexican Foreign Minister
Jorge Castaneda's resignation and his disappointment in not reaching U.S.-Mexico mi-
gration deal).
404. See Marion Lloyd, For Mexico's Fox, Change in Plans: Political Move Seen In Can-
celed U.S. Trip, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2002, at A8 (reporting on U.S. refusal to halt
execution of Mexican national and President Fox's subsequent U.S. trip cancellation);
Karen DeYoung, Differing Agendas Chill Relationship Between Bush, Fox: Mexicans Cite Stall
On Border Issues, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2002, at A13 (reporting that President Fox can-
celled his U.S. visit after White House ignored his pleas not to execute Mexican na-
tional).
405. See Karen DeYoung & Colum Lynch, Bush Abandons Bid to Win U.N. Backing for
War: Failure to Garner Support Seen as Historic Setback for U.S. Diplomacy in International
Body, WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 2003, at A16 (reporting that Mexico questioned legality of
U.S. military action in Iraq); see also Hugh Dellios, Powell to Mexicans: Reform Will Be
Slow, Smoother Flow Of Immigrants Still U.S. Goal, He Says, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 2002, at 4
(discussing Bush Administration's displeasure with Mexico for not cooperating on Iraq
issue).
406. See T.R. Reid, Identifying Way To Help Mexicans Living In The U.S.: Acceptance Of
ID Card Is Spreading, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2002, at A3 (reporting that President Fox has
launched campaign to get consular identity cards accepted as valid for of identification
in United States); see also Eduardo Porter, Mexico Pushes ID for Migrants: Aim is To Inte-
grate Workers In U.S. Locales As Amnesty Founders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2002, at A2 (report-
ing issuance of Mexican consular identity cards to its citizens living in United States).
407. See Reid, supra note 406, at A3 (reporting on campaign to get Mexican consu-
lar identity cards recognized in United States); see also Porter, supra note 406, at A2
(reporting that Mexican consulates have begun to issue identification cards to its na-
tionals in United States).
408. See Susan Ferriss, Mexican ID opens Doors: Card Gives Immigrants Access to More
Services in the U.S., ATL. J.-CONST., Nov. 17, 2002, at B5 (noting that more than 800,000
cards have been issued, with 800 U.S. police departments, fifteen cities, twenty counties
in various states and thirteen states accepting cards as valid identification); see also Reid,
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position in regard to the cards,4 °9 noting that Mexico has the
right to issue them but that possession of a card does not indi-
cate an immigrant is in the United States legally.4" 0 Immigration
opponents have denounced the cards.4"' In the meantime, Mex-
ican workers continued to stream across the U.S border, with
migration levels rebounding to pre-September 11 levels just one
year after the attacks on the World Trade Center.4 12
d. Recent Developments
After a more than two-year hiatus, the Bush Administration
announced in January 2004 that it would renew its efforts to
push an immigration reform agenda.41 3 President Bush has re-
vived his proposal for a temporary foreign worker program that
promises to match "willing foreign workers with willing Ameri-
can employers. "414 The program aims to offer temporary legal
status to millions of undocumented workers now employed in
the United States and to those in foreign countries who seek to
participate in the program and have been offered employment
supra note 406, at A3 (reporting that more than eighty cities and about 600 police
departments had recognized consular identity cards in eight months).
409. See Porter, supra note 406, at A2 (stating that INS is officially neutral in regard
to cards); see also Reid, supra note 406, at A3 (noting that INS has not taken position on
cards).
410. See Porter, supra note 406, at A2 (reporting that Mexico has right to issue
consular ID cards); see also Reid, supra note 406, atA3 (reporting that consular ID cards
are not indication of whether immigrant has legal status in United States).
411. See Reid, supra note 406, at A3 (quoting Republican Congressman Tom Tan-
credo as calling cards "ploy" to keep illegals in United States); see also Seper, supra note
385, at Al (reporting that twelve lawmakers stated that card existed only for express
purpose of evading U.S. law).
412. See Jim Yardley, Mexicans' Bids to Enter U.S. Rebound to Pre-9/11 Levels, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at 24 (reporting that abrupt slowdown in illegal immigration from
Mexico after September 11 had ended); see also Jacob H. Fries, Business Of Human Smug-
gling Slowed Only Briefly After 9/11, DENy. PosT, Jan. 5, 2003, at A22 (discussing data
which indicates that number of illegal immigrants has bounced back to and possibly
surpassed pre-September 11 levels).
413. President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program, Remarks by the President
on Immigration Policy, White House Fact Sheet, Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/ [hereinafter Bush Proposal] (proposing U.S.
guest worker program); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9, at Al (reporting that
President Bush proposed new guest worker program for which illegal immigrants in
United States and prospective workers abroad would be eligible).
414. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (calling for guest worker program that matches
willing workers with willing employers); see also Del Olmo, supra note 25, at M5 (noting
that President Bush's proposed guest worker program seeks to link willing workers with
willing employers).
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in the United States.4 15 Temporary worker visas, which shall be
renewable, will be valid for three years.4 1 6
President Bush, however, has emphasized that the program
expects temporary workers to return permanently to their
homes after their period of work in the United States has ex-
pired.417 Moreover, the program does not purport to offer am-
nesty to existing undocumented workers, nor does it place tem-
porary immigrant workers on an automatic path to citizen-
ship.41 As an incentive for workers to return home, the
president's plan proposes that participants contribute a portion
of their earnings to a tax-preferred savings account, which they
can access after leaving the United States.4"
Under the Bush plan, temporary workers will have to apply
for green cards and citizenship under existing laws,4 20 with no
advantage over other applicants. 42 1 The Bush Administration
has expressed its desire to increase the total annual number of
green cards that can lead to citizenship, but has not indicated
415. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that both undocumented workers and
workers abroad would be eligible for guest worker program); see also Alonso-Zaldivar,
supra note 9 at Al (reporting that White House guest worker plan would be open to
both immigrants currently working in United States and those outside country).
416. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that temporary work visas would be valid
for three years); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9, at Al (reporting that President
Bush's guest worker proposal would grant three-year permits to participants).
417. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that guest workers must return home
when work permit expires); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9, at Al (reporting that
under President Bush's proposed guest worker plan most participants would be ex-
pected to go home eventually).
418. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that guest workers would not be eligible
for U.S. citizenship automatically); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9, at Al (report-
ing that President Bush opposes immigration amnesty and that program would not
guarantee of green cards or U.S. citizenship).
419. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that guest workers would be able to
place U.S. earnings into tax-deferred savings accounts); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra
note 9, at Al (reporting that President Bush proposed tax-free savings accounts that
guest workers could cash out when they returned home). U.S. Social Security taxes
would be credited to workers under their home countries' retirement systems. Id.
420. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that temporary workers will have to ap-
ply for green cards and citizenship under existing legal framework); see also Alonso-
Zaldivar, supra note 9, at Al (reporting that legalization under President Bush's guest
worker plan would occur under existing green card scheme but noting that U.S. presi-
dent planned to ask for increase in total number of green cards).
421. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting that guest workers will not receive prior-
ity over current applicants for U.S. citizenship); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9, at
Al (reporting on President Bush's statement that undocumented immigrants would
not be rewarded for violating U.S. immigration laws).
2004] AMERICA'S DE FACTO GUEST WORKERS 1647
how many more green cards could be issued in the future.422
President Bush's latest proposal has met with notable oppo-
sition on both ends of the political spectrum.423 Conservative
opponents of the Bush plan have asserted that the White House
proposal is little more than an amnesty program that rewards
illegal behavior.4 24 Conversely, labor leaders, civil rights activists,
and immigrant rights advocates have criticized the plan as both
exploitative and impractical.425
These critics claim that the president's plan will lead to even
greater exploitation of immigrant laborers because temporary
workers will fail to report employer abuses out of fear of losing
their employer-sponsored work permits. 426 Moreover, critics ar-
gue that tying temporary work visas to a single employer will not
benefit the masses of immigrant laborers currently in the United
States who work in the "informal" sector of the economy or who
work for multiple employers for short periods of time.4 27 Many
422. Bush Proposal, supra note 413 (noting possibility of increasing total number of
green cards available in United States); see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9, at Al
(reporting that Bush administration planned to ask Congress for increase in number of
green cards for those seeking to work in United States).
423. See Washington, supra note 25, at Al (noting that many conservatives do not
support president's immigration plan); see also Del Olmo, supra note 25, at M5 (noting
that many Republicans, including key members of Congress, oppose Bush's immigra-
tion reform proposal); Bumiller, supra note 25, at Al (noting conservative Republicans'
opposition to immigration reform); Fine, supra note 25, at L.1 (noting that Bush's
immigration proposals will give too much power to employers); Wood, supra note 25, at
1 (reporting on labor expert's statement that Bush's plan gives employers opportunity
to exploit immigrant workers to even greater degree).
424. See Washington, supra note 25, at Al (discussing negative impact of presi-
dent's immigration plan on some of his conservative supporters); see also Del Olmo,
supra note 25, at M5 (noting that some Republican Members of Congress do not sup-
port President Bush's immigration reform proposal); Bumiller, supra note 25, at Al
(noting some conservative Republicans' opposition to immigration reform).
425. See Fine, supra note 25, at LII (reporting that White House immigration pro-
posals will give too much power to businesses); Wood, supra note 25, at 1 (reporting on
labor expert's concerns that White House plan will lead to greater exploitation of immi-
grant workers).
426. SeeT. Shawn Taylor, Critics Bash Work-Visa Proposal, CHi. TRIB.,Jan. 13, 2004, at
4 (discussing labor leader's comments that White House proposal will not strengthen
wage or benefit protections for immigrant workers); see also Fine, supra note 25, at LII
(reporting that President Bush's immigration proposals will leave companies that em-
ploy immigrant workers with too much power); Wood, supra note 25, at I (reporting
that labor expert stated that Bush's plan gives makes it too easy for employers to exploit
immigrant workers).
427. See Fine, supra note 25, at Lll (noting that many immigrants have little to
gain from U.S. president's temporary worker program); Taylor, supra note 426, at 4
(explaining that immigrants in informal sector will not benefit from Bush plan because
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illegal immigrants are employed as day laborers,4 28 construction
workers, nannies, gardeners, and domestic workers.4 2 9 Many
others work for subcontractors, 430 and a large number are paid
in cash by employers that do not report their employees' in-
come.4 31 It is doubtful, say critics, that these immigrants' em-
ployers will apply to sponsor them for temporary work visas.112
Although President Bush has asserted that temporary work
visas should be renewable, he has made it plain that renewals will
be finite. 43 3 Accordingly, critics also have argued that long-term
immigrants have no incentive to register for the temporary work
program because they risk deportation once their permit ex-
pires.43 4 Many illegal immigrants will be unwilling to reveal their
they would not be able to attain guest worker status because they do not work for com-
panies that could sponsor their visas).
428. See Brian Grow, Day's Pay For Day's Work - Maybe: Outsourcing Means Explosion
In Casual Labor. But It's Largely Unregulated World, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 2003, at 100 (report-
ing that United States has several million day laborers, most of whom are illegal immi-
grants, homeless, or poor); see also Evan Perez & Carlos Tejada, Economic Slowdown
Leaves Immigrant Day Laborers High and Dry: Idle and Strapped, Many Talk Of Giving Up,
Going Home, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2001, at BI (reporting that many day laborers are
undocumented immigrants).
429. See Fine, supra note 25, at LlI (noting that undocumented workers are em-
ployed in variety of different sectors, many of which are informal); Wood, supra note
25, at I (noting that illegal immigrants dominate janitorial, restaurant, construction,
and landscaping jobs); Fraser, supra note 31, at 101-02 (noting that immigrants are
concentrated in low-skill, low-wage sectors, such as agricultural production, garment
manufacturing, food processing, meatpacking, poultry processing, food service, hotels/
motels, landscaping and construction); HAus, supra note 205, at 66 (noting that un-
documented workers are concentrated in service sector and agriculture).
430. See Fine, supra note 25, at Ll (noting that many undocumented workers are
employed as subcontractors); see, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Middlemen In The Low-Wage
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at 4.10 (explaining how U.S. companies circumvent
law prohibiting employment of illegal immigrants by hiring independent contractors).
431. See Fine, supra note 25, at L1I (stating that many employers do not report
income of their immigrant employees). But see Mary Beth Sheridan, Illegal Immigrants
Paying Dues With Taxes: Workers May Be Contributing Billions, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 15,
2001, at 3 (noting that many illegal immigrants receive paychecks from their employers
who deduct taxes from their wages).
432. See Fine, supra note 25, at LI (noting that many employers will be reluctant
to sponsor immigrants for guest worker visas); see also Steven Greenhouse, Business
Cheers Bush's Plan To Hire Immigrants More Easily, But Labor Is Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2004, at Al (noting that Bush's guest worker program is geared toward larger busi-
nesses rather than small or individual employers).
433. See Bush Proposal, supra note 413; see also Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 9 at Al
(reporting on President Bush's statement that three-year guest worker permits would be
renewable at least once).
434. See Taylor, supra note 426, at 4 (noting that undocumented immigrants will
not register for U.S. President George Bush's temporary worker program because they
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identities to the U.S. government to acquire a temporary work
visa if it increases their chance of deportation over the long
run.
43 5
Accordingly, some lawmakers have introduced their own im-
migration reform plans.436 The Border Security and Immigra-
tion Improvement Act, introduced by Republican Senator John
McCain (R-AZ) and Republican Congressmen Jim Kolbe (R-AZ)
and Jeff Flake (R-AZ) in the summer of 2003, contains a provi-
sion for temporary worker visasj 7 but maintains that guest
worker visas must be flexible, enabling participants to switch em-
ployers and acquire U.S. citizenship over time.43 8 Similarly, a
more recent bipartisan proposal set forth by Senators Tom Das-
will be afraid of consequences of revealing identity to U.S. government); see also Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivir, Catch-22 Seen in Immigration Plan: Limited Supply of Green Cards May Keep
Illegal Immigrants From Applying For Status Under White House's Guest Worker Proposal, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A14 (quoting immigrant rights advocate who states that long-
term illegal immigrants are unlikely to apply for temporary work visas if they do not
lead to green cards); Bill Ong Hing, Legal Status: Amnesty or Deportation Trap?, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 9, 2004, at 17 (calling Bush plan immigration trap that will result in deporta-
tion of those that participate); Brown-Gort, supra note 196, at A13 (noting that it is
doubtful that many established immigrants will risk exposing themselves to authorities
under Bush plan).
435. See Taylor, supra note 426, at 4 (noting that many undocumented workers will
not want to reveal their identities or whereabouts to government officials); see also Fine,
supra note 25, at LII (discussing how fear of deportation will act as disincentive to
participate in temporary worker program).
436. Republican Senator John McCain and Republican Congressmen Jim Kolbe
and Jeff Flake have co-sponsored their own immigration reform plan. See The Border
Security and Immigration Improvement Act, S. 1461, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003) (calling
for guest worker program for which undocumented immigrants would be eligible); see
also Rachel L. Swarns, Republicans Put Immigration Laws Back on Political Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at A9 (reporting that Senator John McCain and Representatives
Jim Kolbe and Jeff Flake introduced bills that would grant permanent residenct status
to foreign workers who enter country legally and to illegal workers already in United
States). Democratic Senator Tom Daschle and Republican Chuck Hagel have also
sponsored their own immigration legislation. See Hagel Introduces Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform Legislation, Press Release From The Office Of U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel,
Jan. 21, 2004, available at http://hagel.senate.gov/Press/pressapp/releases/record.
cfm?id=217240 [hereinafter Hagel Release] (calling for immigration reform that in-
cluded proposal for guest worker visas); see also Helen Dewar, Two Senators Counter Bush
on Immigrants, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 2004, at A4 (reporting that Senators Daschle and
Hagel had introduced guest worker bill).
437. The Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act, supra note 436 (call-
ing for temporary worker visa program); see also Swans, supra note 436, at A9 (report-
ing that Senator McCain's immigration proposal includes provision for temporary
worker visas).
438. Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act, supra note 436 (support-
ing guest worker visa plan); see also Swarns, supra note 436, at A9 (reporting that under
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chle (D-SD) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) would allow illegal immi-
grants and their families to become "invested stakeholders" in
the United States, 39 putting them on track for permanent resi-
dence and eventual citizenship, if they meet certain criteria.4 40
Applicants would have to have lived in the United States for five
years and worked in the country for four years, including one
year after enactment of the bill.4"' They would have to pass na-
tional security and criminal background checks, pay federal
taxes, demonstrate knowledge of English and American civics,
and pay a $1,000 fine."' The Daschle-Hagel measure would ad-
mit new temporary workers from abroad but limit their number
to 350,000.11
3
For his part, Mexican President Vicente Fox has been sup-
portive of the Bush plan."'4 Although initially lukewarm, the
Mexican leader more recently has expressed his support for the
Arizona Republicans' proposal guest workers could earn permanent residence status
over time).
439. Hagel Release, supra note 436 (noting that Senators' proposed plan would al-
low illegal immigrants and families to become "invested stakeholders" in United States).
See also Dewar, supra note 436 (reporting that Daschle-Hagel proposal would allow ille-
gal immigrants and their families to become "invested stakeholders" in United States).
440. Hagel Release, supra note 436 (noting that Senators' proposal would make
guest workers eligible for U.S. permanent residency or citizenship under certain condi-
tions). See also Dewar, supra note 436 (reporting that Daschle-Hagel plan would put
immigrant guest workers on track to get permanent residence and citizenship if they
met certain requirements).
441. Hagel Release, supra note 436 (noting that applicants who lived in United
States for five years and worked in United States for one year would be eligible for
permanent residency). See also Dewar, supra note 436 (reporting that temporary work-
ers would be eligible for permanent residence after living in United States for five years
and working in United States for four years under Daschle-Hagel proposal).
442. Hagel Release, supra note 436 (noting that prospective guest workers would
have to demonstrate knowledge of English language and U.S. civics, pass national secur-
ity and criminal background checks, pay federal taxes and U.S. $1,000 fine to be eligi-
ble for program). See also Dewar, supra note 436 (reporting that temporary workers
would have to pass national security and criminal background checks, pay federal taxes,
demonstrate knowledge of English language and American civics, and pay U.S. $1,000
fine).
443. Hagel Release, supra note 436 (noting that Senators' plan would admit 350,000
temporary workers living outside United States). See also Dewar, supra note 436 (report-
ing that Daschle-Hagel measure would admit new temporary workers from abroad but
limit their number to 350,000).
444. See Washington, supra note 25, at A12 (noting that President Bush had con-
vinced President Fox to support his temporary worker plan); see also Bush, Fox Agree On
Immigration Plan, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2004, at 9 [hereinafter Bush, Fox Agree] (reporting
that President Fox wholeheartedly embraced Bush's guest worker proposal).
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initiative 44 5 and agreed to meet with President Bush at his Texas
ranch in March 2004.446 Although talk of immigration reform
did not loom large at the meeting, President Bush made a small
concession to the Mexican leader when he agreed to stop requir-
ing regular visitors from Mexico to be fingerprinted and photo-
graphed at the U.S. border.447
III: TOWARD A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION POLICY:
TRANSFORMING TEMPORARY WORKERS
INTO CITIZENS
The ghosts of Germany's Gastarbeiter have been ever present
in recent U.S. immigration history.448 Although none of the re-
forms of the past two decades formally involved temporary work-
ers, the unintended consequences of several U.S. immigrant pol-
icies should sound hauntingly familiar.449 Undoubtedly, the ex-
periences of Germany's Turkish guests and those of
undocumented Mexican workers in the United States are strik-
ingly similar, despite differences in the groups' legal status. 450
Germany's experience with its Gastarbeiter indicates that the
temporary migration of labor is an unattainable goal with unfa-
445. See Washington, supra note 25, at A12 (noting that President Bush won sup-
port President Fox's support for his plan); see also Bush, Fox Agree, supra note 444, at 9
(reporting that President Fox had decided to support President Bush's immigration
proposal).
446. See Bob Kemper, Fox Praises Bush Decision On Mexico Border Checks: Those With
Special Visas Wouldn't Be Photographed Or Fingerprinted, CHI. TRIB., Mar 7, 2004, at 7 (re-
porting on President Fox's March 2004 visit to President Bush's Crawford, TX ranch);
see also Mike Allen, Bush, Fox Settle Short-Term Visa Spat: Mexican Visitors Would Bypass
Being Photographed, Fingerprinted At Border, WASH. PosT, Mar. 7, 2004, at A9 (noting that
Mexican leader visited President Bush in United States in March 2004).
447. See Kemper, supra note 446, at 7 (reporting on President Bush's decision not
to fingerprint or photograph short-term visitors from Mexico); see also Allen, supra note
446, at A9 (reporting that Mexicans who come to United States regularly will not have
to be fingerprinted or photographed under new U.S. policy).
448. See supra notes 202-11, 229-36, 242-47, 248-99 and accompanying text (noting
that U.S. immigration policies of past twenty years have led to permanent settlement,
labor dependency, social stratification, and political extremism).
449. See supra notes 91-95, 202-11 and accompanying text (noting that German
and U.S. efforts to restrict immigration actually led to greater number of immigrants in
each country).
450. See supra notes 103-36, 235-36, 241-47 and accompanying text (noting that
Germany's Turks and Mexican immigrants in United States have both suffered from
discrimination and exploitation).
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vorable consequences.4"' First, immigrants inevitably settle.4 5 2
Second, the import of low-wage workers creates a dependency
on foreign labor.4 53 These effects undermine the primary pur-
pose behind guest worker policies: the ability to export unem-
ployment in less favorable economic times.4 54 Third, because of
the inability of policymakers to foresee long-term worker settle-
ment, Germany's temporary worker program yielded a variety of
social problems: ethnic stratification, juvenile delinquency, and
political extremism.455 Unable to ignore these effects, Germany
was forced to engage in a long and divisive political debate re-
garding the status of its foreign residents that has only in recent
years begun to resolve itself.4 56
The defacto guest worker policies45 7 instituted in the United
States over the past two decades have had similarly unfortunate
consequences.4 58 U.S. companies are dependent on foreign la-
bor, and immigrants, unable to improve their socioeconomic
standing without legal status, have become handy scapegoats for
all of society's ills.4 59 Attempts to reverse these trends through
restrictive measures have merely resulted in the long-term settle-
ment and marginalization of undocumented workers.4 6 °
451. See supra notes 98-136 and accompanying text (discussing adverse conse-
quences of Germany's guest worker program).
452. See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (explaining why Germany's
guest workers settled permanently).
453. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that Germany's guest
worker program led to dependency on foreign immigrant labor).
454. See supra notes 75, 84-93 and accompanying text (finding that Germany had
limited success in exporting its unemployment during national recessions).
455. See supra notes 103-36 and accompanying text (discussing social and political
marginalization of Turkish immigrants in Germany).
456. See supra notes 127-36, 178-83 and accompanying text (discussing immigra-
tion politics in Germany and noting that "foreigners issue" dominated German politics
for many years even after Gastarbeiter program was abandoned).
457. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting that United States has im-
plemented de facto guest worker program over last two decades).
458. See supra notes 202-11, 229-36, 242-47, 248-99 and accompanying text (noting
that U.S. immigration policies of past twenty years have led to permanent settlement,
labor dependency, social stratification, and political extremism).
459. See supra notes 229-36, 248-99 and accompanying text (discussing Germany's
dependency on immigrant labor and explaining how politicians have exploited immi-
gration issue).
460. See supra notes 202-11, 242-47 and accompanying text (discussing how U.S.
policies led to permanent settlement and consequent marginalization of undocu-
mented workers).
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A. Germany
1. The "Temporary" Worker Myth
The German case illustrates that temporary worker pro-
grams counter the rational and human inclinations of immi-
grants to advance their place in society and reunite with their
families.4 61 Indeed, many of the steps the German government
took to limit migration in fact led to increased settlement.4 62
The 1973 ban on the migration of non-EC workers caused a rise
in the number of foreigners, as they chose to make their homes
permanently in Germany rather than leave and be barred from
reentry.4 6 3 Similarly, after the German Minister of Labor pro-
scribed work permits for non-EC youths who entered the coun-
try after November 40, 1974, foreign youngsters rushed to enter
Germany to beat the deadline.464 A 1975 law limiting foreigners'
childcare benefits to those children living in Germany had a sim-
ilar effect.461 5 Rather than deprive dependents of precious eco-
nomic aid, immigrants sent for their children from Turkey, so
they could continue to qualify for the aid.466 Stricter limits on
spouses' right to work caused many foreigners to migrate to Ger-
many before the laws took effect.4 6 7
Efforts to encourage Turkish repatriation were similarly
doomed.4 68 Hoping to reduce the number of foreigners in its
midst, the Federal Republic passed the Gesetz zur Fdrderung der
Riickkehrbereitschaft von Auslcindern [Law to Support Foreigners'
461. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (noting that Turkish guest
workers sought to bring their families and provide for them in Germany).
462. See supra notes 91-93, 124-26 and accompanying text (noting that German
federal government's immigration policies actually encouraged settlement).
463. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing Germany's ban on
entries for non-EC workers and its effect on country's immigrant workers).
464. See supra note 124-26 and accompanying text (noting that 1974 ban on work
permits for foreigners caused juvenile delinquency among Turkish youngsters living in
Germany).
465. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (noting that ban prompted Turkish
families sent for their children because they did not want to lose government assis-
tance).
466. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing effects of ban on bene-
fits for children living outside of Germany).
467. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (noting that limits on spouses'
right to work caused many foreigners to migrate to Germany before laws took effect).
468. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that German government's
efforts to repatriate its guest workers largely failed).
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Willingness to Return] in 1983.469 The program was mul-
tifaceted, but had two primary financial components. 470 It of-
fered the immediate repayment of social security contributions
to non-EC foreigners on the condition that they leave Germany
immediately and not return or seek work in Germany in subse-
quent years. 4 7 1 The program also offered financial incentives in
the amount of DM 10,500 to foreign workers who had recently
been laid off and were willing to return home.4 7 2
Although as many as 247,000 foreign workers, primarily
from Turkey, Portugal, and Tunisia, left Germany in 1984, at
least one scholar has estimated that only 45,000 or so left purely
due to the government's return incentives. 4 7' At least one
scholar has argued that the return incentives may have played a
role in the timing of emigration, but not the decision to return
home itself.4 74 Indeed, the influx of foreigners picked up again
in 1985 and continued thereafter.4 7 5
2. The Politics of Marginalization
As is evident from the German case, as well as the exper-
iences of other countries that have implemented guest worker
programs, the temporary migration of laborers is an unrealistic
objective.476 Whatever their personal ambitions, immigrants in-
evitably settle in order to achieve economic gains, and their fam-
ilies eventually join them. 47 7 Consequently, it is vital that immi-
469. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that Gesetz zurFdrderung der
Rfickkehrbereitschaft von Ausldndern offered financial incentives to encourage foreigners
to leave Germany but it was mostly unsuccessful).
470. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing Gesetz zur Fdrderung der
Ruackkehrbereitschaft von Ausldndern and noting that foreigners were offered as much as
DM 10,500 to return home).
471. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that Germany's repatria-
tion law offered immediate payment of social security benefits to foreigners).
472. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that foreigners could re-
ceive DM 10,500 if they returned home).
473. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that only about 45,000 for-
eigners left purely due to government's repatriation incentives).
474. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that law prompted foreign-
ers to return home sooner than expected).
475. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that number of foreigners
in Germany increased during 1980s).
476. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that many guest worker pro-
grams have resulted in permanent settlement of their migrants).
477. See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text (noting that immigrant workers
almost inevitably settle in their host countries and send for their families to join them).
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grant-receiving countries make provisions for the long-term set-
tlement of their immigrants. 478 In Germany, the failure to do so
created a stratified society that facilitated xenophobia and politi-
cal extremism.479
Although some racial intolerance may be unavoidable, it
may be hindered.4 0 Foreign workers in Germany faced struc-
tural obstacles that made it impossible for them to integrate into
society as a whole. 41' Because they lived and worked separately
from natives, Turks were all the more seen as outsiders, and the
German government did little to suppress that view prior to the
1980s.4 8 2
In fact, German government's refusal to characterize Ger-
many as a multicultural or immigrant country validated anti-for-
eigner sentiment.483 Rather than tout the contributions foreign-
ers made to the success of Germany's post-War economy, many
German politicians focused on the pressures they claimed immi-
gration was having on the country's social services. 48 4 This fail-
ure to publicly recognize the contributions of foreign workers
was particularly ironic since immigrant workers occupied largely
the manual and unskilled jobs for which Germans themselves
refused to apply.485 Additionally, foreign workers had played an
important role in creating jobs and financing the welfare system
of which Germans were and continue to be so proud.486
Another problem with Germany's temporary worker pro-
478. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (noting that German govern-
ment's failure to provide for permanent settlement of immigrants led to social stratifica-
tion and political extremism in Germany).
479. See supra notes 103-29 and accompanying text (discussing xenophobia and
political extremism in Germany).
480. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that inclusion of foreigners
through citizenship can help reduce racial intolerance).
481. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (noting that foreign workers were
subject to sociocultural and economic disadvantages that made it difficult for them to
advance their position in German society).
482. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting that German federal gov-
ernment stepped up efforts to integrate foreigners after 1979).
483. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting that German leaders re-
fused to acknowledge that Germany has become multicultural society).
484. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that German politicians
blamed immigrants for straining country's public resources).
485. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that Germans were unwill-
ing to apply for jobs held by foreign migrants).
486. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing contributions foreign
immigrants have made to German economy).
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gram was its rigidity. Most Gastarbeiter work permits were linked
to specific companies, jobs, or regions, and in some cases, regu-
lations forbade foreigners from taking up residence in areas that
the government considered overpopulated.487 Inevitably, this
system created a two-tiered labor force, in which foreigners occu-
pied the least desirable, lowest-paying positions while indigenous
workers advanced to white collar careers.48 " Moreover, because
some work permits were geographical in nature, certain areas of
the country became disproportionately populated with foreign-
ers, leading some Germans to feel that their towns were being
"invaded" by outsiders. 48 9
Needless to say, these economic and regional divisions con-
tributed greatly to the country's social stratification and created
a dependency on foreign labor in many German industries.49
As foreigners began to dominate positions at the lowest tier of
the work force, Germans increasingly refused to apply for these
jobs, even in times of economic downturn. 491  Therefore, a na-
tive labor "shortage" existed in certain industries even when Ger-
man unemployment was high.49 2
Some economists have further criticized that the mass im-
port of cheap, foreign workers hindered the rationalization of
the German labor market.493 Rather than invest in new technol-
ogy and machinery, companies lowered costs by hiring immi-
grant workers.49 4 Over time, the availability of cheap (and politi-
cally immobilized) foreign labor also reduced incentives to im-
prove wages and working conditions.49 5
487. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that Germany's guest
worker permits restricted where and for whom foreigners could work).
488. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that foreign workers were
underrepresented in white collar industries).
489. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that geographically re-
stricted work permits led to disproportionate concentrations of immigrant communi-
ties in certain areas).
490. See supra notes 65, 103-36 and accompanying text (discussing problems of
social stratification and foreign labor dependency in Germany).
491. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that Germans were unwill-
ing to apply for jobs held by foreign migrants).
492. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing paradox of Germany's
"native" labor shortage).
493. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting possibility that companies
would have "rationalized" if cheap foreign labor were not available).
494. See supra note 69 and and accompanying text (noting that companies lowered
costs by hiring immigrant workers).
495. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that availability of cheap
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B. Recommendations For U.S Immigration Reform
In light of Germany's Gastarbeiter experiences, President
Bush's calls for a temporary worker program496 as an immigra-
tion panacea are somewhat ironic. Generations of Mexican so-
journers have settled in the United States,497 and the need for a
more long-run approach to immigration has never been more
evident.49 In contrast to the White House, many policymakers
agree that temporary worker visas should be part of a larger im-
migration framework.499 Among the most sensible solutions are
those that would elevate current immigrants (illegal immigrants)
to guest worker status, allowing them to "earn" citizenship over
time.5 °° Although critics bristle at the idea of another mass am-
nesty for undocumented workers,50 1 legalization may be the
most judicious way to reverse the adverse consequences of the
poorly thought-out reforms of recent years.50 2
1. Restoring Circular Migration
A primary goal of immigration reform should be to restore
the circular migration that existed between the U.S. and Mexico
prior to 1986. The experiences of both Germany and the
United States demonstrate that immigrants are more likely to
return to their countries of origin if they believe they will not be
cut off from future economic opportunities in their host coun-
tries. Measures restricting such access merely result in perma-
foreign labor reduced incentives for employers to improve wages and working condi-
tions).
496. See supra notes 413-22 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush's
guest worker proposals).
497. See supra notes 198-11 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why many
Mexican immigrants have settled permanently in United States).
498. See supra notes 334-54 and accompanying text (noting why need for immigra-
tion reform has become more urgent in recent years).
499. See supra notes 367-73 and accompanying text (noting that Democrats, among
others, have proposed guest worker programs in conjunction with other immigration
reforms).
500. See supra notes 366, 371 and accompanying text (discussing proposals that
would allow illegal immigrants to earn citizenship over time).
501. See supra notes 374-77 and accompanying text (noting that many politicians
oppose legalizaton of undocumented workers).
502. See supra notes 202-11, 297-99, and 341-41 and accompanying text (noting
that IRCA and IIRIRA had adverse effects on many immigrants).
503. See supra notes 91-95, 202-11 and accompanying text (noting that immigrants
in both Germany and United States settled permanently after their options of returning
freely to their host country were reduced).
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nent settlement.50 4
Some immigrants undoubtedly will become permanent set-
tlers regardless of opportunities to return.50 5 But at minimum
these numbers could be largely reduced to those who genuinely
want to build a life in the United States, rather than those feel-
ing trapped by an unfair immigration system. Moreover, given
changing demographics in both the United States and Mexico,
such settlement should not be a cause for alarm. For one, the
United States needs these immigrants to sustain its economy, as
Americans workers grow older, become more educated, and are
increasingly unwilling or unable to take on low-skilled posi-
tions.50 6 Secondly, demographic shifts in Mexico reveal that cur-
rent migration trends are not without end. As Mexicans them-
selves age, the cohort of immigrants seeking work across the bor-
der is expected to decline.50 7
2. Reducing Labor Dependency and Improving Social Status
Although the current dependency on foreign labor is in
large part related to demographics, the status quo cannot con-
tinue indefinitely at the expense of investments in fixed capital.
A major criticism of Germany's Gastarbeiter program was that the
wide availability of cheap, foreign labor provided a disincentive
for companies to increase productivity by investing in new tech-
nologies. °
The best way to keep U.S. companies competitive is to put
immigrant laborers on par with native workers. No longer wor-
ried about jeopardizing their legal status, immigrants are more
likely to assert workplace rights. 50 9 They are more likely to shop
around for better wages and less likely to stay atjobs when condi-
504. See supra notes 91-95, 202-11 and accompanying text (discussing failed efforts
in United States and Germany to reduce immigration).
505. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (noting that some immigrants
inevitably become permanent settlers).
506. See supra notes 221-32 and accompanying text (noting that many U.S.jobs will
remain unfilled because of changing U.S. demographics).
507. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (discussing changing
demographics of Mexican population).
508. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that some critics felt that
Germany's guest worker program prevented rationalization of industry).
509. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (noting that immigrant workers
presently are afraid to assert their workplace rights for fear that they will jeapordize
their legal status).
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tions are poor.5 '0 As a result, employers will be forced to offer
more competitive wages to attract workers and make more effi-
cient decisions about when to invest in fixed, as opposed to
human, capital. 51' Finally, this approach should put to rest argu-
ments that immigrants take jobs away from natives because im-
migrants are willing to work for less than citizens.512
3. Promoting Citizenship and Eliminating
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Putting immigrants on par with natives by providing them a
path to citizenship has multiple advantages. Recent U.S. history
suggests that immigrants are more likely to invest in their own
socioeconomic wellbeing when their legal status appears more
secure. 513 In contrast, immigrants fail to take advantage of pub-
lic programs meant to ease their socioeconomic advancement
when their status is precarious. 514 Because U.S. anti-immigrant
sentiment in the recent past has been rooted in the perception
that immigrants drain public resources, 51 5 encouraging immi-
grants to help themselves is an important step in fighting
prejudice. 16
Citizenship appears to be the best incentive for such social
and economic mobility, in no small part because it also reduces
feelings of alienation among immigrants. 51 7 The German expe-
rience reveals that long-term residence permits alone failed to
decrease feelings of exclusion and insecurity among Turkish im-
510. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text (discussing poor working con-
ditions with which many illegal immigrants must contend).
511. See supra notes 243-47, 324, 380 and accompanying text (discussing current
immigrant wages and noting that wages of of Mexican immigrants could increase by as
much as 20% if they were legalized).
512. See supra note 14-15 and accompanying text (addressing argument that immi-
grants take away jobs from U.S. workers).
513. See supra notes 318-23 and accompanying text (noting that many immigrants
learned new skills after acquiring U.S. citizenship under IRCA).
514. See supra notes 309, 313, 317 and accompanying text (noting that immigrants
are afraid to apply for public benefits if they believe it will endanger their legal status in
United States).
515. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. politicians have
blamed immigrants for straining public resources).
516. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (noting that after passage of IRCA
immigrants made efforts to improve their skill sets).
517. See supra notes 151, 159-62, 314-16 and accompanying text (discussing how
lack of citizenship and reductions in public assistance cause immigrants to feel increas-
ingly alienated from State).
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migrants and their families, so much so that some of them did
not choose to naturalize even when they had the chance.5"'
Children of Turkish Gastarbeiter, lacking a legal "place" in soci-
ety, frequently expressed feelings of bitterness and insecurity
and often compensated for their isolation by joining nationalist
groups or militant street gangs.f 9
Children born to immigrants in the United States are guar-
anteed citizenship, but this does not mean they are free of the
risks of isolation or marginalization.52 ° Studies show that U.S.
immigrants often neglect to apply for public benefits for their
eligible citizen children, indicating that the fates of immigrants
and their children are intertwined. 51 1 Accordingly, lawmakers
must ensure that immigrant families, not just immigrant chil-
dren, are naturalized.
Granting legal status to undocumented workers is not
enough, however. Lawmakers must do a betterjob of protecting
immigrants and highlighting their economic contributions to
the public at large. The current hypocrisy of condemning illegal
immigration while at the same time turning a blind eye to corpo-
rate abuse of undocumented workers cannot continue.5 2 2 Fortu-
nately, the growing political power of the U.S. Latino community
ensures that politicians are increasingly likely to pay heed to the
plight of immigrants in this country.5 23 But recent polls signify-
ing renewed anti-immigrant sentiments demonstrate that the po-
litical divisiveness of the 1990s could easily be revived.5 2 4
Ultimately, granting legal status, and eventually citizenship,
518. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (noting that low naturalization
rates among Turkish nationals residing in Germany reflected allegiances to their coun-
try of origin).
519. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text (discussing stigmatization of
Turkish youths in Germany and their participation in street gangs).
520. See supra notes 305-06, 309-17 and accompanying text (discussing plight of
immigrant children in United States).
521. See supra notes 309-17 and accompanying text (explaining that citizen parents
frequently fail to apply for public benefits for their citizen children).
522. See supra notes 235-36, 241-47 and accompanying text (noting that sanctions
against employers hiring illegal immigrants have been ineffective and that many em-
ployers exploit undocumented workers).
523. See supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text (discussing growing political
power of Latino voters in United States).
524. See supra note 383 and accompanying text (discussing recent poll results that
indicate anti-immigrant sentiments could be on rise in United States).
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to immigrant workers is also the appropriate moral choice.525
The United States is a liberal democracy that prides itself on a
tradition of immigration, hard work, and social mobility. By tak-
ing advantage of the labor immigrants provide without granting
them the benefits of the political process, the United States re-
mains untrue to its liberal democratic tradition.
4. Increasing Security
Finally, no post-September 11 th analysis is complete without
a discussion of security. Although the Mexican border poses lit-
tle threat in terms of terrorism, the U.S. government spends
U.S.$3 billion annually to protect it.526 Yet the majority of peo-
ple who enter the United States illegally do so by overstaying
legally obtained (tourist or student) visas.5 27 This was the fa-
vored immigration strategy of the terrorists responsible for at-
tacking the World Trade Center in 2001.528
By granting undocumented workers from Mexico perma-
nent legal status, the resources expended on border control
could be diverted to other, more urgent, immigration matters.
Moreover, equipped with legal channels to enter the country,
immigrants would have little need for the criminals who cur-
rently provide them with fraudulent travel documents and smug-
gling services.52 9 Presumably, these underground markets would
in large part collapse, making life easier for law enforcement of-
ficials and more difficult for those trying to enter the United
States for activities other than an honest day's work.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of Germany's Gastarbeiter policies and recent
U.S. immigration reforms reveals that the U.S. has implemented
525. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (noting that democracy's legiti-
macy is undermined when it excludes its foreign residents from public decision-making
process).
526. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing how much U.S. govern-
ment spends to enforce U.S.-Mexico border).
527. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (noting that most people who stay
United States illegally do so by overstaying their legally acquired visas).
528. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (noting that many foreign ter-
rorists, including those responsible for World Trade Center attacks, overstayed their
U.S. visas).
529. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (noting that Mexican immi-
grants presently rely heavily on smugglers to cross U.S.-Mexico border).
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a de facto guest worker program in the past two decades, with
comparable unintended and adverse results. Reforms aimed at
restricting immigration have instead encouraged the permanent
settlement of Mexican immigrants. The exclusion of undocu-
mented workers from public assistance programs and their in-
ability to enforce workplace rights have limited immigrants' so-
cioeconomic mobility, which has, in turn, led to anti-immigrant
sentiments among the public at large.
A comprehensive immigration reform plan that legally rec-
ognizes the economic contributions of Mexican immigrants, not
a temporary worker program, is most judicious means of curing
these trends. A policy that ultimately grants citizenship to Mexi-
can workers could restore the circular migration patterns of the
past, reduce foreign labor dependencies, and limit social stratifi-
cation and political divisiveness. Such a policy is also consistent
with this country's liberal democratic values and could help allay
recent national security concerns.
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